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
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THE BEQUEST OF  
CHARLES SUMNER, LL. D.,  
OF BOSTON,  
(Class of 1830).

Received 28 April, 1874.













ON

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# THE DESIGNS

OF

# RUSSIA.

BY

*Sir George*

LIEUT.-COLONEL DE LACY EVANS.

1



LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

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TO

**GENERAL LORD HILL,**

*COMMANDER OF HIS MAJESTY'S MILITARY FORCES,*

THE FOLLOWING ESSAY

IS INSCRIBED BY THE AUTHOR.



## INTRODUCTION.

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IF any useful purpose be attained, or the public service be in the slightest degree promoted, by the following pages, very little apology need be offered for the attempt I have made ;—if not, none ought to stand me in stead.

My object has been to select and examine,—by means of as diligent a research as the time would admit of,—the leading facts which bear upon the matter under consideration. Whether the inferences to be drawn from them shall coincide with the policy intended to be pursued by his Majesty's government, is of course, beyond my humble opportunities of knowing ;—but I am by no means unsanguine in the hope, that such may, in effect, prove to be the case.

With reference to the motives in which the invasion of the Turkish dominions may have originated, I would, ONCE FOR ALL, make one observation, namely—that, though territorial or political

aggrandisement should, in reality, have been totally foreign to the previous contemplation of the Russian cabinet,—*still the question remains* as to whether the consequences likely to ensue, may not be the same as if such views had been actually entertained—should the Porte be induced (from whatever cause) to provoke or give pretext for a continuance of this unequal contest.

Sensible of the almost universality of the interests involved in the subject, I am quite conscious of the responsibility incurred in entering upon it.

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### SUMMARY OF EVENTS.

THE Grecian revolt may be regarded as the first tangible occurrence in the more recent portion of the great political drama now approaching a *dénouement* in the south-east of Europe. It was prepared from within the Russian frontier, and, —there is fair ground to assume,—not without the knowledge of some of the Russian authorities. From that point,—to the installation of Count Capo d'Istria as President,—there has been a series of events, many of which will be but too fresh in the memory of the reader.

The Morea, Attica, and the Archipelago, whither the insurrection quickly spread, and where alone it gained head, may average a distance of about a thousand miles from the dominions of the Autocrat. No sooner, however, were the flames of rebellion (if it can be so termed) against the Ottoman authority lit up within those remote territories, than occasion seems to have been conceived for augmenting the armies of the Pruth and Dniestre.

The savage outrages thenceforward so frequently perpetrated by the Turks—the more than suspicion

entertained by the Porte relative to the sinister intentions and conduct of Russia,—and the loud and peremptory tone of reclamation adopted by the latter,—now tended to exasperate more than ever the ancient and multiplied causes of discordance existing between those neighbouring states.

A general anxiety gradually arose in Europe to bring this afflicting civil war of extermination to a close. The Cabinets of France and England, readily falling in with this popular sentiment, interposed—ostensibly, rather on the ground of the piracies and hinderances to commerce which had ensued,—but far more probably actuated by considerations of the danger to be apprehended from leaving Russia to pursue an unobserved or unrestricted course in the transaction. And this latter most indispensable precaution was, we can hardly doubt, the real originating cause both of the Protocol of 1826, and the tripartite Treaty of 1827.

At length, the indomitable pertinacity of the Porte, in resisting the mediation of the allies, led to the withdrawal of their ambassadors.

A Manifesto, or Firman, was then circulated to the superior vassals of the Sultan, which boasts of having negotiated only to gain time,—declares the sword to be, in all likelihood, the only resort,—and

summons the whole mass of the Mussulman people to prepare to arm.

Bad faith, and monstrous impolicy, are the leading characteristics of this document. Nevertheless, it contains some very grave, and—there are ample data on which to presume—not unfounded imputations against Russia; which, if dwelt on and substantiated with any tact, must have gone far to place the proceedings of the Northern Court in a very unfavourable point of view.

There can be very little doubt but that the fomenting of various conspiracies amongst the subjects\* of the Porte, could easily have been traced: and no less so, that this procedure is not only subversive of the first principles of international law, but vitiatory of every complaint emanating from a power that could permit to itself the employment of any such means.

\* “Being anxious, for the last fifty or sixty years, to put in execution her culpable projects,” &c.—and again, “Russia did not stop there. The military reforms that had been adopted by the Sublime Porte gave umbrage to her. She felt that this organization might one day or other cause all the evils to fall back on herself, which had been prepared for Islamism. From that moment she resolved not to give any respite to the Mussulmans,” &c. *It is confidently stated, that considerable incendiary supplies have been distributed to the Janissaries from the north of the Pruth.*

But the Turks are themselves too obtuse on the score of justice, and too familiarly in the habit of violating every species of right, to anticipate probably any advantage from unmasking an unwarrantable or disingenuous line of conduct. Besides, the Hatti-Sheriff does not appear to have been addressed to Foreign Courts\*.

But be this as it may, never had Russia so excellent a plea for an appeal to arms; an alternative for which she appears to have been most fully prepared; since, at no former time, had the amount and organization of her armies reached to anything near so formidable a height.

Credit, it appears, is claimed on account of her not having resorted to war at an earlier period, particularly in 1821; but there are several considerations that may have influenced—first—the postponement,—and, secondly, the selection of the recent period for executing this supposed long-meditated attack. For instance, the essential enhancement of the Russian means of aggression, both financial and military, during the last six years;—the abject condition to which Persia has been so opportunely reduced;—but, above all, the

\* Since writing the above, a detailed answer to the Russian Manifesto has been published by the Porte.

severe shocks and instability to which the two cabinets, from whom obstruction was most to be apprehended, had been just then almost coevally exposed.

Having conquered, as Russia has done, the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman states, she can never be at a loss for plausible, if not unanswerable, pretexts for engaging in hostilities whenever it shall perfectly accord with her position to do so. These have been now elaborately imbodyed, and sent forth to the world in justification of the war.

But it is the consequences, not the causes, of the quarrel, which mainly concern other governments. And here it is, that the Russian Declaration expresses itself in by far the most vague, unexplicit, and least satisfactory manner.

The whole expenses of the war, however extended in duration,—and the commercial or other losses of the Russians, for a series of years back, of whatever amount or description,—are, it is decisively announced, to be borne by the Sultan. The longer the contest, then, the more difficult it will be of adjustment. Nor is it to be inferred from the tenor of the passage alluded to, that the extent of this indefinite claim is to be subject to

the award of any impartial or neutral power: and if the sum required be a large one, how is the drained and attenuated exchequer of the Seraglio to defray it? And what are to be the consequences of non-payment? Are the provinces overrun by the Russian armies to be held till the stipulated debt of contribution be fully liquidated?

The inviolability, likewise, of the commerce of the Black Sea and of the passage of the Bosphorus, are declared to be a *sine qua non*;—the recurrence of such acts, also, as have given the Emperor a ground of war, is to be “for ever” provided against.

How is this inviolability to be established—this perpetual and unqualified security to be achieved,—while the Turks garrison the castles of the canal through which the commerce of Russia must pass,—while the revolting despotism of the Crescent goads and presses upon any portion of the co-religionists of the Russians?—At least while there is no sufficiently immediate countervailing check.

In short, the utmost possible latitude of construction clearly is reserved to the Czar. Nor is there, in regard to future pretensions of any sort,

one word or expression to be found in those state papers, which does not bear the stamp of being guardedly undefined and unbinding: and the Emperor declares that he will not lay down his arms, till these results (whatever they may be) are obtained.

Thus the matter stands—and Europe awaits with solicitude the issue.

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#### REVIEW OF TOPICS.

If the war now actually waging on the Danube should really lead, as many seem to apprehend, to the demolition of the Turkish empire, this—in itself, and separated from all collateral considerations—might be a source rather of congratulation than anxiety. A question, however, necessarily arises, as to the subsequent distribution of the territories as yet subject to the Ottoman power. If they went, or were likely to do so, to the formation of a new state, this, also, might perhaps be matter for satisfaction. But nothing whatever has transpired, which can lead the public to anticipate that any project of this sort has been in contemplation.

We are left, then, to infer, that, if any dismemberment takes place, the provinces thus becoming disposable are destined to be appropriated by one or more of the surrounding states.

Thus would new combinations originate, of more or less importance, and, of course, requiring the consideration of all the other governments. But even this might not be found, on due examination, to solicit any peculiar interference, provided at least the states so destined to be aggrandised were of an ordinary class.

Such, however, is not the actual probability. The accession of dominion, if any, appears but too likely to go to a power already too dominant;—whose general course of policy and accumulation of the means of aggression were even previously too preponderant for the repose of other states, and of a nature to endanger, as was generally supposed, that proximate degree of security and independence, which, for the maintenance of separate rights and the well-being of society, must ever continue, AS LONG AS NATIONS ARE ACCESSIBLE TO EACH OTHER—as long as a confederacy is deemed preferable to a single and universal dominion—to be the just, necessary, and common object of the general preservation.

The foregoing are amongst the considerations which have led to the drawing up of these pages, wherein it will chiefly be sought to ascertain,—

1. Whether,—it is not now OPTIONAL with Russia to overthrow the Turkish power in Europe within even the present year\*.

2. Whether,—the feasibility of this contingency may not demand, on our parts, a more serious attention, because of the severe terms recently imposed upon Persia, and the further important territorial loss † it has been obliged to submit to.

\* If the period, that elapses before a decisive blow be struck, shall turn out to be greater than is here supposed—this every military man knows may arise from the nature of the operations adopted by the invading army, rather than from the obstacles it will have had to surmount. The season for action may be said to continue till late in autumn,—with an interval, however, of some weeks in the middle or latter end of summer, during which no arduous operations can well be carried on, especially in the valley of the Danube, without calamitous results to the health of the troops. But this was formerly felt more severely than it might now probably be, from the deplorably inefficient state in which the Russian medical department then was.

† The district of Gocksca is barren and unfertile, but that of Erivan was one of the finest of the Persian empire. The former, however, was peculiarly desired because it commands a principal pass into the Shah's territories.

3. Whether,—if the Russians establish themselves on the Hellespont, it may not imminently endanger, *if not lead on*, to the loss of British India—British maritime ascendancy—and even, not impossibly, British connexion with Ireland.

4. *With reference to France :—*

We will suppose a space of fifteen years \* to pass over, during which nothing intervenes sufficiently important to alter materially the political combinations arising out of this *new territorial arrangement*. France may then have a population of about thirty-four or thirty-five millions. She will be then more commercial and industrious in her habits—she will be enabled to raise a greater revenue—but her debt, which has been as yet progressive, may very possibly reach three hundred millions sterling.

The *European* population of Russia is now estimated, on all hands, at about fifty millions†. Its

\* This will give Russia an interval between this and the next war, in which to prepare herself for another great onset, about similar to that which has elapsed between the opening of the present, and the termination of the past, one.

† The French empire, in 1812, previous to the invasion of Russia, counted forty-three millions of souls; including Holland and the German departments. There were, however

present annual advance is calculated at twelve hundred thousand\*, which gives, in fifteen years, eighteen millions. To these add five millions for Roumelia, Bulgaria, and the Principalities, which is no more than one-fifth of the population these luxuriantly fruitful provinces are capable, at no distant period, of supporting.

Thus will seventy-three millions, be then, at the lowest computation, the number of the Russian people, westward of the Volga. And this supposes that the Czar has, during all the intermediate period, abstained from carrying his arms into Anatolia, Thessaly, or Albania; although it is clear that, at least, a large part of Anatolia must, of necessity, be occupied, if only for defence.

The Russian finances will have increased in a yet more considerable ratio than those of France, by reason of the peculiarly advantageous outlet now about to be obtained for the rich products of the southern governments of the empire, and of the great impetus to industry this may be expected to afford.

besides, six millions and four hundred thousand in the kingdom of Italy, and one million and a half in the Illyrian provinces.

\* Dupin.

Now, if any cause of umbrage should spring up, and we can fancy many,—for instance, the clashing rivalry of their pretensions in Spain, Italy, the Levant, Egypt, &c.,—it will be for those whom it concerns to consider, while there is yet time to do so, *whether* the Rhine may then be counted on as a sufficient barrier against the columns advancing from Warsaw on the one side, and the higher Danube, or Servia\*, on the other, and corresponding in strength with the anticipated census above stated; aided also by, or propelling the armies of thirty or forty millions of Germans, whose feeble courts, and virtually captive sovereigns, will long previously have been thoroughly subdued to Russian influence, and chained down to follow in the wake of the Russian policy? I do not pretend to state whether France may, or may not, be enabled to overthrow this combination. But it appears distinctly demonstrable that, at the period pointed out, she may have to contend against a power wielding the resources of a

\* In the first coalition to which the late autocrat acceded, the main Russian army debouched from Galicia. With this, there co-operated two maritime armaments, which may be termed wings; the one disembarked at Naples, the other at Pomerania, the latter being destined to penetrate, in conjunction with the Swedes and English, to Hanover,

Russo-Germanic population, exceeding in amount one hundred millions. There is nothing chimerical in the supposition of operations on this extended scale ; similar, and yet greater, have taken place in our own time.

But even granting that the semi-barbarians of the north have no relish for the enjoyments afforded by France and Italy,—that the popular feeling has been untinged by the inflated accounts of the successful soldiery, who twice so prominently assisted in subverting the governments of those luxurious and inviting countries,—still, it cannot be denied, that if the Russian flag waves over the towers of Constantinople, the present influence of the autocrat, in the German Courts\* of every class, must not only be very decisively augmented, but will in a little time reign paramount along the shores of the Mediterranean, reducing that of France to comparative insignificance.

Toulon can never send forth the fleets that may

\* Already by political connexion, and by blood and marriage relationship, there are ample materials prepared for a Russo-Germanic Confederation, resembling that which was created by Buonaparte. The grand Duchy of Warsaw then formed the chief strength of French interest in Germany ;—that now is in the hands of Russia.

be prepared in the Marmora. That sea, the Asoph, and Euxine, will then be Russian lakes, pre-eminently adapted to make good seamen \*, whose shores, and those of the rivers that disembogue into them, abound in all the materials for a navy on the largest scale: the practicability of which has been already more than proved by the creation in the ports of the Crimea, under infinitely less favourable circumstances, of a considerable marine, comprising ships of one hundred and ten guns. There can be very little doubt that at Constantinople ships of war may be built †, fitted out, and provisioned, at about one-third of the expense necessary to be incurred at Toulon; and also at a far cheaper rate than at Sevastopol and Nicolief;—the materials at present required by the Russians in the Black Sea, being chiefly brought from the Baltic: which, in the event supposed, need no longer be the case.

But to return to the heads of topics,——

\* “Both possess (the Black Sea and the Asoph) that which renders them invaluable as a nursery for good seamen,” &c. &c.—JONES, (Captain, R. N.)

† For more ample information on this head, the reader is referred to Pallas, Leckie, Pasley, Eton and Jones,—but on maritime affairs, especially to the latter.

5. Whether,—though the future means of Russia be likely, under certain favourable contingencies, to become almost irresistible,—she may not at present be less invulnerable in reality than in appearance.

6. Whether,—she has not now become proportionably more formidable in offensive than defensive warfare.

7. Whether,—the invasions by Charles and Napoleon afford sufficient data to invalidate the affirmative of these queries.

8. Whether,—it is not still perfectly competent either to France or England, *separately*, to exhaust her means, and effectually paralyze her operations, especially on the southern and Asiatic frontiers, and even most probably force her, at least, to recoil on her own line:—although, after she gains possession of the entrances to the Black Sea, it should, perhaps, require a very onerous series of efforts on the part of both those powers, in conjunction, to restrain the other within any reasonable limitation of its pretensions.

9. Whether,—the sanguine expectations and expensive efforts of the Russians, relative to the appropriation, in a considerable degree, of the

British Eastern trade, and the supplying the German, Italian, and other markets, with Eastern produce, by land, from the Tigris to Trebisond,—and by water, from the Tartarian shore of the Caspian, to Taganrog,—may not be unlikely to be realized in great part—though certainly not in regard to heavy or voluminous articles of merchandise.

10. Whether,—there is ground to anticipate a dismemberment of the Russian empire, within such given period as may render a reliance on it safe, eligible, and politic.

11. Whether,—if suffered to proceed in her career, and to arrange without obstruction her materials of operation, this power may not shortly acquire a degree of intercourse with India that will *enable* her—1st, to disturb and disaffect the public mind of that country towards us; 2dly, to move (say thirty thousand men\*, exclusive of the maintenance of communications) from the Caspian and Aral as a base, and by the Oxus as a

\* “As to attack from abroad, the intention (says Lord Hastings) must be long previously discovered, so that India could not be found unprepared.” On this point, I would beg to direct the attention of the reader to a detailed note on the subject at the end of the volume.

principal line of communication, to the neighbourhood of Attock on the Indus, or into the Punjab,—there, perhaps, to take post during a period as a rallying point for the disaffected, or as a beacon for their encouragement and direction ;—whereby India must soon become either untenable to us ; or, from the excess of expenditure over receipts, resulting from this state of things, unworthy of further retention.

12. Whether,—the national debt has really increased in the ratio that is generally supposed ; whether it is a full and unveiled picture of the financial affairs of the country that is usually presented to the public through the medium of Parliament ;—and whether the existing condition of our resources really presents a due obstacle to the adoption of the measures, now by so many supposed to be requisite for the prospective security of the national interests.

The general bearing of these propositions will now be briefly entered on ; with such preliminary notices on collateral points as may seem necessary.

**BRITISH INDIAN POSSESSIONS.**

THOUGH nearly the whole of the Mogul empire, (besides several adjoining states that were not included in that sovereignty,) together with a far more extended and confirmed authority over the subjugated people than was ever possessed by the Mogul monarchs, have, within the last seventy or eighty years, been brought by some able and heroic men, under the dominion of the British crown,—still one may occasionally hear this splendid acquisition spoken of, as if its concerns were on a par with some petty insular or colonial dependency.

Whether any one may have hitherto happened to class it with Ireland, in the degree of its importance, I am not able to say; but a parallel may certainly be drawn in some respects.

It is true, that it is more distant from the superior state, and that we ought to retain our ascendancy for ages longer in the one than we can hope to do in the other. But, on the other hand, the area of British India is to that of Ireland in the proportion of twenty to one; the

population of fourteen to one; and the revenue\* in that of six to one: the value of commercial interchanges† is also, by several millions, greater, being, in fact, considerably beyond that of any other branch of our external commerce. The amount of property likewise (public‡ and private) annually transferred thence to the capital of

\* £24,000,000,—being far superior to the revenue of any other empire or state in the world—France and England excepted.

† The imports and exports to and from the East are now thirteen millions sterling annually; with no other country or dependency do they exceed ten millions. Besides the peculiarity of the former having doubled within the last ten or a dozen years; thus affording the most brilliant prospect of a yet further and progressive extension. This circumstance could not, of course, have been known to M. Say when he published his (in a degree) depreciatory essay of British India.

‡ The Marquess of Hastings states the average annual supplies from India to England (beyond those from England to India) between the years 1814 and 1822, to have been £1,323,814.

It is usual with all Eastern governments to reserve a cash balance in the treasuries, as a preparation for emergency. By the authority of the above-quoted Governor-General, the aggregate amount of this item in the coffers of the three presidencies, after defraying the regular expenditure, was, in 1821, £12,200,000.

The value of property remitted on private accounts from India to England is, of course, not easy to ascertain; but must be very considerable.

the English wealth, not falling short probably of the sum of Irish absentee money spent in this part of the United Kingdom—with this advantage, that the one is a clear addition, while the other is but an abstraction, and, perhaps, injuriously so, from one integral part of the state to another.

India enables us to keep on foot about thirty thousand British troops (King's or Company's) over and above our other forces; besides a highly disciplined native army of two or three hundred thousand men; both being maintained free of all expense to the home government;—being armed, equipped, and clothed also from England, thereby furnishing no inconsiderable item of employment to our manufacturing population.

It is commonly supposed that the Indian army is only available on the Ganges, and is not directly contributive to the British European defence. This is erroneous with respect to the past, and will, it may be hoped, prove still more so with respect to the future.

During the last war, we transported the Se-poys over distant seas, and triumphed with them at many thousand miles from their native soil—against the Dutch, for example, at Batavia—against the French at Bourbon, Mauritius, and

Egypt; and therefore on the borders of the Mediterranean.

And here it may be observed, that the known fact of so great and efficient a numerical force being at our disposal, cannot fail to enhance the high consideration of the British power in the opinion of mankind:—thus probably strengthening imperceptibly, though by no means unimportantly, our political weight and influence on many occasions, totally unconnected with Eastern affairs.

To these direct and collateral advantages, there may be added,—what is far from immaterial to a commercial and manufacturing nation,—the unlimited control of the mercantile concerns and markets, internal and maritime, of such immense and populous countries.

Finally,—as the precariousness of our tenure of India tends unavoidably to lessen its unequalled value as a possession, so—that very insecurity and sole source of depreciation are the strongest possible reasons for vigilance in regard to its protection. And in all such cases, there is a maxim, which can never, of course, be lost sight of with impunity,—namely, that the defence of dependencies, held by the sword rather than by the affections of the inhabitants, can only be advantageously made, in advance of their frontiers.

### PRESENT STATE OF THE OTTOMAN POWER.

To dilate on the well-known military and political infirmities of the Porte were now only a waste of time. The best,—perhaps the only, chance of safety that remained to it, as a nation, would have been to adopt without limitation the guidance of France and England.

The counsels so often earnestly tendered to the Divan by the representatives of those countries have been without avail. Whether the ill-success of these endeavours be most attributable to the extreme ignorance of the Turkish functionaries,—to the encouragement said to have been at one time held out by the Court of Vienna,—or to the intrigues and studied arrogance ascribed to the Russian envoy, Count Strogonoff,—were now a matter of unimportant inquiry.

By a return said to have just issued from the Grand Vizier's office, the army of the Sultan, regular and irregular, for garrisons and frontiers, amounts to one hundred and seventy-seven thousand men. Of these, eighty thousand only are stated to

be in the pay of the Porte, and consist of raw levies or reformed Janissaries, whom it has been endeavoured to drill after the European system. This half-organized force might overcome troops of an inferior order, but cannot be expected to confront, with effect, the sustained fire and combined movements of any tolerably constituted army.

The ninety-seven thousand irregulars are the armed followers of the tributary Pachas ; and these, particularly the Asiatic portion, are, generally speaking, a disorderly, ferocious, and intractable banditti, who repair to the standard of the Prophet partly under the cloak of religion, and partly in the hope of plunder.

By this statement,—forty-seven thousand are allotted for the defence of Asia ; sixty-two thousand five hundred for the Dardanelles, Bosphorus, the capital, and Adrianople ;—there would thus remain sixty-seven thousand five hundred, for the defence of the Balkan, Bulgaria, and the Danube. But this is the strength of the army on paper. And if we reduce the nominal force by at least one-third, or even one-half, we shall probably be much nearer the effective numbers.—Rapidly, too, will even this diminished strength decrease as the campaign advances.

The formation of an army according to the present scientific European system, is not the work of a day, and requires elements beyond the reach of the Othman chief.

The Russians have been more than a hundred years in making the one they now have; and even yet, although the whole energy, and almost every faculty of the empire, have been directed to the perfection of that single department or machine, it is deficient in an important ingredient, superior intelligence or mind. Numbers, docility, and hardiness, both as to enduring courage, and physical constitution, make up in a degree for this defect.

The Portuguese of the last war were good troops under British officers;—the Hindoos and Musselmauns of India are so, with the same assistance;—the Persians were so under Macedonian officers;—the Italians of the late kingdom of Italy were chiefly under French officers.

On the other hand, several years elapsed before the energetic and indefatigable Peter could enable his devoted and brave Muscovites to withstand the Swedes; although, on all occasions, immensely outnumbering them, and covered to the teeth with entrenchments,—to which he was obliged to resort, even up to Pultawa.

So also the Spaniards,—who are not inferior in manliness to any nation,—who are superior to most in constancy and fortitude,—and who, though actuated by the strongest feelings,—were yet, up to 1814, after six or seven years' experience, scarcely capable of meeting, in the open field, the youngest conscripts of France.

The Turkish cavalry, which in former times was the most brilliant and redoubtable portion of their armaments, still occasionally display a fiery individual valour; but they cannot break steadily formed squares. Their infantry was never good for much, except in skirmishing, or in the defence of walls or entrenchments. Their artillery is represented as still worse.

When the country attacked is not very extensive,—when the invading army has the means of supplying itself from without,—and there are some points and lines of imperative consequence to be held, a superior cavalry (even if that of the Ottomans were such) will not avail against a superior infantry and artillery. The Turkish empire in Europe falls, as a matter of course, if the lines of the Danube and Hemus, the passage of the Bosphorus, and the capital, are possessed by Russia. It is true, that the Ottomans will not probably

abandon their towns and fastnesses without a contest. But as they have no adequate idea of the use of fire, even with small arms, much less cannon,—nor any notion of the combinations requisite for rendering a general attack either in the field or against a fortress abortive,—their bravery on the breach can have no other effect in the present instance, than the effusion of blood. When they undergo a decisive defeat, it is well known to be a very difficult matter to rally them ; and they seldom, afterwards, make a firm stand in the field during the remainder of the campaign.

The occurrences which, during the last half century, intervened to prop the tottering fortunes of the Crescent, arose chiefly out of the mutual jealousies of the Christian powers,—and are as follow :—

Between 1788 and 1792, the Austro-Russians were completely successful, and the Turks reduced to the most deplorable weakness ;—but the victorious armies continued to besiege and storm towns, whether necessary to their line of operations or not,—instead of investing them, and marching on to the centre of resistance. This gave time for accident, or what is called accident, and for the interposition of other cabinets.

The Netherlands rebelled,—Joseph's attention

was thus called off,—the Hungarians became turbulent,—Joseph died,—Potemkin, Catherine's prime minister and generalissimo; died,—England, Holland, Prussia, Hanover, Sweden, Poland, which still existed, took the alarm, and resolved to interfere in an efficient manner. England prepared an armament for the Baltic;—Prussia moved one hundred and fifty thousand men towards the Imperial frontiers;—the Polish diet, instigated by Prussia, and, for the moment, under its protection, commenced the levy of a hundred thousand men;—Sweden, instigated by France, and subsidized by the Sultan, invaded Russia from the side of Finland,—the Swedish cannon shook the windows of the Czarina's palace;—St. Petersburg was completely uncovered, and must unquestionably have fallen into the hands of the Swedes, were it not for the disaffection previously sown amongst them by the Empress.

Catherine, thus embarrassed and pressed in other quarters, found it expedient to withdraw for a time from the South, in order to complete—(as an indispensable preliminary to the realization of her views in that direction)—the destruction of Poland.

She was then far advanced in years, and unavoidably much at a loss, on account of the sudden

demise of the able adviser, who had been so many years the sole depositary of her confidence. Subsequently, the settlement of the dismembered republic, and the affairs of France, unavoidably engaged her attention. In three or four years, she was ready, it appears, to recommence the attack upon Turkey;—but death, this time, interposed, and put an end to all this great woman's projects.

Neither was it the prowess of the Turks in 1807, as many suppose, but the victories of the French, that respited Selim:—as may be seen by the treaty of Tilsit, which stipulated for the relinquishment of the line of the Danube. At that time, the Ottomans were unable to muster thirty thousand men in the field. Under various pretexts, however, the Russians evaded the fulfilment of this stipulation, and kept their army in the Principalities, until they renewed the war in 1810.

In 1812, it was again Napoleon who saved the Crescent by advancing upon Moscow with the "grand army," that so soon after perished in the snows. Pressed by this immense host, the Czar now was compelled to relinquish the advanced positions in Turkey, which he had so long striven, both by negotiation and war, to maintain,—but not

without some equivalent,—consisting of the mouths of the Danube \*, Bessarabia, and part of Moldavia. The recollection of recent defeats, and the intercessions of the British and Swedish governments, disposed the Porte to this opportune arrangement,—which freed the Russian army of the Danube, and enabled it to move against the French line of communications in the north.

The Divan seeing, soon after, the desperate predicament in which their enemy was placed, was dissatisfied with the treaty, and accordingly the negotiators of it lost their heads.—Until the last part of this brief war, Count Kamenskoi commanded the Russians ; and it was generally supposed might have made much greater progress, having had originally one hundred and fifteen thousand men (counting recruits) under his orders. He engaged in tedious, unessential blockades or sieges ; occasionally cannonaded, skirmished, or engaged in sanguinary, but in their nature indecisive, affairs, about the camp of Choumla ; and, in fact, completely wasted the seasons of action, and ruined the army committed to his charge. It was

\* Including the fortresses of Ismaël, Kilia, Khotin, and Bender.

the same officer who resigned his command, with such strange abruptness, four years before in Poland. On the last occasion he was superseded by Kutusoff, who had scarcely enough of troops to occupy the line of the Danube. But he signally overthrew the Turks whenever they advanced, particularly under the walls of Rutchuk. One corps was entirely cut off, and surrendered; another, of sixty thousand men, was pursued for some miles, by twenty thousand Russians. The fact, however, was, that the object of the campaigns of 1810 and 1811, was in great part *not* of conquest, but almost exclusively to intimidate the Porte into favourable terms of peace, in order to extricate the army of the Danube, for the defence of the Niemen.

The superiority of the Russians now, to what they then were, is as much perhaps in other respects as numerically: and at present there is no Napoleon, either at Tilsit or on the Borytesnes, with four hundred thousand men, to operate as a diversion in favour of the Sultan.

Finally, in the war of 1806, the Russians brought into the field fifty-five thousand men; in that of 1810, one hundred and fifteen thousand;—

this force was, however, reduced in 1812 to sixty-five thousand \*. Between two and three hundred thousand are now reported to be in movement, in Asia and Europe.

The Turks in Europe may amount to two or three millions,—living in the midst of four or five millions of enslaved and disaffected Greeks or non-descripts. A rising *en masse*, in defence of their religion, may, it is thought by some, have the effect of checking the Russians; but, in the present advanced state of the military art,—however patriotically or fanatically inspired a people may be, they make but indifferent combatants when suddenly transformed from the shop-board or plough-tail to the ranks.

Nor is a popular or guerrilla warfare to be calculated on. The country in question is inhabited by two nations. A guerrilla war can never be carried on with effect by the minor against the greater number—especially if a foreign force comes to the aid of the more numerous: but if the minor party can maintain a regular army in the field, these desultory services may or may not be advantageous. There are eight or nine millions of Mahometans, and a million and a half of Chris-

\* Four divisions, out of nine, were withdrawn to the north.

tians in Asiatic Turkey: a country said to have contained, two centuries ago, fifty millions of people. This, under the rule of the Crescent, is improbable. Its area, however, is more than double that of France; in fecundity of soil it is superior,—and in picturesque beauty and classical interest, it almost rivals Italy and Greece. Geographers continue to represent this extensive region, as appertaining to the Ottoman empire: nominally, this may almost be correct, but that is all. Large tracts of the interior are entirely in a state of anarchy, being inhabited by tribes of rapacious plunderers by profession. In other parts there are great agas, or independent lords, who maintain considerable forces, and occasionally levy contributions on the neighbouring towns.

The greater pashaliks, especially the more distant ones, yield a mock rather than a real allegiance to the Sultan. The supplies or quotas of troops which they should furnish, are quite precarious, and always scanty in amount. Sometimes these distant tributaries enter into sham wars, either against each other, or some Arab chieftain,—in order to excuse themselves the more readily in disobeying the requisitions of the Porte. The

consequence of this state of things is, of course, a general devastation and frightfully increasing depopulation.

The funds and the regular sources of the revenue, if rapine on a large scale can be termed such, are supposed to be in a great degree dried-up. Confiscations and adulteration of the coin, are amongst the favorite resorts of Moslem financiers; but these are of the class of expedients which soon defeat themselves. The exhortation\* in the Hatti Sheriff, to serve without pay; and the proposed sequestration to the public use of the property of the black eunuchs of the palace, who are usually amongst the most influential men of the empire,—are very symptomatic of the wants of the Divan.

The marine, except, perhaps, that of Egypt, is and has for a long time been, virtually extinct.

\* “Let no one dream of a monthly pay or remuneration of any kind,—far from it, let us sacrifice both our persons and property,” &c. If this be to be the case, the Sultan would do well to create without delay what never before existed with a Turkish army,—a commissariat. Hitherto they have been supplied by a bazaar, which daily opens in the camp or bivouac; and if the soldier cannot pay in this ambulatory market for his food, the merchant will not follow the troops with his rice.

The mosque alone triumphs, but it is upon the ruins of the state. The Turk is unconscious that the desolating imposture of Mahomet, with which he now sanctifies his violence, was, at an earlier period, received by his own ancestors not in a very dissimilar way from the Saracen.

The high martial spirit, enthusiasm, and severe discipline, which once rendered the Crescent so formidable to Christendom, are gone. Fanaticism remains, and supports by an inferior impetus, a comparative degeneracy. And this cannot be more strongly evinced than by the lingering, the protracted, and languishing war of the Morea. The opinion, however, on this subject, of one of their own chief ministers of state, will be subjoined.

Of course, if the Ottoman power is now destined to fall, its ambitious neighbour will be the more immediate instrumental agent in the catastrophe. Nevertheless, this will be no more than an accelerating cause, inasmuch as others of a more inherent and remote origin exist,—namely, the unaltered character of the Islamite domination,—its implacable prejudices, with the consequently impolitic treatment of the subjugated people,—to which may be added, an essential incapability of

assimilating with Europe. A deadly and irreconcilable mutual hostility supervenes between the two occupants of the soil, leading, it would seem, unavoidably, (even without foreign interposition,) to the expulsion or extermination of one or the other.

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#### THE MOREA, ATTICA, &c.

THE advantages derivable to Russia, from the existing state of the Morea, as tending, possibly, to mask ulterior objects\* ; to mislead, it might even seem, the governments, and the liberal parties of Europe, by diverting attention from the progress of her real designs ; as adding to the enfeeblement of the Turks ; and as cutting them off from that strong and extensive Peninsula, including Macedon, Thessaly, &c., as a place of retreat for at least a part of their forces,—are all quite obvious.

The *de facto* independence of Greece, or at least

\* How is this protection of a republic in Greece, to be reconciled with gratuitously leading the van of a haughty crusade against limited but legitimate monarchy in Naples, Turin, and Madrid ? Either there is an extreme inconsistency, or the promotion of free institutions is not the true object in view. The fact is, *liberalism* enfeebles the Turkish power ; *ultraism* that of Italy, Spain, and Western Europe, generally.

of the unfortunate survivors in it, which, it may be feared, are now not numerous, is evidently within the easy accomplishment of any one of the parties to the triple alliance, by the employment of a very few thousand men, in support of the native bands, and by a really strict blockade. If this be to be done at all, the sooner the better for every one concerned, Russia alone excepted.

But as for the permanency of the Peloponnesian Republic, that must eventually depend upon other contingencies, as well as on the expulsion of the Egyptians. A really free, not to say republican institution, can no more endure within the vicinity of the Russian bayonets, than under the scimitar of the Turk.

Supposing that the embryo Presidentiary Government gains possession of its assumed territory, and thrives for a little time, which it assuredly will do, under the generous protection or even sufferance of the allied flag:—no sooner are the Muscovites within sight of the *Ægean*, than their party in the republic will be revived and insidiously fostered. Nicholas may then play over again, at his ease, the game of the crafty Philip of antique times. Nor will there be any Demosthenes at *Ægina* or *Napoli*, to hurl an invective to the *Dardanelles*.

Still, although all modern Europe mainly owes its civilization to the effulgent genius of this little territory, which has been now so long given up (perhaps somewhat ungratefully) to the unbridled fury of the barbarian,—it must nevertheless be acknowledged, that its emancipation is, at present, indispensably to be considered as quite of a secondary importance

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WALLACHIA, MOLDAVIA—OCCUPATION OF THEM,  
&c.

THE principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia rather exceed the superficial extent of England. By right of treaty, they are no more than tributary to the Porte: in effect, they have been abjectly enslaved and ruinously plundered, even, it is said, to a greater extent, and in a more systematically grievous manner, than any other of the Turkish territories.

The staple productions of these provinces consist of wheat, oxen, sheep, and horses. The unconscionable agents of the Sultan reserve to themselves not only large supplies in kind, but

the exclusive privilege also of purchasing any surplus quantity of those valuable commodities nearly *at their own price*, which, as may be supposed, is not a “remunerating” one—a grinding system, justified on the pretence of some ancient regulation relative to the supply of the capital.

Thus the population has dwindled to about nine hundred thousand ; which, under any tolerable species of government, might, it is stated, be at least fifteen millions \*,—so rich and various are the produce. The existence of mines of a superior promise along the Wallachian side of the Carpatian range, is perfectly ascertained ; but the inhabitants have hitherto carefully abstained from any attempts of exploring or working them, under a conviction that it could only furnish an additional stimulant to exactions and extortion.

No one, it may be presumed, can now doubt, that it is the settled purpose of Russia to appropriate these fine districts on the first favourable opportunity. Within a brief period, they would actually rival, in value, the whole of Russian Poland. The Danube must then become, what it is naturally calculated to be, a great commercial

\* Wilkinson’s Wallachia,—British consul at Galatz—a very ably drawn up account.

road between Asia, the borders of the Black Sea, and those of the Rhine.

When Catherine found it advisable to postpone pushing matters to extremity in the South, she resolved, as an intermediate step, to erect, if possible, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, into a dependent monarchy, under the present Grand Duke Constantine, or, as some state, under Potemkin. The former, as is well known, was entirely educated with a view to prepare him for the government of a Greek nation. Her Majesty represented her wishes to this effect with the concurrence of Austria. This took place about eight-and-thirty years ago. But the other courts, and especially our own, being alarmed and indignant at the proposition, denounced as totally inadmissible.

But it appears the Divan of Wallachia has just addressed the Autocrat, conveying their wishes that he would at once formally annex them to the empire. This address was, of course, got up by the permission and sanction of the Russian provisional government, and probably for the distinct purpose of affording to Europe a display of His Imperial Majesty's continence in these matters. Of course the request was not complied with.

This would have been most gratuitously and prematurely to disclose, without the slightest earthly equivalent, what it may have cost his ministers many earnest protestation and ingenious sophistries to conceal.

There are several passages in the *Mémoires* ascribed to Napoleon, tending to show that the late Alexander was unvaryingly and intently desirous of following up the designs of the illustrious Catherine. There does not seem any adequate reason for questioning the motive of those passages. Abundant evidence, however, exists of their truth. At the interview of Erfurt, the Czar consented not only to join in an attack upon Austria, but to the elevation of Joseph Buonaparte to the throne of Spain,—on the mere condition, that the Emperor Napoleon should not oppose “la réunion définitive à l’empire Russe de la Moldavie et de la Walachie.” See the admissions to this effect—inadvertent perhaps—in the work of the Imperial aide-de-camp, Colonel Boutourlin, written, as is understood, under the immediate inspection and with the critical aid of the Autocrat.

The evacuation by the Russians, stipulated for at Tilsit and Slobodséa, was not carried into

effect,—because, says the same authentic writer, “Le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg désirait amener la Porte à consentir à la cession des provinces cis-danubiennes, sans renouveler les hostilités suspendues depuis l’armistice de Slobodséa ; mais la négociation que l’on entama à ce sujet dans un congrès réuni à Jassy ayant échoué, la guerre sur le Danube recommença avec plus de vigueur qu’auparavant.”

Where are the manifestations of departure from this policy by the Emperor Nicholas ?—Do they consist in words ? And if so—are these words borne out by the stupendous nature of the present invasion, both in Asia and Europe ? The Muscovite rule is not, according to our notions, of the most gentle character—but even the knout, under limitation, would be a grateful redemption from the defiling and harpy system under which the suffering Danubian people groan.—But this relief, and improvement of their condition, were purchased at too dear a rate, if the tranquillity and international relations of all the civilized nations were, in doing so, completely disarranged.

Russia is in the habit of posting large armies on her frontiers. We may expect that she would

in this case canton, *at least*, one hundred and fifty thousand men beyond the Pruth. Thus would the investment of the Austrian dominions be nearly completed,—while the political existence of the sovereign of the Bosphorus must thenceforth hang by a mere thread; for it is totally beyond his means to keep on foot a permanent force capable of resisting any sudden advance of a considerable corps from so near a point as the Danube.

But granting that the Autocrat merely insists on the independence of the Principalities,—this is precisely what was done with respect to the Crimea \*. What was the result? Briefly after-

\* Such was also the preliminary to the appropriation of the Kuban, and several other countries, now forming part of New Russia,—as appears by the Art. III. of the Treaty of Kainargi, 1774. “ All the Tartar people, those of Crimea, of Budgiac, of the Kuban, the Edissans, Geambouiluks, and Edischkuls, shall, without any exception, be acknowledged by the two Empires as *free nations*, and entirely independent of any foreign power, and shall be governed by their own sovereign of the race of Gingis-Khan, elected and raised to the throne by all the Tartar people; who shall govern them according to their ancient laws and usages, rendering no account whatever to any foreign power;” &c. &c. &c. These solemn guarantees were soon after found to be no better than waste paper.

wards, the Khaun was compelled, by one means or another, humbly to lay his ostensible sovereignty at the feet of the Russian Empress.

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## RUSSIA.

No parity, of course, exists between the disjointed Ottoman state and its portentous antagonist. The peculiar influence of the Russian court is becoming more and more marked and perceptible in several of the continental capitals. The Czars and Czarinas have, during several reigns, extended an uncommon and most gracious patronage to almost every literary or scientific foreigner who may have come under their notice. We must, therefore, be the more on our guard against flattering and exaggerated statements of the ameliorations introduced into that country. No government has ever yet availed itself more skillfully or constantly of the talent and ability of more advanced nations than that of Russia has done. This is a remarkable and, in its consequences, a most important feature of its conduct. There is no doubt that order has been established,

that industry has been promoted,—and the powers and capabilities of the empire put, in a great degree, into a course of developement.

But in point of political rights or personal freedom of any kind, the Russians, with some perfectly unimportant exceptions, are essentially in almost as profound a state of debasement as at the very first day on which the Great Peter, their reputed regenerator, ascended the throne. “Where such a people come as conquerors,” says an impartial and candid biographer of the late Czar,—“they trample on the existing civilization; where there is none, it will certainly not spring up under their feet.”

The occasional enfranchisement of a few hundred slaves which appear in the St. Petersburg Gazette, are proofs of individual generosity, but of course have no material effect whatever on this vast population. Alexander, it is understood, was at one period desirous of laying a basis for improvements of a more just and extensive nature than as yet exist; but was dissuaded by the magnates and influential persons of the court. The senate is merely a salaried board of functionaries, nominated by the sovereign, removable at pleasure, and employed in the execution of details, judicial,

fiscal, or other wise, as their services happen to be required. The whole nation consists of two distinct classes, those of the slave and the master, between whom the strongest line of demarcation is drawn. The sovereigns have evinced a desire to alleviate the condition of the former,—in which they have been obstructed by the unwillingness of the latter.

The foreign policy of a state whose grandeur is founded upon conquest, must characteristically be that of conquest. It is of course in furtherance of this policy that the great and novel plan of “military colonization” has been devised. Eventually this, it appears, is to place at the disposal of government, three millions of males,—trained from the earliest age to military exercises, and to be held constantly in readiness to reinforce\* the embodied army. Whether this number is to be the maximum, will of course depend upon circumstances.

The settlements granted to the Roman Legions were chiefly for defence, and for services performed. These appear to concern the future more than the past; and are obviously calculated rather to assail than protect. The consequence, if not

\* Seventy thousand is the number stated to be now available from this source.

the intention, is plainly the foundation of an immense military caste, whose confirmed habits and separate interests must no less dispose and qualify them to rivet the chains of their own countrymen, than to impose an equally galling bondage on every surrounding people.

What political institution, democratic or otherwise, can be so inimical to the safety of other states, as the uncalled-for preparation of such permanent and overwhelming means of aggression?

The number of serfs stated to belong to the crown, is fourteen millions; with a still greater proportion of land. The individual members of the Imperial family also possess a considerable number—the remainder, with a small exception\*, being the property of noble or private persons,—all being equally subject to unlimited and uncontrolled military conscription. It cannot therefore be alleged that other governments have their remedy by adopting a like system, because to no other government are there means of a similar amount and character available.

Whether these colonies may or may not produce to the full extent what appears to

\* About one-eleventh of the population is the proportion, it is believed, that are free.

have been contemplated,—is, as yet, uncertain. But the stupendous project completely discloses the *animus* of the government.

The succession to the throne of the Russias has not unfrequently been broken, and even the occupants cut off, by conspiracies,—which have usually effected their purpose, through the aid of such portions of the army as may have been at hand. But these tragical events have, in no instance, wrought any essential change on the general conduct and external views of the government. Such are amongst the perils which must ever be the penalty of an injudiciously exerted despotism.

In this instance, however, it is unnecessary to resort to generalities. It is perfectly true that both the father and grandfather of the present Emperor perished in this violent manner ; but it is no less so, that they were capricious and unmanageable maniacs,—equally the objects of ridicule and terror, and in whose hands there was no safety either for public or private interests.

But that there is no wanton or habitual tendency to licentiousness or regicide fairly attributable to the Russians, may further be inferred from the historical fact, that for about seventy out of the one

hundred years intervening between the death of the Czar Peter and that of the late Alexander, the empire has been prosperously governed, with scarcely any interruption by a succession of females,—some of whom were persons of a very ordinary capacity.

In general, the Russians of a superior class, especially those who reside or travel much abroad, are amongst the most instructed and prepossessing people to be met with in society. But the social structure, if it can be so termed, of which they form a part, considered only in reference to its political bearing and aspect cannot be regarded with an equal complacency. This may be said to consist of the unrelenting, inexorable ambition of the Romans—unredeemed by the spirit of republicanism,—abased by the unlimited vassalage of feudal eras,—and directed by the polished finesse and calculating intelligence of modern times. A military cement, a layer of soldiers, binds together, for the present, this strange admixture—these seemingly incongruous elements.

Several of the nobles are wealthy\* ; and like the barons of old, are surrounded by their •villains.

\* Their wealth chiefly consists in their boors. Some possess as many as 50,000, and even 120,000.

This produces, especially while the countenance of the court is not withheld, a corresponding weight, influence, and respect. But they have no castles, no *armed* followers, or personal rights or pretensions of any sort, with which to contest a point with the Autocrat,—who is irresponsible, and may at pleasure inflict the knout, banishment, or the scaffold; and who, in fact, is the only feudal lord in Russia. Nevertheless, as education is extending in the upper ranks, the power of opinion is extending with it; and accordingly, the desire of institutions which shall give the noble and the wealthy an aristocratical position in the government, is now strongly manifesting itself. And thus is there furnished an additional impelling reason for entering upon war, in order to turn off attention from internal affairs, and provide the more stirring spirits with the prospect of foreign commands.

As for the finances of this government, all that need now be said, is, that if it has money enough to provide a powerful army\*, the army is very likely to provide it with money. It has just sent in a round sum from Persia. The Cossack and

\* The actual pay of a Russian soldier is little more than half-a-crown a month.

the Muscovite have already tasted of considerable stipends,—voluntarily from England, compulsorily from France. They now put forth a threatening indefinite demand against Turkey : which, it is not impossible, may fall very little short of the permanent revenue of the Sultan. A great army will also obtain credit, as well as a great mercantile firm. Every thing depends, in these cases, on the idea of stability. If *power* be well ascertained, and at all likely to endure, the sordid, the timorous, and the base, will always administer to its purposes and bow to it. The strong rarely seek in vain for allies or accomplices: accordingly, were the Czar's agents now negotiating a loan on the London Exchange, which is not unlikely to be soon the case, the reports, true or false, relative to the great amount of his force, could not fail to facilitate their object, and obtain from the capitalists more advantageous terms than might otherwise be conceded.

Before quitting this topic, it may not be irrelevant to remark upon the similarity of the present proceedings generally with those adopted towards Poland. In that memorable transaction, also, one of the interventional pretences, frequently advanced by the northern cabinet, was a religious one. A sixth of the Poles were of the Greek church, which

was not the dominant one.—The Empress declared that *all exclusions on account of religious belief were contrary to a “LAW OF NATURE”*—that “those so situated were ABSOLVED FROM ALL NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE, and had a right to appeal to the rest of the human race, and choose from amongst them judges, allies, and protectors.” If this be still the doctrine of the Russian court, it affords matter for consideration, and certainly great scope for its benevolence.—WHERE,—in effect, it may be asked, is the country which might be exempt from the influence of so sweeping a clause, or from the interference of so universal a protector of sects?

One of the last declaratory acts preliminary to a dismemberment of Poland, after setting forth her autocratic Majesty's great love of peace, and how careful she had been to preserve it, runs thus :—“Filled with these sentiments, it is with regret that the Empress sees his Polish Majesty follow different maxims with regard to her, and make no return to her friendly proceedings\* ”

\* “The Emperor sees, with grief, that the Porte, instead of duly appreciating this truly friendly policy,” &c. (1828)—Is it friendly to encourage and league with the Greeks? Is it friendly to bribe the Janissaries?

but by proceedings directly opposite," &c. &c. The further instances of her Majesty's *friendly* regard are now matter of history.

The people of England were, we are informed, filled with surprize and indignation at the partition of the republic. *The cabinets of London, Paris, Stockholm, and Copenhagen loudly REMONSTRATED.*—How fruitlessly need not be told! Nevertheless Poland was very far from being a primary object with her Majesty. The priority in subjugation was, indeed, yielded to this ill-fated country,—not so much because of the extreme facilities afforded by its distracted condition, (which was so cruelly no less than adroitly aggravated and administered to)—but in a considerable degree, because of the strength the yet uncorrupted party were rapidly gaining, leading, it was apprehended, to their being enabled to protect and vindicate the national integrity, if not immediately crushed.

Nor did this event concern, in any comparative degree, the *maritime nations*. Though so much enhanced in strength, the character of the Russian state remained unchanged. It was still an *inland*—a military, and not a naval power. The extinction of the Ottoman sway, and the throne

of the sultans for her grandson, was universally known to have been Catherine's most cherished ambition,—the great and unvarying aim of her political life,—and no less so that of her ablest counsellors. Nor will the fulfilment of any of her views, to whose lot soever it may fall to do so, be an inconsiderable title to fame.

Finally, a very casual inquiry into the proceedings of this half Asiatic, half European cabinet, shows most incontestibly, that though Russia is physically without a rival, it is resolved not to rely *alone* on force; and thus it is that we see schemes of a gigantic violence carried on with as much caution, craft, and stealthy tortuousness, as if there were no other means for executing them than the condottieri of the times of Cæsar Borgia.

It is now obvious to all, that if an able, ambitious, and ardent prince should succeed to the Muscovite crown, there will be much difficulty, to say the least of it, on the part of the other states of the European confederacy, in maintaining themselves against him. The autocrat Nicholas may be of that character, for aught that is generally known to the contrary. The subjugation of nations, who are inferior in the scale of social life, is happily not always an unmixed evil,—

inasmuch as improvements are, in such instances, introduced in the train of the victorious army, which may go far to redeem the violation of general right. When the picture is reversed—when semi-barbarians\* overcome a civilized people, it inflicts an immedicable wound upon the best interests of mankind.

The great question is—DOES SUCH A CONTINGENCY NOW IMPEND OVER EUROPE?

But this consideration would seem to demand additional attention from the fact, that,—though the Northern sceptre should be wielded by a succession of more moderately disposed sovereigns,—still there will be wanting an adequately countervailing chance in favour of the general security and repose; since it is a perfectly well-known fact, that the plans of Peter and of Catherine were not only of the most grasping and boundless character, but are fully recognised in the cabinet of the Czars as a sort of political

\* “ But it must not, for a moment, be imagined” (says the recent publication of one of the travelling fellows of Oxford) “ that simplicity of character is at all connected with the gross ignorance of a Russian; on the contrary, in cunning he surpasses all people. The Greek of Athens, the Jew of Salonica, even the Armenian so celebrated for his duplicity, must yield the palm of *finesse* to the bearded Muscovite.”

gospel—are enshrined in their portfolios of state as the acknowledged dicta of unerring wisdom;—and impart to the measures, of which they are the guide, a perseverance and consistency to be looked for from a government of institutions, rather than from one so entirely under the influence, were it not for this circumstance, of the personal disposition of its chief for the time being. And it must be admitted, that if the physical ascendancy can for a moment be considered as preferable to the moral and internal prosperity of a nation, then those bold sketches for a universal empire are well deserving of the profound deference they receive, being not only monuments of the genius of their authors, but the most inestimable boons they could have bequeathed to their descendants.

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## OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE, &amp;c.

IN addition to the enormous and unprecedented military establishment of Russia, an Ukase has been just promulgated for the conscription of a reinforcement of one hundred thousand men. Are these prodigious preparations necessary to crush the crazy, feeble, and worn-out strength of the Seraglio?—Clearly not. There is but one interpretation of them. They are meant to overawe the WEST,—to prevent interruption in the progress and hostility as the sequel of this operation. Nothing is more evidently possible, than that the autocratic government may for the present deem it most politic to restrain itself to gaining, as a primary step, the line of the Danube. Thus might the public mind in other countries be more gradually reconciled to the eventual result.

From the fortresses of the Danube, as a secure basis, or even from the left bank, they might go on, after due collecting of means, and when occasion serves—to the goal of the enterprise: occupying about as many days in doing so, as would

convey the intelligence to Paris or London. The fatuity of the Turk will never leave the Czar without a most sufficient reason for exhibiting to all the courts in ostensible amity with him, that the honour and interests of his throne and people imperatively demanded of him the advance of the troops, and the sacrifice of his much-loved-peace.—It seems a great deal more likely, however, that he will now proceed at once to the condign castigation of his misguided opponent. Still, the slower method would be the more prudent—all the contributive means and combinations, military and diplomatical, could thus be better matured.

The present Turkish lines of defence are the Danube and the range of the Hemus, which latter is nearly parallel with the river, at about forty miles in rear of it, and at about two hundred from the capital. The Turks do not pretend, it appears, to keep the field in the plains of the Principalities. But the Danube can no longer be counted on as a defence, since the invaders, being so disproportionately superior, both by sea and land, besides being in possession of the mouths of the river and of Ismael, may turn this whole line with impunity—when, how, and where they please.—A bridge, and a tête-de-pont, will no doubt be

established near Silistria,—and perhaps also at Sistova.

Twelve thousand men, it is reported, have been embarked at Sevastopol for Varna, which it is probable there will be no great difficulty in gaining possession of. But if this be the sole use the Russians propose to make of their undisputed command of the Black Sea, it will be a proof of no inconsiderable inaptitude, and deficiency of enterprise. It is idle to talk of the late naval action, as having deprived the Ottomans of their means of defence in the Euxine: it is many years since they could venture to appear in force upon that sea. It was at Chismé, not at Navarino, that their inexpressibly contemptible maritime impotency was principally exhibited and consummated. By all accounts it is not easy to conceive more incapable or more pusillanimous sailors than the Turks: on that element even their personal courage has usually abandoned them.

The Hemus or Balkan is of no great elevation. The roads over it are few and indifferent. There are, however, two or three of them, which, according to travellers, are practicable, with very little reparation, for twenty-four pounders or any other carriages.

The position of Chumla, on the direct road to the capital has been designated as the Thermopylæ of the Turks. The title has been rather gratuitously conferred. It is represented to be a strong position, and has never been captured ;—neither, however, has it ever been seriously attacked. It is a town in the hills, surrounded by a mud wall, of no great thickness, and with scarcely any flanks ; this, during several late wars, has been made the nucleus of an entrenched camp, for which, it appears, it is well adapted. In the case of protracted operations in the hills, during summer, I have understood, that one of the chief inconveniences to be contended against would be the insufficiency and badness of the water ; but in the accounts of the campaigns I have met with, I do not see the circumstance mentioned.

If the Russians were not in possession of the sea,—if a series of well-connected entrenchments were thrown up along those hills, under the inspection of capable officers ;—if the Sultan had a sufficiency of cannon,—a military chest,—an hospital,—and one hundred and fifty thousand disposable troops\*

\* If the Sultan has one hundred thousand men at present under arms, (not counting the rabble that might be assembled for a particular occasion,) then, one-third will scarcely suffice

with which to line these entrenchments, then there might be hope entertained of his sustaining himself upon them. But none of those suppositions coincide with the fact.

It is impossible to say what the Russians *will* do, but we may conjecture what they *may* do in this campaign.

We will suppose that only one half the invading army enters the Principalities, and passes the Danube. The right places itself near Ternova, in readiness to force the passes to Philopopolis, and Sophia, &c. ; the left, in front of Rasgrad, observing and menacing Chumla ; a detached corps invests, besieges, or has taken possession of Varna.

The remainder of the army *may be*, and perhaps *is* collected, near the mouths of the Danube, at Odessa, Sevastopol, &c. ; the Russians having in those ports and others, at least from sixty to eighty thousand\* tons of shipping, lying unemployed,

for the principal garrisons, at least another third will be required for reserves, for Constantinople, and the sea-shores : thus there would not remain above thirty thousand for the field.

\* This of course comprehends some hundred merchantmen, averaging perhaps a hundred and sixty tons, chiefly under neutral flags.

including fourteen sail of the line\* ; and some hundred zebecks, galliots, gun-boats, &c. The wind during eight or nine months of the year, blows steadily from the north or north-east. The usual passage for single ships does not exceed two days.

Thus, in a week or two from the period of embarkation, sixty or seventy thousand men, with their stores, may be landed on the line of coast between Burgas† and Media inclusive. The latter is forty miles from the capital. The corps in Bulgaria, before mentioned, will at the same time press vigorously to their front.

Constantinople receives the water for its consumption from Doumouderé, twelve miles off. These reservoirs are on the sea-side, and almost within reach of the cannon of the Russian ships ; were they cut off, the town must fall a bloodless prey‡ : a simultaneous attempt to force the Bosphorus might also, perhaps, take place ; both wind and current singularly favour this operation. But it is a far more formidable passage than that of the

\* One half of these might be converted into transports.

† The defences along this line of coast are known to be unimportant. The Turks are proverbially negligent on this point.

‡ Jones, 1827.

Dardanelles. Granting, however, that provision of water has been made, and that entrenchments have been thrown up round the unimportant walls of the city, still its fate would not be delayed beyond an inconsiderable period. A well sustained cannonade, storm, and bombardment, could have only one eventual result.

Finally, if the Russian army be as numerically superior as is represented, it ought, and probably will, act in three great corps ; one observing or besieging the places on the Danube,—the second operating against the Balkan,—the third embarked in the shipping. There are already two other corps in the field,—those of Armenia and the Kuban.

Mahmoud, we are told, will hold with a firm grasp the last fragment of dominion, and that he is resolved to bury himself beneath the ruins of his capital. This (if it be so) would probably quite accord with the policy of the invaders ; nor is it at all unlikely that their occult machinations may purposely lead to that result. The signal massacre to be anticipated in such case, would, in the estimation of such calculators, be amply compensated by the added terror of the Russian arms,—and the consternation it would spread, especially in Asia. The final

extinguishment of the Mahometan power might thus also be forwarded.

And, though the whole of the edifices at present composing the capital, from the serai, mosques and minarets, down to the humblest shed, were thus given to the flames, what would that signify? Unlike the fall of Carthage, this pre-eminent place must rapidly rise again to more than a renovated and palmy zenith of grandeur. The heroic conqueror of the former once powerful city is said to have wept over its ashes. But in executing the stern, ungenerous command of the senate, the last blow may be considered to have been struck in the accomplishment of the unbounded domination of the republic;—all the rest was an unresisted march of victory.—And yet at that time it cannot be asserted that Rome exhibited to the nations, in any comparative degree, the assured, well-organized, and preponderating mass of physical force that Russia now does. THENCEFORWARD IT WAS THAT SHE TOOK HER STATION ON THE SEAS, AS WELL AS ON THE LAND.

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**ERZEROUH.**

**BUT** it may even so turn out, that the Sultan's army will be unable to keep the field at all ;—for the Asiatics, who form so considerable a portion of it, are extremely likely to begin their return or desertion to their own provinces, so soon as the movement is known of,—which (if not already undertaken) is inevitable, against Erzeroum.

This great and populous city, which contains a considerable number of Christians, is not unlikely to form one of the permanent acquisitions now intended by Russia. The country around Erzeroum is known to be, in every respect, one of the fairest portions of the world. Even now, it is highly cultivated, of an abundant produce, and flourishes in spite of all the injurious and paralyzing influences of its political condition.

It is the centre of several great communications—namely, those of Erivan, Tiflis, Teheran, Ispahan, Bagdad, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo. From thence to Moossul, (on the site of Nineveh,) the first navigable point of the Tigris, it is two hundred and fifty miles ; and on the other

side, to Trebisonde, about a hundred and fifty\*. Here the wants of a large army may be supplied for a considerable time,—the means of transport being also particularly available,—horses, camels, oxen, and mules, being a chief produce, and of a remarkably fine description.

In a commercial point of view, also, this city is of no less importance,—being superlatively calculated to become a great inland mart for the interchange of India with those of the vast countries lying along the great northern rivers, (Volga, Don, Danube, &c.,) that disembogue themselves into the Caspian or Euxine. From Trebisonde, on the latter, to Moossul, as before observed, is but four hundred miles of land-carriage. The Cossacks will have no great difficulty in putting down the Khoord plunderers, at least along the river and caravan roads. From this point, likewise, as a great central position, both Persia and the lesser Asia may with advantage be controlled and overawed.

\* The question of a rival commerce between Constantinople and India by this route, with that between London and India by the Cape passage, does not simply depend on a comparison between sea and land carriage,—but rather of that between about four hundred miles of the latter, and some ten or twelve thousand miles of the former,

### RUSSIAN FRONTIER POSITION.

THE Russian line, as opposed to the western nations, will, after the reduction of Constantinople, be as follows : the right and centre as before, at no great distance from the capitals of Sweden, Prussia, and Austria ; the left will have been moved forward from the mouths of the Danube to the shore of the *Ægean*. In this extension, of some hundred miles, there is a principle of weakness ; but the point itself on which the flank would thus rest is well appuied. From the *Ægean* to the *Euxine* is strong ground ; and there are still more secure and available ranges, rivers, or obstacles on the Asiatic side, at a suitable distance ;—so that, if necessary, a great detached periphery of defence may be formed. And were even the communication with *Ismael*, or the *Pruth*, interfered with by a hostile army, the sea line will remain open, and be beyond all molestation.

Nor could any army beyond the present frontier by possibility be more favourably situated for supplies. The herds of *Bessarabia*, the corn of *Wallachia*, the *Crimea*, &c., offer, in these essen-

tials, a cheap and sufficient resource. Wine is the common produce of several of the adjoining provinces. The provisioning of this army ought, with good management, to cost very little more than if it had remained in concentrated cantonments. And even were it isolated upon the Bosphorus, it were well worth the while of the Autocrat to incur the hazard and expense of its maintenance on so extraordinary and commanding a position.

The mere naval and military advantages, offensive and defensive, would amply indemnify him. Of the latter, the most prominent is, that it will completely lock up, as it were, and cover from all French or British expeditionary attacks,—in the possible event of hostility from those states,—the whole of his exposed, unsettled, insecure, and rebellious conquests in the Caucasian isthmus. Thus, likewise, will be protected the communication with the right flank of the position on the Araxes;—for this army also is chiefly supplied with stores, reinforcements, and even a considerable part of its provisions, by sea.

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FOREIGN COMMERCE.—AUSTRIA—PRUSSIA—SPAIN  
—PERSIA—SWEDEN.

To drive the Muscovite eagles back over the Danube or Pruth may not be so easy a task as to have checked their flight ere they had passed those barriers. Prevention is generally easier and always better than remedy. If, however, prevention has not in this instance been compatible either by or through our means, then we have no more to do than reconcile ourselves to the abandonment, at no distant period, of every pretension to the station of a great or influential power—and even eventually prepare to bow our necks to the yoke ;—for, if we are already so helpless, such must clearly, it is in vain to deny it, in due course of time, be the result.

The desire of wealth, when allowed to master the other passions, or to engross too exclusively the mind, has been ever found to be one of the most tenacious principles of action. Witness the Armenian and other merchants of Constantinople, who go on hoarding and acquiring, although aware that success is the ordinary precursor of confis-

cation and death. Witness the inflexible constancy of the banker-jews and goldsmiths, of former days, in this our own country. The sovereigns of the times alluded to, when in need of replenishment, were wont to send for some opulent Israelite, from whom it was the established process to extract tooth after tooth by royal command, until the reluctant victim could make up his mind to disgorge the required sum. Undismayed, however, by these sort of admonitory visitations, we find those ancient representatives of the monied interest invariably returning to their bureaux and haunts of business, with as keen an avidity of pelf, as if nothing had happened—as if the security of their gain was inviolable. Now, in following up this inquiry, I persuade myself it will appear very remote from improbable, that what was wont to be practised by the monarch on the Jew, is precisely that which the greater and victorious military state will seek to execute on the less formidable, but more wealthy one. And that amongst the first teeth, as a mere matter of course, attempted to be extracted from us, would indubitably be the “keys,” as they are termed, “of the Mediterranean,” Corfu, Malta, and Gibraltar.

Many will refuse all credence, at least during our time, to the possibility of any such humiliating event. Others there are—so various are opinions—who suspect that we are in the last stage of political and financial exhaustion,—and that if anything derogatory be brought to bear against us, our best plan will be to submit—retire within our own shores—occupy ourselves thenceforward with an exclusive domestic industry, and avoid all further intermeddling with our neighbours ;—thus, say they, our burdensome colonies will be lost, and our money saved. A no less numerous class are those who neither look before nor behind, and are strongly persuaded, that whatever is, will continue to be,—at least, for as long as it is of any concernment to them to speculate upon. To rouse these sort of persons to any positive belief in the wicked designs of distant potentates, the battalions which are to accomplish them must present themselves—the cannon of the enemy must nearly echo upon their ears. These doubt that any great changes take place without a lapse of ages intervening,—although, in reality, change is no less the order of the political than the natural world ;—and is unceasingly presenting new combinations, with more or less of transition, as chance or skill directs its progress.

But I pursue my remarks,—observing, however, first,—that to prefer domestic industry to foreign commerce, and foreign possessions and connexions, may or may not be wise and politic to do—should it become necessary to make an election; but that to carry a preference for the former to the extent of neglecting the due precautions for the preservation of the latter, is no less than voluntarily to hazard the loss of five-sixths of the population subject to our laws;—of a disposable foreign or external revenue equal to one half that of the United Kingdom;—and moreover of the means of livelihood for those amongst us who have been hitherto employed in the annual transport, export, and import, of considerably above one hundred millions worth of commercial produce, —including some sixty millions worth of goods actually manufactured by us for the yearly supply of foreign markets!—Besides,—to render the complete pacific, non-interference system safe and valid, it should undoubtedly be reciprocal. **WE** must not only resolve not to meddle with *others*, but obtain some sure guarantee that **OTHERS WILL NOT MEDDLE WITH US.**

China has hitherto partially executed this policy; but her safeguards and guarantee consist

in deserts, mountains, oceans,—and if I may so express myself,—her antipodean remoteness. These are the real ramparts that have as yet saved that country from the rapacious ambition of Europeans ; but they have not saved it from the Barbarian Tartars, who not very long since have taken possession of the Celestial Empire, and now reign at Pekin.

Austria is very well known to be one of the most inert and unelastic of powers ; and though, through our pecuniary aid, she has evinced constancy, her efficient force by no means corresponds with her territorial extent. The contracted and obsolete maxims which still so utterly impede the prosperity, and as completely interdict the union, of the Austrian provinces, must be to us, her natural ally, a source of unfeigned regret ; for it is thus that her strength falls so short of what it should be, as a dike against the North. Little of a spontaneously energetic character is to be augured from the court of Vienna. Nay, unless under the influence of foreign impulse, it were rash to assert that it may not in the sequel personate both the dupe and the accomplice. A province or two, if demanded as the price of complicity, will be readily conceded.

The great captor of the territorial booty, thus

distributed, will consider any such transfer as no more than a loan. Additional honours and applause will be showered on the celebrated Austrian minister, whose dexterity, it will be said, has thus added, without the employment of arms or the chances of war, to his master's dominions :—while, in point of fact, the real and inevitable tendency of this pretended aggrandisement will be neither more nor less than that of paving the way for sending back with all practicable speed that Imperial house to its original little domain of Hapsburg ; or, if not, for rendering it, within a far more limited period, a mere intermediary and dishonorable channel, through which to convey to the Germanic nations, with as little shock as may be to their honest feelings, the authoritative ukases transmitted for fulfilment.

Thus it was that the Tartar Khauns, and even sometimes the Poles, up to a comparatively late period, governed and trampled on the Muscovites, through the medium of their Dukes—whom it was then customary to treat with the last indignity. The latter are now enabled to return the compliment under a loftier appellation. Such are amongst the reverses and vicissitudes which occur in these matters !—Eventually, the Austro-Imperial idol may chance to be dispensed with

altogether, so soon as the illusion of its rights is judged to be sufficiently obliterated from the public mind.

Possibly, however, the cabinet of Vienna, afraid to partake of the ill-gotten spoil, may assume the respectable bearing of a neutral. This may perhaps be on the principle of the ingenious expedient propounded a few days ago, in the legislature of a neighbouring country—namely, that the balance of Europe would be best upheld, and the ambition of Russia repelled, by “an awe-inspiring reserve” on the part of the Chamber of Deputies!

Prussia, about twenty years back, adopted what, no doubt, her government then deemed a very adroit policy,—that of holding aloof from the passing conflict,—that of looking on with folded arms at the rise or fall of adjoining states. France, with more sail set but less caution at the helm, was then avowedly embarked on the very same voyage in which Russia is now covertly engaged.—For a brief period neutrality prospered. But after contributing in this manner to the subjugation of the continent, it had well nigh erased the Prussian monarchy from the list of nations. Frederick William is now, by intermarriage, related to Nicholas in the same degree that the Emperor

Francis was to Napoleon—but with infinitely greater inducements to a collusion of views.

The personal character of the King of Sweden mainly preserves him upon the throne of that country. His sound judgment, military talents, and irreproachable deportment, render him individually one of the most formidable Princes in Europe. Had it been otherwise, long since would he have shared the fate of Murat! But the intention as to the succession being continued in this dynasty, seems very questionable. Were there nothing else to warrant this doubt, the recent marriage of the son of the ex-king into the Royal House of Orange, now so closely and confidentially allied with that of Russia, would be a sufficient indication. Firm and sagacious as we may suppose Bernadotte to be, his measures can scarcely be unembarrassed,—for he must be conscious that in defective illegitimacy he stands alone;—and the muzzles of the Russian guns are almost within sight of his council-chamber. Stockholm is no longer a fit residence for the Swedish government\*. An unswerving alliance with England is the sole bond of security which this power has to look to. Twice, during less than a century, the cabinet of

\* It is no doubt in this conviction that so much care is now bestowed on the construction of the strong fortress of Wanas.

St. Petersburg has brought about or confirmed revolutions in the successions to the Swedish crowns; a similar opportunity may ere long be again within its reach.

Persia is now in a very dependent state. Its entire conquest may not possibly enter, at least as yet, into the intention of the Czar's government. Commanding positions on the frontiers, and a completely over-awing influence in its political conduct, are obviously sought for: an important pass has just been seized on, and the Persians are forced to submit to their virtual exclusion from the navigation of the Caspian.

For excellent reasons does Russia protect the ultra party in Spain, for it is they who are the real traitors to their country and their sovereign.—The French troops remaining in the Peninsula, are now only a garrison of ten thousand men in Cadiz, and one of eight hundred in Haca. These, it is expected, will be withdrawn within a short period hence.

King Ferdinand has fifty-eight thousand men in arms. The privates are of a good description—the officers being, it is represented, bad citizens and worse soldiers: they are now six months in arrears. When the last of the foreign troops are withdrawn, this most contemptible of governments will again be in danger of tumbling of

its own accord;—and in such event it will be a general misfortune, should the Jesuits and the Czar's envoy succeed in once more luring France to embroil herself bootlessly in the affairs of the Peninsula.

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MOTIVES OF CABINETS—FRANCE—MR. PITT.

FULL well we may conjecture that the long halt of the columns on the Pruth, is attributable to considerations relative to the possibility of a hearty alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and England. The Northern Cabinet has probably had misgivings on this point, and is alive to the fact, that the union of these powers is yet amply capable of bidding defiance to the world,—of triumphantly protecting the great interests of which they are the fitting guardians,—nay, of rolling back the tide of a brute ambition, and of setting impassable bounds to the progress or the pretensions of every other state, however stupendous its means, obsequious its allies, unlimited its views, or astute its proceedings!

It is quite possible, however, that an unreflecting jealousy of the naval power of Britain, adroitly worked upon, may be a bar in the way of this cordial co-operation:—for on the continent it is constantly forgotten that this is a mere effect and not a cause,

—an effect which must equally flow from the industry and commerce, maritime and otherwise, of any other country, if pursued in an equally continuous, spirited, and enterprising manner.

But in reference to the motives of other cabinets, in hazarding a conflict of opinion or of conduct with ours, there is but too much reason to conclude that a good deal of reliance is placed upon our presumed or at least confidently proclaimed financial embarrassments. It is very evident that constant incitements to this calculation have been afforded.

No sooner are the receipts of any class in this country (especially if an affluent one) likely to suffer the slightest diminution, than straight every enginery of influence is brought into play, and an anticipatory outcry raised that is heard in all directions. In no nation in the world where truth and general principles are in any degree understood, is this species of manœuvre so unbecomingly exhibited.

An approaching general ruin and bankruptcy are on those occasions invariably announced and unscrupulously insisted on, both at home and abroad; in order to obtain a more ready compliance with some special exemption or legislative enactment favourable to the party alleging itself aggrieved; and thus the moderating impartiality

and controlling discretion of the government is but too often subdued to the purposes of the complainants. The reality of the poor man's distress is all this time overlooked, or made use of to point some collateral argument, as matter for some vague harangue; or perhaps is dilated on with stoical magnanimity, as a salutary check to population. It were uncandid to assert, that these representations are, in all cases, fallacious; but certainly it is not the distresses of the most distressed which are most loudly trumpeted.

But what gives currency to these ominous prophecies of the national insolvency is, that there are those who occasionally indulge in the same strain who are evidently above all suspicion of an unworthy motive. Thus it is, that, but a few evenings back, a noble lord, of unimpeachable character for integrity, has not hesitated, at this great crisis, to declare, in his place in Parliament, that he knows not how the government can go on, even under ordinary circumstances, so utterly impoverished are the national resources and necessitous the Exchequer; and this goes forth on the authority of a distinguished member of the Finance Committee, and provoked, too, by no graver matter than some inconsiderable item of

expenditure, amounting to about a fractional part of the personal recompense just conferred by the Russian Sovereign on General Paskowitz, for concluding a third or fourth rate description of war. Such avowals, from persons of any eminence of station, are now peculiarly ill-timed and indiscreet. Besides, the statement is in itself utterly unfounded.

But what are the consequences of those unblushing assertions continued to be made in the very teeth of facts? A foreign government, whose sinister projects may have hitherto been checked, perhaps, solely by a sense of the extent of our resources, *now argues thus*:—"ENGLAND may or may not be in financial difficulties; but certain it is, that the clamour which it would appear will be raised on the least prospect of an extended expenditure or mooted of warlike preparation, must effectually shackle, if not totally debar the ministry from interfering with our proceedings;—and though they were even sure of a majority in Parliament, the greater part of every cabinet will be reluctant to hazard their places in order to guard against a contingent danger which may not, at all events, develop itself for some years." Well—the crisis approaches: we will suppose

that these inferences are correct, and that the British ministry adopts some half measure—intimidated or overborne in their judgment by the prejudice which they are well aware will be otherwise excited against them.—The proper opportunity for action is lost,—the secretly hostile government gains some great and formidable vantage ground; at length all the world sees, that we have nothing left for it, but, on the one hand, to submit ignominiously, and no less destructively, or, on the other, to combat. The latter, it need not be feared, will be the choice. But then we enter the lists with every possible disadvantage; under, perhaps, the inevitable necessity of spending some ten or twenty fold what, in the first instance, might have sufficed; and with an inverse chance of success.

And this it is that will be dignified with the appellations of “economy,—a due regard to the commercial welfare,—the financial interests of the country,” &c. &c. &c.—while, perhaps, it were much more justly and accurately described as a compendious method of hazarding the fortunes, impairing the power, and squandering eventually the wealth and property of the nation.

In writing the above passage, I thought I was

merely putting a possible,—an ideal case. But I have since discovered that it is little more than a narrative of what almost literally took place in this country in the year 1791. Our great ministerial leader of that time was strongly impressed, it appears, with the conviction, that, even then, the progress of Russia afforded a ground of alarm to all Europe ; although her population and means were scarcely more than one-half what they now are. The Czarina had successively reduced her pretensions to the retention of the fortress of Oczakow, and its unimportant district. But even this comparatively trivial accession the British minister deemed it essential to the general interests to prevent, though at the hazard of a war.

For that purpose, he moved an address in Parliament, to enable his Majesty to send a powerful armament into the Baltic, to support with vigour the then kings of Sweden and Prussia, and the expiring efforts of the Polish patriots. A majority of ninety-three was obtained in the lower house. The armament was in a forward state of preparation, but the opposition was conducted with so much energy, both in the Lords and Commons, by some able and eloquent men, and so effectually strengthened and contributed to from

without, by the mercenary clamour of the manufacturers and merchants trading to St. Petersburg, that a general sense was created in the country against the measure. Finding the public mind so successfully acted on by his opponents, the minister surrendered his own opinion\*,—confined himself to negotiation,—abandoned, so far as any overt measures were concerned, both Turkey and the North to their fate,—and soon after, Poland fell.

It is impossible to find a case more in point. This was one of the very few occasions in which

\* See, in Bishop Tomlinson's work, Mr. Pitt's private letter to Mr. Ewart, our minister at Berlin; wherein it is candidly confessed that the fears of a dissolution of the Cabinet alone prevented his proceeding. His regrets are strongly expressed. "This opinion I formed neither hastily nor willingly; nor could I easily make a sacrifice more painful to myself, than I have done in yielding to it." "You perfectly know, that no man could be more eagerly bent than I was on a steady adherence to the line which we had at first proposed, of going *all lengths* to enforce the terms of the strict *status quo*; and I am still as much persuaded as ever, that if we could have carried the support of the country with us, the risk and expense of the struggle, even if Russia had not submitted without a struggle, would not have been more than the object was worth."—May, 24th, 1791. A single fortress, the capture of which had cost her many thousand men, was all that the Empress then demanded.

this resolute and powerful orator was defeated in parliamentary contest. But extraneous and, perhaps, unconstitutional means were resorted to against him. Of the distinguished persons who led this opposition only two survive, Earls Grey and Fitzwilliam. These are already historical characters, to question the elevation of whose principles were a presumption very remote from my intention, no less than it would be repugnant to my feelings. But in lending their powerful abilities to restrict, at that particular juncture, the government, in a disbursement of half a million or a million of money, there is but too much reason to predict, that they entailed upon Europe,—within half a century from the time when so ill-judged an economy was effected,—probably a general war,—bringing with it an expenditure, of which our own share may possibly be to be counted by scores or hundreds, rather than units of millions.

This is a most unfortunate part of our parliamentary history. In attempting merely the expulsion of the Premier from office, no doubt with a good intent, it so happened, that schemes, the most mischievous to all Europe west of the Russian frontier, were completely co-operated with!

## FRANCE.

THE atmosphere of the Tuileries has been usually a genial one for the mysteries of diplomacy,—less so now, however, it may be conjectured, than under any former regime. Forty years of political storms or conflict have so nerved and elevated the character of the French people, that it is no longer safe or easy to mislead them. The experiment has been partly tried, the result is a recoil. The equally wise and noble popular impulse which dictated the withdrawal of the troops from Spain, will not, gratuitously, in the present great emergency, sink into dereliction.

Baits, in the shape of proposed territorial extensions, will, no doubt, have been insidiously thrown out to them, but most probably in vain. When they have fortified their rising liberties,—their blood-bought institutions,—when they have consolidated, what it has cost them so many heroic efforts, so many terrible sacrifices to achieve, they will not, of course, neglect the acquirement of such external advantages as may be of a permanent and solid description. But while thus judiciously

employed in subduing the domestic foe, we should wrong the high spirit and penetration of this great and enlightened people, were we to imagine them so absorbed as to prevent their discerning, in the distance, the approach of another and more comprehensive peril from without.

As for jealousies between France and England, they are now little better than ignorant and puerile\*. What has either any longer to fear from the other? They are both great in their respective ways, and are proceeding and likely to continue to do so, in a parallel course. Under this persuasion it is that I rejoice to see provision making for an augmentation of the French forces, naval and military. It is to be hoped that the means thus placed at the disposal of the executive may not be misapplied, or frittered away in the unseasonable pursuit of separate, petty, or ephemeral objects.

But this observation, it is thought, is equally applicable, whether they should be such as are calculated to advance the real interests and power of France, or merely of a nature to catch a fleeting and

\* A rumour was not long since, for a few days, afloat, relative to a French expedition to Egypt; the futility of any apprehension, on our parts, on the score of any such design, will be developed in an after part of this volume.

meretricious applause: because the entering, at this critical period, on separate enterprises\*, might not only have a tendency to disturb the concord and unison essentially subsisting between Great Britain and that country, (which it should rather be the endeavour of every statesman in both to bind indissolubly,) but, what is more distinctly important, must go directly to the weakening and dispersion of the force of the latter, when considerations of a much more imminent and wider import should point out another and an exclusive destination for every man, horse, and gun at its disposal.

The eligibility of taking advantage of the present state of affairs to extend the French frontiers to the Rhine has, it seems, been mooted, or at least touched on, in the course of a declamation in one of the Chambers.

To entertain this sort of proposition may or may not merit attention at a fitting time. But to enter on its consideration while an infinitely weightier affair is on the tapis—and under the idea, too, of thus obtaining an equivalent for an

\* The expulsion of Ibrahim, from the Morea, though of secondary moment, would not be liable to this objection. The greater the French or English force brought into the vicinity of the scene of action the better.

acquisition of many times more importance, at which another and stronger power is at the same moment grasping—were too glaring a miscalculation and inconsistency to need any remark. Let the civilised nations set bounds to the irruption of the barbarian, and afterwards settle their own boundaries.

As for the desire of procuring an influence more consonant with its relative greatness, intellectual and otherwise—that may be considered as done. France, it is quite true, has not enjoyed, during the last ten years, her proper station in the international councils of Europe. The part of a satellite to the opaque northern planet was the one which her late administration seems to have deemed most eligible. Under cover of the Jesuit's cowl she was rapidly retrograding into the condition of a second or third-rate power; into a dependency of the Holy Alliance! But all this wretched thralldom is, it may be hoped, pretty nearly broken through. The snake, at least, is scotched. The French and English people are, it is beyond all question, at once the most humane, civilised, and powerful communities that exist. It is good that their influence should predominate. And if the chief men of those communities should forego on

their behalf, a due ascendancy, they will commit a treason to the greatest interests that can be compromised.

And to think, on the other hand, of enhancing the military glory of France by the project previously alluded to, were even yet more inconsequent. The cry of victory with which the Gallic eagles were wont, but a little time ago, to stun the world, is yet fresh in the general recollection. To descend at once into a by-sort-of-warfare—to fall upon a lesser neighbour while an equal or superior one is already in the field, were a strange mode of effecting this object. The chiefs and old soldiers of Napoleon, who yet survive, and have enrolled themselves under the royal banners, must of course, continue to be the soul and directors of this army; and the theatre we must suppose to be alone worthy of *them*, is that on which the great stakes are played for. If Prussia, however, shall be so blind to her true interests as to countenance or abet the designs of Russia, in the remotest possible way, then, indeed, no one could at all object to see her Rhenish provinces seized upon by the left wing of the French army, in conjunction with the whole force of Hanover\*.

\* In such case, Hanover could bring into the field fifty thousand men at the least.

**DISMEMBERMENT OF RUSSIA, AND OF GREAT  
EMPIRES GENERALLY.**

BUT the extension of the Russian dominion is, after all, say some of our able journalists, a matter of no great importance; for it is impossible that so vast an empire can hold together—it must sink or collapse under its own weight—the subjugated states will throw off the yoke, and recover their independence, &c. &c. Such are amongst the vague and careless conjectures on which it is sometimes suggested to rely, in a matter involving no less than every great interest of every civilised community. But on what basis does this anticipation rest?

It seems to me, that, whatever defects there may be discernible in the conduct of the Russians, there is yet no evidence that they hold their conquests by a transient or insecure tenure. The proofs, I should say, are all on the other side.

It is now more than a hundred years since they have begun to busy themselves influentially in almost every great political transaction of Europe;

and throughout the whole course of that eventful period, they have never made peace without advancing their frontiers, and never lost a conquest by war or rebellion. Nor, it may be observed, is there any reason to suppose that the *warlike* qualities of the population of this state correspondingly decline as its means and circumference are enlarged. There is no relaxation in discipline, or falling off in courage, as yet perceivable, as was the case in their prototype legions of old. On those points, they are obviously progressive rather than deteriorative. In fact, Russia has received a great impetus. It yet obeys that impetus; and, rolling onward in the course into which it has been propelled, accumulates in volume, and accelerates in rapidity as it proceeds: and from what data it is assumed to have now arrived at the exact term of its extension,—that it will henceforth cease to be moved by the same impulse, or actuated by the same policy,—that it will forthwith recoil, crumble, and break off into fragments,—or how it is that any one can be so sanguine as to contemplate the probability of this occurrence, not by means of a vigorous and well-directed series of combined efforts from *without*, co-operating with internal causes of weakness within, but rather from some fortui-

tous, self-executed, spontaneous, and sudden disruption, calculated to arrest at once, and in sufficient time for the general preservation, the hitherto unresisted progress of this political leviathan, it is not easy for the uninitiated to imagine. There is no problem in Euclid more demonstrable than that peace in itself is preferable to war. But peace, *without regard to consequences*, can only be desired by the ignorant or the interested.

These are the sort of persons who would convert the adage of "sufficient for the day is the evil thereof" into a political maxim. But, if there be any one duty more incumbent than another on enlightened governments, it is that of providing for the future. In civilised and tolerably well-ordered communities, the people are usually both adequate and willing to take care of themselves, so far as regards the present and passing influence of events.

Between *personal* and *national* conquests, a wide distinction, it should be borne in mind, exists. The external acquisitions of Napoleon, for instance, were *his* rather than those of France. And yet, were it not for his latter departure from sound military principles, his presumptuous fatuity in attempting the overthrow of a great empire,—not by a justly calculated series of operations, but actu-

ally by a coup-de-main, at the very moment, too, in which he was undergoing defeats in the fourth year of a vain endeavour to subdue another, and far less numerous people, some thousand miles off; but, more than all, were it not for the Herculean efforts directed against him,—a very considerable portion of those countries might, at this day, have been under the Buonaparte instead of the Bourbon dynasty. But that extraordinary man, led away and intoxicated with success, and by an overweening confidence in the long ascertained ascendancy of his fortunes, is known to have singularly neglected many obvious precautions for the permanent maintenance of his rule over the countries he had overcome in arms. In this respect, he fell infinitely short of the consummate foresight and excellent generosity of the Macedonian hero\*, to emulate whom, it may be imagined, was not unfrequently his aim.

Candour, however, should likewise compel us to

\* One of the finest eulogies of Alexander to be met with in any language, is the following.—“Qu'est-ce que ce conquérant, qui est pleuré de tous les peuples qu'il a soumis? Qu'est-ce que cet usurpateur, sur la mort duquel la famille qu'il a renversée du trône verse des larmes?”—*De l'Esprit de Lotz*, Lib. x.

admit that an infinity of good must have arisen, and, perhaps, continues to arise, to some of the benighted states that sunk beneath the energy of Napoleon, by the shocks that were given by him to false opinion, and by the introduction of many excellent laws and regulations.

But there cannot be a better proof cited of the feasibility, not only of retaining, but of transmitting the most rapidly acquired and immense empire, than this, that notwithstanding the brief term of the Grecian conqueror's reign just alluded to, the vanquished nations submitted without a struggle to his feeble brother Arideus, and, on his death, to the then avowed usurpation of the principal generals. The dynasty of another brother, Ptolemy, reigned for centuries in Egypt; but the hereditary succession to the royal power was a point by no means ascertained by the laws or customs of Macedon.

Nothing, however, is more common than to adduce this early dismemberment of the Macedonian conquests, as an instance of the fate that awaits the Russian empire, in the event of its continued accession of territory. But never was any apparent similitude less borne out, on inquiry,

than this comparison will be found to be. I before drew the attention of the reader to the distinction between personal and national conquests. Those of Macedon fall purely under the former class ; those of Russia, under the latter. Macedon was a wretched and petty state, with physical means utterly disproportioned to the splendid fortunes that accrued to it. Not so Russia ; her overwhelming powers, in that respect, are beyond all comparison. It was not Macedon that conquered Greece, Egypt, and all central Asia : it is to the cunning, genius, and heroism of two extraordinary men, father and son, not natives even of Macedon, that these stupendous achievements are attributable. Both likewise were suddenly and prematurely cut off. It was the consciousness of the insufficiency of his inconsiderable inheritance to furnish resources, as a great dominant state, which, we may conclude, influenced Alexander in assuming so systematically the Persian character, and in amalgamating, so sedulously, himself and army with the Persian people ; and in no other way could he have conveyed those vast countries even to his generals. Hear what he himself is represented to have said, in reproving the mutineers at Opis. “ My father Philip (for with him it is ever fit to

begin) found you, at his arrival in Macedon, miserable and hopeless fugitives; covered with skins of sheep; feeding, among the mountains, some wretched herds, which you had neither strength nor courage to defend against the Thracians, Illyrians, and Triballi. Having repelled the ravagers of your country, he brought you from the mountains to the plain, and taught you to confide, not in your fastnesses, but in your valour. . . . But my father rendered you the masters of those, to whom you had been previously tributaries, subjects, and slaves; and, having entered the Peloponnesus, and regulated, at discretion, the affairs of that Peninsula, he was appointed, by universal consent, general of combined Greece. At my accession to the throne, . . . I conducted you from Macedon, whose boundaries seemed unworthy to confine you," &c. &c. Where is the similitude between this state of things and that which exists in Russia? In the former, the kingdoms that were overrun were as a world, compared with the narrow district which furnished the warriors by whom the achievement was first begun; for, as to the consummation of it, that is partly to be ascribed to the vanquished and completely conciliated Persians acting under the di-

rection of Greeks. On the other hand, Russia is already of far greater bulk and immensity than all the civilized nations put together, whom she is ambitious to subject to her influence, if not to her arms.

But the Russians themselves know better.—They compare their empire to that of the Romans, and with infinitely more reason. The one, it is true, is a single despotism,—the other was an aristocratical democracy,—adulterated likewise, though not in an equal degree, by personal slavery. The foreign policy of these dissimilar governments is the same. It was by a series of wars, and by exertions continued through some ages, that Rome became the mistress of the world. Russia is now in the second century of a resembling progress. It was not the Fabiuses, or Scipios, or Cæsars which gave her pre-eminence. It was the original impulse imparted by her law-givers and founders, by the warlike spirit and tendency to aggrandisement that was inherently constituted as the guiding principle of the national councils and character.

Neither is the gradual augmentation of the Russian power to be individually attributed to Alexei, Peter, Elizabeth, the Catherines or

Alexander, but to the engrafting by all of those sovereigns successively (with more or less of consistency) of almost exclusively military institutions upon vast physical means, well adapted for their reception and developement.

It is true that the Roman empire also fell to pieces—but not until after a lapse of three or four hundred years. But let us not suppose that because the Roman generals succeeded in trampling upon the world, that therefore Russia is also assured of success. Had the Punic invasion of Italy been in the most ordinary degree supported,—had the factions and venalities of Carthage permitted of supplies being sent to Hannibal, there seems very little reason to doubt that he would have crushed the proud republic, ere it had reached the goal of its ambition.—Neither will Russia be arrested in her course, if she be constantly allowed to select a theatre of war beyond her own frontiers.

But it may be observed that Russia consists of many nations. But it should also be remembered that the great mass of the people are Muscovites, who regard the Autocrat almost as a deity,—who are sufficiently devoted and numerous to retain, under *ordinary circumstances*, the subjugated circumference under the same chains by which they

themselves are bound. Besides, this whole mass, with the exception of the surface of society, are nearly in the same state of comparative barbarism.

Charlemagne's dominions were broken up at his death; but he had himself previously directed an allotment of them amongst his children. In like manner, Charles V. divided his immense possessions, previously to abdication, between his son and brother. That empire, therefore, did not fall by its own weight,—nor was it even restrained in its extension, by any enfeeblement arising from bulk or unwieldiness of size, although in reality it laboured under a most virulent inherent affection of weakness, unfelt and unknown in Russia, namely, the conflict of religious sects. Geographically, and politically also, disadvantages appertained to the empire of Charles, from which that of Nicholas is wholly free:—it consisted not of one great mass, under perfect, uniform, and unqualified subjection,—but of several distinct states, violently jealous of each other, and for the most part strongly agitated by internal faction;—besides which a great and hostile kingdom existed in the very centre of them.

Nevertheless, had not the chivalrous Francis, and his able successor, together with the Sultan

Barbarossa and the sturdy rebel Friar Luther, most perseveringly exerted themselves against the encroachments of the Pope and Emperor, all Central and Southern Europe must have fallen into their hands.

The despot Philip would have inherited those spacious domains, and our own heroic Queen had possibly been overborne by the superior armadas that, under such circumstances, might have been directed against her.

It is true that France, in this prolonged conflict, must have been exhausted in no ordinary degree. But, however considerable her pecuniary distress may have been during a limited period, it were evidently a thousand fold preferable to the permanent rule of the genuine Castilian disciples of Loyola, which had else inevitably been her fate to endure. Behold the condition to which they have reduced Spain !

Was it a wanton, unnecessary contest that was carried on with such unshaken constancy by William, both as Stadtholder and King ? On the contrary, there is every possible ground for apprehending that if that magnanimous Prince and his successors and allies had remained quiescent, France had then obtained, in a great degree, the

object of her vain glorious monarch, which was literally the establishment of an European sovereignty.

In both those cases, then, it was the hostile exertions of foreign states, and not the incumbent weight, or any debility attributable to extended dominion, that produced the results.

Very different, however, has been the duration of what may be termed national conquests to those which have been achieved suddenly by the ability or ambition of individuals: for instance, those of the Romans, Goths, Scythians, Arabs, Huns, Normans, Saxons, Franks, &c.

In fact, so far from the greater tendency being to instability or inadhesiveness, it is marvellous to observe how very long the most obviously disjointed and contemptible systems and governments maintain themselves, after every component part is impregnated to the core with decay. Whether this be attributable to the tenacity of opinion which ever lags so heavily behind events, or to what it may be assigned, I pretend not to divine.

Montesquieu foretells with eloquent regrets, but, let us hope, not with a prophetic spirit, the fall of the British constitution and power! A still more admirable writer goes yet further, and predicts

the wreck and annihilation of the "great globe itself." We will not then hesitate to admit, that the "vast Autocratic empire," and the formidable Autocratic armies, and military colonies\*, will (like all other institutions that have preceded them) sink, lose their force, consistency, and energy. But the great question in this case is,—when will that event come to pass?

Now, if history be any guide to us in these matters, it must be acknowledged that no military nation has ever yet VOLUNTARILY abstained from conquest, while there was any thing yet within its grasp to conquer; and that, from the point of palpable relaxation, degeneracy, and decline, to that of extinction or demolition of power, a long and dreary period of not less than centuries has almost invariably intervened: while, in the mean time, and nearly as invariably, both vanquished and victors have been alike hurled into a common turpitude! Every base, pusillanimous, and humi-

\* The original establishment of the Janissary system very nearly resembled, on a small scale, that of the colonies alluded to. Two centuries passed away before they lost their discipline and efficiency. Nor would they then, perhaps, have become disorganized and degenerate, were it not for the abandonment by their Sultans of the fatigues of the camp, for the enjoyments and voluptuousness of the harem.

liating vice then concentrates in the character of the former—while all the more harsh, ungenerous, and barbarous ones, become the habitual and unconscious propensities of the latter !

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## PEACE OF AMIENS.

IN 1803, opinions might and no doubt did differ, in this country, relative to the eligibility of going to war. The language then held by Napoleon was even more pacific than that of the Autocrat at present. Many there were, also, who were cajoled by it—put faith in it, and believed him sincere. But have we not since learnt that nothing was more remote from the fact ; that, while his words breathed nothing but moderation, peace, and goodwill, his ulterior views and those of his cabinet went to the utter extirpation of the British power ? that he was, in fact, a ruthless soldier, resolved to have whatever force could gain him ?

And, if we had not then taken up arms, ignorant as we at first were of war policy, and, therefore, lavishing resources without reaping an adequate return ; had we not subsidized the Austrians,

or at least co-operated in some way with them; had we subsequently refused to lend a helping hand to the patriots of the Peninsula; had we shrunk from committing our armies successively on the Tagus, the Ebro, and the Garonne;—if, in short, we had resolved to await, timidly, or supinely, or *prudently*, the storm on our own shores—*husbanding our resources*, as it would plausibly have been designated—what would have been the issue?

What our debt had now been, it is impossible to say. Our clear revenues, private and public, which are the important consideration, would most assuredly have diminished, and in a tremendous ratio.

Be this, however, as it may, no one can now reasonably deny that, in the case of our persevering neutrality, Napoleon had been enabled so to confirm his power over the continent, as must have left at his disposition a sufficient mass of force to reduce us, in the sequel, to the condition of a province,—when a French general, or proconsul, or titular sovereign, had unquestionably administered the then dependent government of these kingdoms—no doubt in perfect consonance with the orders

from time to time transmitted from the tent, court, or bivouac of the imperial usurper.

Then it would have been seen that all our interests, commercial and otherwise, were only to be viewed in their relative subserviency to those of France. Our money would then assuredly have been considered in the same light in which the Romans regarded the ships and elephants of Carthage—as the means of a rebellious warfare. For this purpose, therefore, if for no other, a rigorous system of impoverishment—that is to say, within a certain limit (for extreme poverty also breeds audacity)—would have been resorted to against us as an indispensable precautionary policy.

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PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.—ALEXANDER—  
NICHOLAS.

WITH a similar sort of plenitude, and almost omnipotence, of authority, has the Czar just invested some Muscovite *Senator*, as he is termed, with the unlimited government, by anticipation, of “ALL THE PROVINCES which shall be occupied by his armies *beyond the Danube!*” the Principalities being included in this investiture.

Now, the *second* province *beyond* the Danube (Roumelia), being the very next one to that now actually occupied by the heads of the Russian columns, will enable the Senator to extend the wand of his high office over the waters of the Mediterranean. How many more beyond these two provinces are to be comprehended under the ample “all,” it might be hazardous to conjecture ; but certain it is that, whatever may be the moderation of the Czar, his armies cannot stop there—they must absolutely go on, or recede.

Much acumen and ingenuity may possibly be exercised in defining the precise scope and meaning of the language employed by the Russian court,

and the assurances it has perhaps conveyed of its guileless intentions ; but it may well be questioned whether the recondite talent so displayed will answer any useful end. A celebrated and truly able politician, whose terse and epigrammatic sayings have been often quoted, is reported to have described “ words ” as given to us, for the purpose of disguising our “ thoughts.” The Prince of Benevento was much engaged in diplomacy,—to the proceedings of which we may conjecture his sarcastic aphorism more particularly applies.

*Faith* may be well in religion, but in politics, *distrust* is better. From the earliest periods\*, when tradition was the only record, to the present time, it has been the almost invariable etiquette to

\* St. Croix, in his learned treatise on the events of an era two thousand years back, observes with reference to a list of grievances advanced against Darius, that “The weakness of a neighbouring nation, strong political probabilities of success, and the destruction of an enemy, are often the real causes of wars, which are entered into with apparent principles of justice. The conqueror of Asia had no other motives. Polybius, with his usual acuteness, hath penetrated into them, and hath had the sagacity to separate them from those pretended reasons for hostilities, in which the Grecian vanity was too much interested, to allow of their suspecting the propriety.”

precede wars, however unjustifiable, by justificatory appeals.

But there is another and a safer way of proceeding in this instance, than by instituting an acute or critical inquiry into the bearing of some studied paper, drawn up possibly with the express intent of eluding this ingenious description of ordeal, namely, by the past policy of the state referred to,—its interests either real or apparent,—the character of its preparations,—the amount and position of its armies, magazines, depots, &c.

But we have been told of the moderation and good faith of the Emperor Alexander, and now the same qualities are as liberally bestowed on the Czar Nicholas. The former is indeed well known to have been of an amiable disposition and of great amenity and goodness of heart, whose memory therefore well deserves being cherished by his subjects. He was a successful, indefatigable administrator in all the departments; a martinet in military details, but destitute of the higher qualifications of that or any other art; a civilian by temperament; and, though incapable of creating great plans, labouring with a laudable and unwearied assiduity on those that were handed down to him by his celebrated progenitors. Furthermore;

it may fairly be assumed, that, in his greatest peril, he evinced a calm fortitude, and in the hour of victory was not devoid of equanimity. Here his panegyric ceases.

Fickleness, political immorality, and, to use a gentle term, political duplicity of the deepest die, are flagrantly distinguishable of his public deportment in other respects. From the treaty of Tilsit, or at least from the interview at Erfurt, he appears to have been totally deluded, perverted, or subdued by the magic superiority of Napoleon's genius. He came into Austria, to assist the Emperor Francis ; soon after he joined in an attack on that Prince, and accepted, as his share in the spoil, Austrian Galicia. He entered the North of Germany, ostensibly to restore the then profoundly and not undeservedly oppressed Prussian King : he was almost instantly beaten, and bribed into an iniquitous compact, which transferred to him a good portion of his Prussian friend's dominions. He now required, that his brother-in-law of Stockholm should imitate this memorable versatility, and declare war against England. The Swede refused to violate his engagements. Alexander invited the subjects of his relative to forswear their allegiance,—made pecuniary tenders to

the Swedish soldiery,—invaded Sweden,—permanently possessed himself of those commanding stations and bulwarks of the Baltic, Finland, Bothnia, Aland,—leagued with an infamous party of boyards against their Sovereign,—and, in short, compassed the deposition of the imprudent Gustavus.

For years he appears to have been perfectly content to witness and even aid in the open violence or flagitious machiavelism, by which the ancient monarchies of western and southern Europe were successively usurped or subverted. He pandered, in truth it may be said, to the terrific and wide-sweeping career of the French Emperor, on the condition (and that only partially conceded) that he might himself be permitted quietly to dismember, in a more gradual manner, the states of his weaker neighbours.

It was not the generous sympathy or the enlarged and magnanimous statesmanship of the Autocrat, which made him a chief actor in the emancipation of the nations. Far from it. He would have been—(deny it who can!)—an accomplice,—but the infuriate presumption of Napoleon would insist on his being also a degraded dependent.

And as for the intrinsic spirit of the Muscovite councils, let the reader compare the feeble and

deprecatory remonstrances of 1812, and the insolent subserviency of the autographic letter of 1807, with the equally well-judged, noble, and eloquent reply to the latter, on the part of our own King,—at a moment, too, when almost every other court and people were struck with stupor, astonishment, and fear, and it will be seen how little, in this respect, can be said for the late Emperor.

Had he, indeed, succeeded in peacable times, to a constitutional authority, he might, and probably would, have been a well-principled and beneficent prince ; but having, in effect, been born to a military one, he has performed the rôle allotted to him by the accident of birth, and fulfilled his part in the pursuits of a characteristically aggressive domination. And so it is that he contrived to appropriate districts, states, or provinces in Europe and Asia, of more than double the extent of the British empire, besides a prodigious tract, to which he laid claim and sent colonies, on the continent of America.

Scarcely any adjoining power has escaped the consequences of this purloining and incorporating system,—even China not excepted. It is but recently, 1823, that seven Khauns of the Kirghis

and Calmuck tribes exchanged the supremacy of Peking for that of St. Petersburg. Accordingly, the population of these dominions, which, at the accession of Alexander, was under thirty-six, amounted at his decease, by the lowest computation, to fifty-four or fifty-five millions.

If I mistake not excessively, the above is not a tirade, but a mere enumeration of historical facts. This, then, is the sovereign, whose immaculate political justice, and incorruptible moderation, we are wont to extol, and even adduce as a sure guarantee for the integrity of international rights, as a pledge that, under the asylum of his power, no infringement need be apprehended—unlimited confidence might be reposed, that no harm could be meant, and no sinister design harboured!

Of the present emperor less, of course, is known. When with the armies in France and Germany, he was scarcely twenty years of age, and not being heir to the crown, attracted little observation. His fondness, however, for the kingly profession of arms, or at least for the semblance of it, military organization and arrangement, especially in the higher and more scientific branches, have been

constantly and unequivocally displayed ; while his personal intrepidity and firmness were no less conspicuous during the insurrectionary movement at the period of his accession ; and which, it is averred, (by those who appear not unacquainted with the state of that country,) had considerable ramifications ; but the immediate explosion of which we may certainly attribute, in a very great degree, to the fermenting inaction\* of the army. A large unemployed army is everywhere a dangerous implement. The remedy has been now adopted.

On the accession of Nicholas, an opinion, pretty nearly in the following words, was expressed by one of the highest functionaries of the Empire, whose name, were it right to be mentioned, would carry with it, even in this country, a degree of authority. “ *Russia has now an emperor, whose*

\* “ That if war was perilous, peace likewise had its dangers ; that by leading back his armies into the interior, he should inclose, and concentrate within it, too large a mass of audacious interest and passion, which leisure and communication would occasion to ferment, and which he should then be no longer able to control ; that a direction must be given to these dangerous influences ; and that, after all, he feared less from them abroad than at home.” So said the late French Emperor.

*character is marked by much stronger traits, and who is of a far higher ambition than distinguished his late brother ; but those qualities will not suddenly reveal themselves. They will be gradually disclosed by his public conduct."* The truth or inaccuracy of this opinion will soon, from the greatness of the pending events, be resolved.

Few instances, I presume, if any, can be pointed out, of a sovereign succeeding, in the most vigorous spring-time of life, to unlimited power,—to the command of an immense, well-appointed, and warlike army, with difficulty restrained from action—who has not allowed these elements to develop themselves—who has not given the reins, in some degree, to his or their ambition.

But it surely must have required something like credulity, or at least a determined resolution to discard all thought of precaution—to have placed any stress on the upright political intentions of Alexander,—observing, as all must have done, that the general pacification of 1815—an epoch, when all the governments were unnerved, and exhausted by excessive and prolonged exertion, and when every people sighed for repose, was precisely that wherein the northern cabinet commenced the organization of a greater armament than any that

had been hitherto embodied during war ; and for which there is no possible mode of accounting, unless we suppose that some great ulterior project was in contemplation, or that some renewed and desperate attempt upon the existence of the empire was apprehended—which, as every one knows, was out of all question. In fact, no sooner was peace restored, than the greatest of all the military powers immediately converted the whole of her southwestern frontier into one vast military camp,—thus giving the most substantial grounds of inquietude, and imposing heavy burdens and expenses on several of the continental states.

And with respect to the reigning autocrat—although it is but the other day the diadem has descended to him, has he not already found time to prosecute successfully an aggrandizing policy ? The ink is scarcely dry which has signed away to him, by means of a most indefensible exercise of force, the banks of the Araxes,—and yet it is concluded that the same hand will gratuitously reject the splendid, and incomparably superior prize that now lies nearly prostrate for acceptance. We presume then, not only that a luxurious court will prefer the frozen swamps of the Neva, with their

worse than hyperborean atmosphere, to the superb and unequalled shores of the Marmora \* ;—but also that a young military monarch will be so reluctant to give umbrage to other nations,—that he is so averse to war, so enamoured of peace, and altogether so imbued with a fine sense of abstract right, that although this transcendant achievement (the ultimate aim of all the national conquests) be now ripe for execution, and, as it were, courts him on, he will yet forbear to give it effect. This is to be more than moderate.

It will be to disregard the fervent aspirations of his officers ; the desires of his clergy ; the wishes of his people (for on this subject even the serfs have an anxious sympathy) ; it will be to decline what comes recommended to him by every great name of Russia ; to be unmindful of his own glory ; to

\* “ The situation of the capital of the Ottoman empire, when viewed, for instance, from the summit of the tower of Galata, is beyond all conception superb. The city itself, with the elegant minarets of its innumerable mosques, the sea of Marmora, the lofty range of Mount Olympus, the canal of the Bosphorus, and the populous Asiatic town of Scutari, combine to form a picture familiar to many from panoramic representation, but otherwise of such splendid magnificence as to baffle all power of description.”—1819.

contemn the substantial interests of the empire,—and even, not improbably, to hazard what we may well conceive to be one of the chief bonds of union between the throne to which he has been preferred and the chiefs by whom it is upheld and surrounded, and who, it is no more than reasonable to suppose, now ardently and sanguinely look forward, through the medium of this very operation, to the possession in their own persons, or those of their descendants, of high appanages, lordships, and princely satrapies, amidst the softer climes and wealthier and more inviting regions of Southern Europe.

Therefore I contend, that there was nothing in the conduct, character, or circumstances of the late Monarch, which afforded a guarantee that views of aggrandizement were not contemplated and would not be pursued ;—and no less so,—that there is nothing known concerning the temper or situation of the reigning Prince, which can justify a similar confidence being reposed in his political abstinence and rectitude.

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COMMERCIAL, FOREIGN, AND MARITIME POLICY OF  
RUSSIA AFTER GAINING POSSESSION OF CONSTAN-  
TINOPLE.

BUT it is precisely the contingency we have some pages back contemplated—namely, the fall of the Turkish capital into the hands of the Czars, which has been so long and anxiously looked-to, as pregnant with momentous change.

It is well known that the site of this capital is, beyond all comparison, the central point of the sea and land communications, commercial and otherwise, of the old world,—combining also other and literally unrivalled advantages. “*The Promontory of Thrace, which stretches*” (says Gibbon) “*into the Propontis, and is placed between two seas, was unquestionably the most eligible situation in Europe for founding a city which might aspire to universal dominion.*”

Nor probably is the estimate of the historian in one iota exaggerated. Innumerable instances, ancient and modern, will doubtless occur to the reader, of the consequences of locality, even when affording entirely an inferior order of facili-

ties to those now referred to ; and also when contending against disadvantages that here do not exist. Amongst the former, perhaps the two most remarkable were Alexandria and Palmyra ; both surrounded by everlasting desert, and yet rising to an astonishing opulence, grandeur, and power, owing merely to the well-situated sea-port of the one, and the convenient mid-way position of the other, on the caravan route between the Levant shore and the Euphrates. A distinguished statician, Dupin, supposes the influence of the site of cities to be so great, that had Rouen been anteriorly chosen as the capital of France, it would have caused that country, instead of being a military, to have been a maritime and commercial state. Perhaps the converse also, with reference to England, had been no less true, *as far as our insular position would have permitted*, if York, instead of London, had been the chosen residence of government.

It was in pursuance of a similar idea, that Peter the Great forced his nobles to follow him to a port on the Baltic, to which they have not even yet conquered their repugnance. Nor was the project without as much result as could fairly be anticipated from it, considering that its ap-

proaches are navigable only for little more than half the year ; that it is at one of the most inhospitable, unfruitful, and ungenial extremities of the empire ; and that it is, unluckily, more contiguous to the sources than the navigable estuaries of the great rivers, along which the mass of the Russian resources lie. But the founder of St. Petersburg had then no alternative ; he could not reach the South. Eventually it will, perhaps, be no more than the station of a governor-general of the northern provinces, and of the admiralty of the Baltic.

The choice of antique Byzantium as a chief seat of the imperial power of Constantine, is distinguishable on many accounts. It was coeval with the dethronement of Paganism, and erection of Christianity as a state religion ; and also was apparently a means of preserving the relics of Roman greatness for nearly a thousand years beyond their duration, in the more ancient mistress of the empire, which, it may be added, was already far advanced in decay. For many ages, though peopled by a contemptible, effeminate race, the united dregs of Greece and Italy, it continued to be the depository of whatever of letters, arts, wealth, or splendour were yet in existence.

A fierce band of martial puritans at length burst into Europe. Having soon overrun several provinces, their attention was recalled, and eager cupidity excited, by the celebrity and reputed treasures of this place. For good part of a century, isolated and enfeebled though it was, it baffled or deterred its ferocious beleaguers, ultimately proving their Capua, and thus passively contributing to avert, from other parts of Europe, what else seems to have been far from impossible, the substitution of the Koran for the Gospel—so far, at least, as the force of arms could effect the conversion.

Thenceforward, during a lapse of four hundred years, it has been bound down and trodden upon in the dust, by merciless ulemas, atrocious soldiers, and the iron and blood-stained sceptre of the Sultans. Such then has been the perverse fate of this capital—and thus, for so long a period, have its perfectly unparalleled capabilities been in abeyance.

To any people not anti-social or sunk into a torpid and slothful inactivity, such an acquisition must be of the greatest possible value ; to Russia it were beyond all price. Rapid without precedent as have been her strides in the lofty career marked

out for her, she has nevertheless been most materially retarded by embarrassments peculiar to her position. The ice of the north, and the closed gates to the southward, have hitherto palsied every effort, and barred every approach to a deployment of the maritime means in which happens to consist one of her chief staple and indigenous products.

The removal for ever of such deeply felt and mortifying obstacles, by the appropriation of a great port, whose attributes are not only above all parity, but which must have the effect of nearing, by some hundred miles, the most fertile regions of the empire to the rich markets of the west, is what every Russian, with the least ray of intellect or sense of the national interests, must most ardently desire.

Granting then, suppositionally, that this anticipated event may have already taken place, and that nothing immediately occurs to disturb the stability of the conquest—beyond, perhaps, the desultory attempts of eastern hordes, or the elaborate remonstrances of some of the western courts (likely to be about as effective as were those of Canute against the encroachments of the sea),—we will now cast our view a little in advance, and

imagine, during some few years, a course of policy which will go far to lull suspicion, to sooth inquietude, and discountenance all advocacy of war.

Let us then conjecture that, with this one exception, which will be defended upon plausible pretexts of the inevitable nature of the case, a general spirit of forbearance and even a disposition to concession on every other point, marks in the commencement the political bearing of the Autocrat: for the materials of resistance elsewhere may yet, possibly, be esteemed too formidable to be meddled with indiscreetly; and so, for some time, no violent assumption calculated to arouse the general feeling in other states will be adventured on. Peace, mutual concession, mutual confidence, liberality, commercial prosperity, good order, repose, and tranquillity, &c., will be the unctuous expressions now in habitual use with this aspiring cabinet, —the only views it will acknowledge to entertain. The ministers of other courts, anxiously wishing that such may, in truth, be the case, will be the more disposed to rely on so satisfactory a prospect for the future.

Constantinople will, at least for a certain term, be made a free port. Every possible facility, pro-

tection, and encouragement will also be given to foreign merchants. The profits of the exchequer will thus, in the first instance, be wholly remitted and disregarded. And thus will commerce suddenly be impelled into those new and congenial channels; and the important influence, everywhere, of the mercantile class, be conciliated and predisposed to exert itself against the disturbance of pacific relations.

The newly-acquired domains will then be arranged on a stable footing,—the roads improved,—forests thinned,—marshes drained, and settlers invited from all parts; but not from Russia—there the formality of an invitation on those occasions is not resorted to. Thence they are sent off in tens and twenties of thousands\*, in the heats of summer

\* Two instances will be enough,—the one in 1778, the other quite recent, about the year 1824.—“While I was in the quarantine at the Russian frontier, there passed seventy-five thousand Christians, obliged by the Russians to emigrate from the Crimea (thirty-five thousand, seven hundred and sixty-nine males). The Armenian women, who came from Kaffa, were more beautiful, and, I think, approached nearer that perfect form which the Grecians have left in their statues, than the women of Tino. These people were sent to inhabit the country abandoned by the Nogai Tatars, near the west coast of the sea of Azof (Palus Mæotis); but the winter coming on before the houses built for them were ready, a great part of

or the dead of winter, as it suits the caprice of a minister, and with as little ceremony as a herd of cattle are driven into some new pasture.

Grants and allotments of land, according to the established practice in these matters, will now be conferred on the magnates, generals, and superior officers in the cortege of the conqueror ; and the exuberant soil thus appropriated, hitherto so long fallow under the hoof of the barbarian, will ere long begin to render up a fruitful return to the calculated labours of the serf.

them had no other shelter from the cold than what was afforded them by holes dug in the ground, covered with what they could procure ; they were people who all came from comfortable homes, and the greatest part perished ; seven thousand only were alive a few years ago."—ETON.

"Not more than three years ago, twenty-five thousand souls were ordered to be removed from the frontiers of Poland to the territory of the Tchernemooski Cossacks, their numbers having greatly diminished, from various causes, since their compulsory migration by Catherine. The reinforcement arrived in the beginning of winter, when numbers perished from the inclemency of the season and from want. Strange to say, the only reason given for this injudicious time for removal was, that the order had arrived to transport them, and that, consequently, they could not be returned in the population report of the new year, as inhabitants of the old government, and must be included in that of the Tchernemooski Cossacks."—JONES.—(1827.)

Those of the pachas, agas, or beglerbegs of Asia Minor, who may not have already renounced all nominal allegiance to their ancient head, will be invited to do so. This will answer as a temporary arrangement. They can afterwards be successively put down or reduced to subserviency as opportunities arise. The reflux of the European Mussulmans will no doubt cause confusion. The courage of the Sultan, should he still have eluded the bow-string or the sword, and be really possessed of that quality in any energetic degree, can alone serve to gild the decline of this odious domination, and furnish a creditable exit, as a ruling dynasty, for the Osmanic race. Soon he must sink into insignificance; and the boon of a retiring pension will, if he please, be his alternative. Such was the lot of the traitor Stanislaus,—of the Dukes of Courland,—of the Kauns of the Crimea,—of King Heraclius of Georgia, and of several other scions of royalty, of more or less importance, who have been successively relieved by the considerate Moscovites from the “*cares\**” of government.

\* “Cares enough are already united to the extent of her dominions” (those of Russia). Declaration of War, 1828. There is no rash avowal, however, of a resolve not to increase the burthens thus so gently complained of.

But in the mean time Nicholas will have added the crown of the once celebrated Eastern Empire to those of all the Russias,—or will have placed it on the head of one of his brothers,—or have amalgamated the country as an integral frontier province; with perhaps a nominally separate administration, as that of Poland. It will not signify which. But this last decisive step may, perhaps, be delayed, at least the public manifestation of it, until some causes of dissension amongst the other cabinets have been sufficiently nurtured, or the general feeling of Europe becomes tolerably reconciled to this view of the affair.

During all this time, a most imposing force will be kept in readiness on advanced positions. Nor will any endeavour be omitted to exaggerate the rumours of its great numerical amount. This will be no more than consecutive to the system which has been pursued, with very little variance, for the last thirteen years,—peace with words, and war by preparation.

Forthwith, new and closer bonds of intercourse will be opened with the states around the Mediterranean. France excepted, they are all politically diseased. The Russians, though unacquainted with factions, in the ordinary sense, at home, are

pretty well versed in the management of them abroad. It is not unlikely that Sicily will soon be coveted as an advanced post, and that an interest will be sought to be created in that island. The alliance with the United States of North America, we may be well assured, will be one of the most intimate. A community of object, the subversion of our naval and commercial supremacy\*, will lead to and cement this incongruous and disingenuous union,—disingenuous it certainly will be on the part of our free and enlightened descendants.

Soon the number of the British pendants in the Mediterranean, and also the land forces on that station, must receive a considerable augmentation.

As immediate a result, however, will be the establishment of relations with the court of the Escorial, of the most confidential nature. Ferdinand (if he still reigns,) will at once be taken under the special protection of his Imperial Brother of the east. The warm solicitude of Russia relative to the domestic affairs and system of government in Spain have been already pretty strongly evinced: nor is

\* It was to effect this express purpose that, about fifty years ago, Russia, taking advantage of our distress in the American war, placed herself at the head of what was called the *armed neutrality*.

it unlikely, that, as a mark of particular friendship, and in compliance with entreaties to that effect, the Emperor may be prevailed on to send to Madrid some half-dozen thousand good Muscovite troops, as a household guard and security for the royal person, against the plots of the Descamisados.

Simultaneously with these arrangements, a new and general \* impulse will be given to all the commercial overland intercourse with the East. To promote this purpose, which will have a military and political even more than a commercial object, the merchants will be invited to place establishments under the guarantee of the government—at Trebisonde, Erzeroum, Mussool, Bussora and Bagdad ;—at Khiva, Balk, Bokhara †, and Samarcand ‡. “ Depuis quelques années, (says Gamba,

\* The readiness of the Russian government to be at great charges for purposes of this nature was fully evinced by their conduct in regard to Odessa. When it became an object to give that ill-chosen and worse-situated port, a temporary prosperity, ships were actually built at the public expense for the use of any tolerably intelligent foreign speculator, who might have come there without other credentials than a mere recommendation of respectability.

† See note in an afterpart of the volume.

‡ Up to the middle of the last century,—when the Russians compelled our company at Astrakan, at the head of which Hanway was, to withdraw—we carried on a considerable com-

consul-general—Tiflis, 1826,) un assez grand nombre de marchands Russes de l'intérieur viennent s'embarquer à Astrakhan pour le Golfe de Koultioug, sur la côte méridionale de la Mer Caspienne ; de ce point ils vont en caravan à Khiva, et jusqu'à Boukhara, en traversant le pays des Turcomans, qui occupent une partie de la côte."

To these ends a secure armed protection will, where necessary, be provided,—the roads and river-navigations will be improved,—dams and weirs will be removed,—aids in point of conveyance, especially on the Caspian, Tigris, and Oxus, afforded,—and lucrative privileges, or what nearly amounts to the same thing, fiscal exemptions, granted. The ukase of 1821, on this subject, is an indication of this course being likely to be pursued—collaterally, and at no considerable distance of time, the Imperial treasury will be amply indemnified.

"Il n'est pas douteux, (says the same writer, who denounces the commercial superiority of Britain as a grievance, against which all nations should

merce on the Caspian and with Bokhara, Samarcand, &c. It is worthy of remark, that the Tartarians along the eastern shore of the Caspian use the tea-leaf in a far greater proportion than we do. The land-carriage of it, therefore, cannot be expensive, for the people are not rich.

unite,) qu'une grande partie du commerce de l'Asie reprendra son ancienne route, parce qu'elle est plus courte; plus avantageuse, et qu'elle n'est dominée par aucune compagnie privilégiée." This zealous commercial functionary is probably a little too sanguine in his views,—but it appears that the Russian government have favourably received the plans in conformity with them.

From London to the ports of the Indian Peninsula generally, the voyage is estimated at sixteen or eighteen thousand miles. From Constantinople to Bombay or Surat is at most three thousand, including four \* hundred of land-carriage, in a country abounding in cheap means of transport, namely, mules, camels, and draft-bullocks, with the redeeming conveniency of passing through a most important intermediate mart, Erzeroum †.

\* This land-carriage, as before observed, lies between Trebisonde and Moussul.—From Moussul to Bagdad is two hundred miles, navigable for large flats. From thence to the Gulf, the river has the appearance of a vast canal,—slow, deep, and level—and is navigable for large sea vessels.

† "In the event (says Colonel Macdonel Kinneir, our present envoy at the court of Persia) of any European power ever undertaking the invasion of India, there is no spot, east of Constantinople, better calculated for assembling a large force, than the plain of Erzeroum; horses and cattle

This, of course, supposes the latter city to be in the possession of the Russians ; which, in point of fact, may even now be the case. Between the Volga (on which steam-boats are already established) and the Don, there is about fifty miles of land-carriage—the connecting canal not being yet open, although it is supposed to be very nearly completed. On this short over-land transit, there is already considerable traffic carried on, in which above fifteen thousand carriages\* are, during the season, in constant employment. And here also,

are cheap and abundant, forage is everywhere to be procured in the spring and summer, and a considerable stock of corn may be collected from the neighbouring provinces. The roads are excellent at this season, and well calculated for the transportation of artillery in the level parts of the country, where carts drawn by oxen are much in use with the natives. The inhabitants of the town carry on an extensive trade with all the large cities in Turkey and Persia, particularly with Constantinople, Bagdad, and Erivan." This, however, is not the line that the Russians will probably adopt for an attempt upon India. The eastern shore of the Caspian and the Aral is evidently more eligible to be their base of operations.

\* A good part, however, of these are engaged in conveying fish. The fishery on the Caspian is astonishingly productive. All Russia is supplied from it, and the quantity required is by no means inconsiderable, the fast of the Lent being kept with great punctuality.

so very moderate is the expense of land-carriage, that many of the boats which ascend the Volga are broken up and carried across to the Don, there to be reconstructed for navigating that river.

The two great lines of trade from the East to the Black Sea, which it is likely the Russians will now endeavour to establish, will pass through the Persian Gulf\* to Trebisond—and from the borders of Tartarian China, Bokhara, the Punjab, &c., to the embouchure of the Don.

From the entrance of the Don, and from Trebisond, it will converge to Constantinople as an entrepot, and thence be transmitted into the Mediterranean, and up the Danube and the other great rivers, probably by steam. Coal abounds especially about Taganrog,—lying even in some districts on the surface. From the Danube to the Rhine is no great distance, It has been long projected

\* Pearls, for all the Eastern markets, form a much more considerable branch of commerce than might be supposed, from the comparatively small quantity of them used in the ornament of European dress. For some few years a very lucrative pearl fishery has been carried on by the Arabs in the Persian Gulf. A number of large vessels are constantly employed in it. During the recent period, when so many fictitious, fraudulent, or ill-judged joint-stock companies were created in London, an attempt was I believe made with respect to this fishery, which failed. This is to be regretted.

to connect these rivers : the expense, it appears, would be moderate ; Buonaparte estimates it, in the Memoirs ascribed to him, at about seven hundred thousand pounds. All this traffic, now enumerated, may, and probably will, be carried on, without any sort of participation on our parts—except on the Indian Seas. The relief from anarchy and spoliation, and the improved condition of the Lesser Asia, &c., granting that such will ensue, might no doubt be highly beneficial to our manufacturing interests, could we go into their markets on equal terms with the subjects of the dominant State. But the prohibitory \* system, already unscrupulously resorted to by the latter, for the protection of her infant manufactures and of her trade generally, leaves not a doubt that our passage through the Bosphorus will, *after a time*, be gra-

\* Four years back a Russian embassy was sent to Peking ; since then a most important increase has taken place in the caravan trade with China : it is to favour this, that several articles of Indian produce, which used to be sent from London to Russia, are, within the last year or two, rigorously prohibited. There is no longer any favour shewn to the English merchant in Russia. The tea brought by these caravans is of better flavour than ours, but much more expensive. It has already found its way in small quantities into the German and French markets.

dually so hampered and impeded with restrictions, that British merchants will not find it for their interest to persevere in the attempt. On this point some further developement will be found in a subsequent note.

By means of the intimate intercourse that may thus subsist between Constantinople and the East, connexions and correspondence will be established with Caubul, Lahore, Sind, the Mahratta's, &c. Emissaries will penetrate into those countries ;—the project of re-establishing the overthrown musnuds of every class will be diligently disseminated ;—the more warlike and dissatisfied portion of the population will be incited to prepare and organize themselves, under the intimation that a general attack is contemplated against the British ascendancy, both in Europe and Asia ; auxilliary aid, too, will of course be tendered, and the fidelity of our native troops tampered with.

Thus will the public mind of those countries be thrown into a state of high excitement and effervescence: for, notwithstanding the ameliorative character of the British sway, from various circumstances, some of them beyond control, others unintentional, India is filled, throughout every part of its extent, with the families of ruined zemindars,—

defeated chiefs,—chastised Pindarries,—and de-throned rajahs or nabobs, with their numerous followers, relatives, and adherents. A large population of disbanded soldiery also exists, in many of the central or north-western states, whose caste and destination by inheritance is that of arms;—accustomed to military adventure, to lawless and predatory habits, individually daring, who are now without resource, and who sigh for action and revenge.

Neither, perhaps, would the idea of restoring to a portion of his ancient supremacy, the Mogul Emperor\*, still holding by our permission his nominal court at Delhi, be without effect, at least amongst the ten millions of Mahometans scattered over the Peninsula.

Those proceedings alone would compel us to add to our Indian army by at least fifty thousand men (European or native); and thus will commence a rapidly increasing expenditure with as rapid a diminution of receipts.

\* “Perhaps the only pretence which any forecasting enemy can have imagined likely to awaken sensation, would be the restoration of efficient rule to the house of Timour; while such a war-cry would have been a call on the fealty of the Sovereign of Oude,” &c.—*Marquess of Hastings's Summary*.

And again—“There is in India (says the same authority) a numerous class, by descent and by habit, from early youth, professedly devoted to a military life.”

An appeal will then doubtless be addressed by us to the court of Constantinople, relative to the use made of the Czar's name on the frontiers and in the interior of India. Explicit and unqualified disavowals will follow, together with warm and fervent protestations of undiminished amity: perhaps, even the idea will be treated as a mere calumny, a "malevolence," as the rumour of ambitious views has been designated in one of the late manifestoes.

Thus, by no more than an insidious and untangible mode of warfare, will any advantages derivable from those great possessions, (capable, under other circumstances of yielding us, it may be hoped, ere long, not less, in surplus revenue and commercial profit, than several millions annually)\* be worse than neutralized; the Indian debt will not long remain at its present amount; loans

\* "*After revolving every circumstance with the coolest caution, I cannot find any reason why, subsequently to the present year, an annual surplus of FOUR MILLIONS sterling should not be confidently reckoned upon. THIS OUGHT NATURALLY TO INCREASE; for the causes which will augment the receipt have nothing in them tending to require further charges.*"—MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.

"There is every just ground to reckon on its progressive augmentation."—*Ibid.*

will be obtained from the oriental shroffs with difficulty, and at heavily usurious interest ;—and yet this will be termed a peace establishment. When governing a conquered people by means of their own armies, the purse, let it be remembered, is at least as necessary as the sword. The regular disbursement of pay is almost the only tie upon the fidelity of troops of this class.

But to return to the proceedings of the Russians.

The Black Sea, which, during more than one former era, was the heart of an active and most lucrative industry,—whose bosom was wont to be covered by the barks of the unskilful navigators of those times,—whose shores were studded, at different epochs, with thriving settlements and prosperous towns, will thus again become what its position so admirably adapts it for ; and its winds, ports, and currents, necessarily be as familiar to the mariner of every nation as are now the tides and soundings of the Thames.

Here is a positive good achieved, so far as the countries alluded to are separately and immediately concerned ; and is it proposed to obstruct or finally prevent those grateful and highly gratifying ameliorations ?—Certainly not. The object of this humble but earnest attempt is, that they should go

to the formation, or at least to the preparation for the formation, rather of a new and a rival state, or federacy of states, of ordinary strength, than be allowed to become accessory to the further development and augmentation of one in another quarter, previously too great for any salutary purpose. That the present condition of these affairs should rather be made subservient to the laying of the basis of one or more states, which, though they may, indeed, be less rapid in their earlier career of improvement, will not only be beneficial, but also innoxious to others ; and which may yet, in the end, attain to a height of moral eminence, and real social advancement, beyond what the purely despotic and serfage system of Russia can by possibility lead to.

It is not, of course, that Russia or any other country may become rich, that can be a just cause of inquietude. *The converse is known to be the case.* The exception here (and it is surely a valid one) —is, that this new competitor in the race of public prosperity and wealth, is at the same time a puissant military power, — in the full march of conquest—with adaptations and capabilities for the following up of this universally hostile policy, which even antecedently were incompatible with the

actual or at least prospective independence of every community within its reach. The instance is a distinct one. With the great sinews of war—"IRON AND MEN," she is already but too well provided. If to these be added, to any considerable amount, an extended "MARITIME COMMERCE AND ITS CONCOMITANT, GOLD," where, it may be asked, can there be then found an expedient for arresting her overwhelming course?

It is on the prosperity of France and England, and the integrity of their independence, that undoubtedly depend the interests of civilization, and of free and healthful institutions in every part of the Old World. And if any essential prejudice be done to the relative strength or future security of those two States, in permitting the transference of a considerable territory from under a cruel tyranny to a more gentle but likewise incalculably more potent despotism—then the remedy is worse than the disease—we hazard all for the relief of a part.

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### PRESENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF EUROPE.

It were in vain to deny, and injudicious to slight, the efficient influence of that modern engine of opinion and government—the periodical press. It is powerful in itself, and the exercise of its power adds to its strength. There is in the last Quarterly Review, which I have but this moment seen, an article on the State of International Relations subsequent to the late peace of Paris.

This concise essay takes a comprehensive survey of its subject,—developes, *for the most part*, just views,—and is pervaded by an excellent spirit.

The merit it displays, and the sound basis its theory is built on, renders it the more incumbent to mark the importantly erroneous conclusion at which it arrives.

The Reviewer examines the different historical periods in which it became INDISPENSABLE TO CONFEDERATE,—at one time, against the House of Austria,—at another, against the House of Bourbon ;—and fully recognizes the fact, that henceforth the great object of the general diplomacy must be that of arranging and giving impulsion to the elements of resistance, not against either of

the former, but against this new power which has entered into our federative system. This is of course not to be denied, but it is put in a too feeble, and generalized manner.

The inconvenient preponderancy is indeed acknowledged, and also the clear necessity of looking forward to the combination of means for counteracting its pressure and operation. But the amount and character of that preponderancy, as well as the degree of urgency for proceeding to the adoption of those measures, the expediency of which is so unconditionally conceded, are evidently seen through a very vague and indistinct medium.—In fact, the question of degree, (here a most momentous one,) can only be approximated by means of a tedious and laborious inquiry into, and comparison of, a considerable body of details, which not a great many persons are disposed to submit to. Such is far too dull a vocation for ingenious or brilliant discursive political theorists. Besides, on this particular topic, I rather think that no great firmness of opinions can easily be attained, without some practical knowledge of military affairs, or at least, peculiar aptness for apprehending them.

The diplomacy of Europe conformable to this

new state of things, is, says this clever writer, as yet in embryo, unformed—chaotic ; no treaties, as he states, have been as yet entered into, of the smallest importance, which bear upon this point, or afford the least promise of a refuge against the clouds and storms impending in the north over the general horizon.

This is but too true :—and furthermore, if the notion elicited in reference to this point, were acted on, the desideratum of adequate preparatory alliances would never be attained, or would assuredly be attained too late: inasmuch as a continued passive quiescence and waiting for events is, in effect, what is approved and counselled, in the paper referred to, as the line of policy now most befitting the principal powers interested in resisting the Northern Cabinet. This is unconsciously to plead the cause and facilitate the dark designs of the latter.

If England and France are not to take the initiative in fortifying civilization against a coming danger—on whom is it meant that that great duty should devolve? Is it the Grand Seignor that we are to look to for the timely preparation of those alliances? Is it the Prince Metternich—whose intrigues have so successfully gone to repress, not

promote civilization,—whose shallow but consummate ingenuity has for so many years been employed, not for the amelioration and honest advancement of the Empire over which he is supreme,—but to the extinction of internal freedom and external independence throughout the world? Is it from the enlightened and respectable, but universally enthralled and insignificant members of the Germanic Confederation that we are to anticipate this indispensable desideratum? Are we to take for our guides in this matter the Court of Berlin\*, which—had its generous and high-spirited people permitted—would have still crouched, even after the Russian campaign, beneath the chariot-wheels of Buonaparte—and which has since so unwisely broken its faith with that same generous people, whose patriotic enthusiasm rescued it from ignominy? The Pope, Don Miguel, and Ferdinand VII., are, it is scarcely necessary to observe, more likely to clog than assist our devices for obstructing the head of the Greek Church, the leader of the Holy Alliance, and the great protector of the vile faction which

\* Every one is aware of the exemplary amiability in private life of the Prussian Sovereign and royal family; but in state emergencies other qualities than these are requisite.

has triumphed in the Peninsula and is struggling for resuscitation in France.

If it be true that Russia has arrived at too great a degree of power,—if the diplomacy of Europe requires to be reconstructed, and should in future be directed to the restraining of that power,—if the moral and political condition of France and England render them the fitting guardians of free institutions and of the European common weal,—then there is not a moment to lose on the part of the two latter, in taking the initiative,—in placing themselves in front of the nations, in giving such order, proper direction, and consistency, to the international relations generally, as is best and most vigorously adapted to meet the pressing exigence of this new state of things.

The writer goes on to recommend, most properly, the speediest possible realization and consolidation of the freedom and power of Greece,—with a view to its becoming a safeguard and barrier of Europe against the irruption of the Muscovites, and of being the future theatre of the contests of France, England, and Austria, against the Czars,—as the Netherlands were, during the ancient confederacies, against the alternate ascendancy of the Houses of Bourbon and Austria,

There is here an inaccuracy. The Netherlands were but too often the battle-field of Europe, but they were never, in themselves, a barrier against the progress of any great power. They brought but little weight into either scale. It was their feebleness, their wealth, and the supplies with which they abounded, that rendered them so eternally the prey and victim of conflicting armies. It has been only recently that an inherent strength for self-defence has been sought to be imparted to them by the boon of independence, and by their re-union with Holland,—certainly one of the best results of the revolutionary wars.

Livadia, Attica, and the Peloponnesus numbered, previously to this cruel and exterminating contest, about a million of inhabitants. Perhaps one-third or one-fourth do not now survive the miseries of want and the swords of their tyrants. The soil is poor, but the situation excellent. Let us suppose that, by commerce and the influx of strangers, the population amounts in ten or twenty years hence even to two millions; and then what species of obstacle could this diminutive state for a moment present to the myriad Russians—whether advancing from Thrace, the Danube, or the Dnieper?—for as to which of these shall then be

the boundary of the Czar's dominion seems, to the author of the sketch adverted to, to be matter of comparative indifference. In short, the premises laid down are excellent, but the conclusion most lame and halting. He perceives the dangerous and growing supremacy of Russia, and proposes that Austria, France, and England should direct their exclusive attention to the restoration of Greece, as a remedy for this evil.

The drift of this advice would suit inimitably with the views of the Russian cabinet. ~~THUS, WE SHOULD BEGIN THE CONTEST,~~ (which he admits, the diplomatists should make arrangements for eventually entering on,) by surrendering, if Russia insists upon it, the rich intermediate dominion, calculated to add so enormously to those powers of aggression, to check and limit which is the object sought to be attained !

A strange mode this of arresting the advance of the Czar,—by voluntarily, in the very first instance, retreating, as it may be termed, seven or eight hundred miles,—thus at once shifting the scene of action, by that distance, to the rear; and so evacuating, or at least yielding up to the enemy all the political advantages belonging to so vast, strong, and prolific a neutral territory,

before a blow were struck,—instead of endeavouring to contend on more equal terms along the shores of the Black Sea, in preference to those of the Mediterranean,—or rather, it should be said, on the right bank of the Pruth,—for that in reality should be the Rubicon—the true position of the out-posts of Europe, and beyond which, should they be permitted to retrograde, subjugation and calamity can alone be the augured consequences!

I take leave to assert, without fear of contradiction, and regardless of the imputation of presumption, that this country is deeply, nay vitally interested to prevent the establishment even of a pulk of Cossacks to the south of the Pruth; and I support my assertion, and am emboldened in my convictions, by the words of the high authority I have more than once before appealed to,—who did not hesitate to declare from his place in Parliament, and as first minister of the Crown,—that, “IF THEY (his opponents) ANSWERED, ‘*Let Russia take all her conquests, and drive the Turks out of Europe, we have no interest in it;*’ “ WITH THOSE WHO MAINTAINED SUCH A PROPOSITION HE WOULD NOT ARGUE!”

And this was said when Russia had not Poland;—when she had not Finland;—when her southern

and almost every portion of her frontier was far within its present line, and when her strength and resources were, in every respect, so much less matured and consolidated than they now are !

The ardent desire of the Russians to possess a fleet, has long, expensively, and even prematurely been displayed. And thus it is, that though incapable hitherto of adequately employing them, they have usually, nevertheless, incurred the burden of maintain about fifty sail of the line ; a large proportion of which are necessarily frozen up during nine months of the year,—the remainder being at all times without any egress to the ocean.

A new era must, under those circumstances, be anticipated in naval affairs. Russia having at length accomplished the establishing herself on the Mediterranean, will descend into the arena as a maritime power. The port of Constantinople cannot now fail, from its resources and locality, to become, in a very short time, the most formidable arsenal in the world.

But very few and unimportant marine stores will any longer be necessary to be sent from the north, by the Borysthenes. The forests\* of Asia Minor,

\* The timber of which is considered superior to the English oak.

the iron of Caucasus, the copper of Calcedon, the hemp of Synope and Trebisonde, celebrated for its long staple and strength, all will flow to the provisioning of the depôts of the Bosphorus. *A more extended application of steam, as an auxiliary, will also probably be essayed.* The extraordinary cheapness of ship-building in the Marmora has been already alluded to.

No great number of years is likely to elapse before the Czar will have a hundred sail of the line in construction, or exercising in the Marmora and Euxine, manned by the expert Greek and docile Russian, and possibly under the severe and skilful direction of North American officers. If Napoleon had had such unassailable lakes on which to make sailors, the invasion of this country might not have been impracticable,—the war might, perhaps, have taken another turn.

Nor in this comprehensive course of preparation, will the Autocrat be reduced to falter from the paucity of means. No sooner does his flag float in apparent security over the “seven-throned-city,” than there will assuredly be found gambling millionaires of the Stock Exchange, quite ready to enter into compact with his Imperial Majesty, for the advancing of all necessary aids towards the

furtherance, on the largest scale, of those great and useful objects. Not that the contractors will trouble themselves in the least, as to the purpose to which these loans are likely to be applied. Whether they shall, or shall not, be raised in order to provide the munitions of war against the country of those by whom they may have been furnished, is a point that will not be too curiously inquired into.

Ten millions\* sterling have been recently raised for Russia in London. And yet we have claims upon the consideration of the millionaires—for honour, and even authority and command, being here the reward of wealth, much more frequently than wealth is of honour, there is thus, it may be said, a more favorable market provided by our laws and customs for their money, than in any other part of the world. This, however, will not prevent the dealers in an article for which there is such universal competition, from disposing of it to the highest bidder—friend or foe—for good or for evil purpose.

\* Altogether, in the ten years subsequent to 1816, there appears to have been lent by *English capitalists, to foreign governments*, ONE HUNDRED AND FOUR MILLIONS STERLING. *This is the nation that complains of poverty!*

**OF THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF THE BRITISH POWER,  
MARITIME, COMMERCIAL, AND REVENUAL.**

**THE** Russians will now begin to feel strong, and to assume a higher tone towards their European brethren. In the mean time we shall have been going on without any very remarkable occurrence to observe upon :—our external commerce and financial resources reduced, it is true, but the public expenditure likewise lowered as far as possible,—several of the national establishments, however, being consequently and unavoidably permitted to sink into a degree of dilapidation.

But if the establishment of a popular frame of government in the Spanish and Italian Peninsulas, on the plains of the Guadalquiver and of Naples, be found displeasing and inconsistent with the Muscovite ideas on legislation, then it cannot be denied that the existence of free constitutions with the inseparable palladium of a free press, must be at least as obnoxious if permitted to endure in France and England.

When, therefore, by the success of its present

measures, this colossal state shall have secured so considerable an accession of strength as to warrant its throwing off the *SUAVITER* and confronting the other Cabinets, which it can scarcely yet prudently hazard doing—is it inconsistent to imagine that, at some convenient season, it may find occasion to intimate a desire, a friendly desire, to the governments of one or both of these Kingdoms, that some slight modifications should take place in their systems of civil polity ;—that some of the unseemly ingredients of democracy which disfigure the French “*Charte*,” and that render the debates of our own legislative assemblies, doubtless, so indecorous and wounding to the refined apprehensions and lofty sensibilities of an Autocrat, should be expunged or neutralized ?

Assuredly, were any one now to hint, within the walls of Parliament, at the possibility of any such audacious proposition, the individual who might be so indiscreet would incur the risk of some ungracious if not indignant and contemptuous reproofs.

But by and by, when the supreme military Chief of the North is flushed with the success of the projects which it has fallen to his lot to execute ; —when he holds, perhaps, a still more numerous

army in the leash than he even now does ;—when his military chest will have been recruited by the increasing obroks of seventy or eighty millions of vassals, whose opportunities of profitable industry will, by the present proceedings, have been so greatly extended ;—when to these tremendous materials he will be enabled to add the resources of, perhaps, half as many more of obsequious and subservient allies, whose wretched courts may still continue to rejoice in the triumph of the Russian designs, under the full persuasion of being destined always to participate in the fruits of them ;—when, in fact, the Czar is no longer locked up within the Baltic and the Euxine—when his fleets will ostentatiously parade the Mediterranean, as his armies have, during some years of a profound peace, been injuriously exhibited along the frontiers,—when all the world begins to succumb to the evidence of his power—then it may be doubted whether he will retain so unfeigned a respect either for the French Chambers or the English Parliament, or the obnoxious, impertinently inquisitive press, as may be the means of averting such a profanation as that which has been above contemplated.

Besides, a request, coming from such a source,

couched in all the becomingness of amity and high consideration,—recommending, in gentle terms, merely an arrangement of the powers of government more assimilated with the well-ordered condition of things in the superior state, will not have the air of being so unreasonable; and the less so as the proposition must apparently go to the strengthening of the authority of the native rulers;—nor is it by any means certain that there may not then be advocates in this country, even avowed advocates, of the Russian system. Few, at all events, in a short time, are the governments of the earth, that will refuse to lend an attentive, a deferential ear, to the communications of an autocratic envoy.

Perhaps the following, however, may be the course taken.—When the Czar is in readiness to pick a quarrel with us, or finds himself strong enough to try, at all hazards, to levy a contribution on this “shopkeeping” nation,—which will not be resolved on till the new acquirements are well organized,—and the fleet in the Marmora is in a forward state—and until some arrangements on the *Eastern shore of the Caspian, the Aral, and the Tartarian frontier* \* generally are made towards

\* It is curious enough, that though this is obviously the

smoothing down any difficulties that may be encountered in a *preliminary movement* against the northern provinces of India, even now a matter of the most *perfect* \* *facility*—Then it is not improbable that the Russian representative at our court may be instructed to represent the earnest hope of his Imperial master, that the duties upon corn should be altogether done away with,—that they are conceived in an illiberal and unreciprocal spirit,—that they are specially injurious in their operation to his Majesty's Ukranian, Crimean, and Wallachian subjects,—who would undoubtedly buy a good deal more of our calicoes, cottons, &c. if they were enabled to send the produce of their farms to the London market. The ambassador will argue this point learnedly as an economist. Finally, a treaty of commerce will be proposed on a plausible basis of reciprocity with respect to corn and some other specified articles of agricultural or unwrought produce—all the benefit of the reci-

best, and only convenient line by which to assail India—and the one along which Catharine and afterwards Paul actually proposed to begin this operation, still it is, of all the adjoining countries of India, the one which we have left most unexplored, and with which we have sought least communication, commercial or political.

\* Vide Note in an after part of the volume.

procuity inclining in such case, as it may be conjectured, to the side of the foreign grower.

I merely suggest this as one of the expedients that may be resorted to, for embarrassing the British cabinet, and preparing the way for a rupture. Ingenious diplomatists will never be at a loss for ample matter of disagreement, when disagreement is found to be convenient.

The London capitalists, then thoroughly aware that the prosperity of the country has at length completely passed the culminating point, will no longer receive with their long-wonted complacency, the propositions of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; for the barometer of the City in these matters distinctly consists in the supposed available resources of the government. The ministers will, therefore have abundant reason to temporize, however grating it may be to their feelings. The haughty and uncereemonious communications occasionally made to them from the court of the autocrat will, therefore, be listened to with a suppressed—a smothered resentment.

In the mean time, the pressing conduct of the Russian envoy will get wind. Some of our manly and determined champions of the agricultural interests, justly alarmed for the consequences, and

sensibly alive to the theory of rents—will go down to the “House,”—threaten the Government, and vituperate the Emperor. Other country gentlemen, warmed possibly into eloquence by the peculiar nature of the subject, will loudly chime in with and support the bold admonitions and profound maxims of their distinguished leaders.

His Imperial Majesty will have every word faithfully reported to him,—and will undoubtedly add this to the catalogue of his grievances,—making it the more immediate groundwork of a rupture,—preluded by a complaint, in high terms, of the insults thus passed upon a faithful friend and ally by the turbulent assembly of the English Commons. Then will there be found amongst us those who will dilate on the benefits, under all circumstances, of tranquillity ;—on the Utopian absurdity of the representative system ;—on the unfitness of popular governments ;—the illusiveness of that obsolete chimera of political visionaries—the “balance of power,” &c. &c.

Still, however, it may be alleviating to admit that, though diminished in activity, the looms, the anvils, and various scientific aids of industry will have only partially discontinued their useful labours. Our home consumption alone will as yet

preserve to them a considerable activity. The industrious and confirmed habits of a commercial people, usually long remain to mitigate the decline of their national integrity and strength. The diminution will be gradual, not violent.—Eventually, indeed, the arm of the British artisan may relax its vigour, if, with despair, he discovers that an arbitrary subtraction from his hard-earned gains goes to the tributary sustenance, or forbearance, of a foreign army,—or for the replenishment of a foreign coffer,—leaving him but a scanty and insufficient surplus for his individual maintenance, or for that of his necessitous family.

But, possibly, to complicate this matter, to invest it with more plausibility, and involve us more ingeniously,—in short, to give a decent and colourable appearance to the whole transaction, the President, Capo d'Istria\*,—or his successor,—the Knights of St. John, who have been long

\* By every account this is a most respectable person. But it is supposed by many, who appear to be acquainted with these matters, that he is even now no more than a proconsul of Russia, and that he is in the receipt of a salary from the Czar. But this will not disprove his good intentions. The Morea, even subject to the direct influence of Nicholas, would certainly be more happily situated than under the iron grasp of Ibrahim or Mahmoud.

under the special protection of Russia—and the Spanish King Ferdinand, if he yet survive, will be incited to demand of us, respectively, the restitution or relinquishment of our present Ionian, Maltese, and Spanish fortresses.

Their great ally, the Czar, to whom an instigated appeal will be made, will cause those demands to be supported by the best selection of sophistry available for the purpose : a strenuous and uncompromising resistance being, of course, on our parts offered. France during these proceedings,—*should she have been previously entrapped into erroneous and ignoble counsels*—(which however must be admitted to be extremely improbable,)—will betray uneasiness—be disposed to retrace her steps, and to coalesce with us. Too late she will have discovered her desperate predicament. A vacillating ineffective conduct ensues. At one time, pacific policy will predominate,—at another, she will augment and assemble her forces on the Rhine. But these irresolute and tardy demonstrations will be held in check by the German and Russian troops in observation in the neighbouring countries. Every indication of an impaired power will then declare itself in this country even to the common mind.

Some few of our colonies may not perhaps, even

at present, be in a very flourishing condition ; but all, indiscriminately, thenceforward will perceptibly decline in prosperity. Those who may chance to have visited the remains of the once affluent Dutch and Portuguese settlements, in different parts of the world, will remember what sad miniatures they present of the declension and fall of states. Under those circumstances it is, that the onerous pressure of our debt would begin to be severely felt.

Long ere this, the quarter's revenue would also, we will suppose, exhibit, on each return, a progressive falling off. Disorder and discouragement must, consequently, pervade the departments of government. Still it will be felt,—that, though inability exists to meet the public expenditure, a considerable degree of wealth, comparatively unreachd by taxation, remains amassed in the country.

The propriety of spoliating the great landed, church, and funded properties will now be familiarly agitated. The passions of the poorer classes will be appealed to. Goaded by their wants, many desperate, intelligent, and partially-educated persons will emerge from obscurity, and discover a calculated energy not hitherto to have been en-

countered in popular commotions ; excesses will be less frequent, but the agitators will not be the less formidable. To restrain them, rigorous precautions and penal enactments must be resorted to.

The spoliations above alluded to, once entertained as an ordinary topic of discussion, and a violent conflict of opinion inevitably takes place ; —the fears of those who possess, and the lust and cupidity of those who desire to do so, will be fiercely arrayed against each other ;—public credit then receives a severe shock ;—consols fall at least as low as in 1797, and all the branches of the public service will be in arrears.

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THE SAME HYPOTHETICAL \* NARRATIVE  
CONTINUED.

At the period to which we have arrived in this suppositional glance into the future ;—those formidable structures, at present to be seen floating in certain of our depôt rivers and harbours, carefully housed-in, in stately and complete preparation for immediate war,—which it gladdens the heart of an Englishman to look on, for they are associated with deeds that must for ever cast a lustre upon the name of his country ;—those moveable fortresses which have so frequently contributed to the national security,—and carried into effect the

\* I beg here to remind the reader, that this series of conjecture is grounded solely on the presumed *uninterrupted* progress, during some years to come, of the commercial, maritime, and territorial power of Russia. I am quite aware that it is liable to the objection, of being visionary, imaginative, &c. The real intention is not that of vainly presaging the occurrence of *specific* future events,—but of endeavouring to embody something resembling what may be expected to be amongst the results of certain premised contingencies ; and of thus presenting them with more of identity and realization, than might otherwise be attainable, to the apprehension of those who may not have previously given the subject much of their attention.

national mandates even within hostile ports and capitals,—which as yet constitute the embattled chain of connexion with our subject colonies and kingdoms, will now be discovered, by reason of the suspension of annual and necessary repairs, to be scarcely sea-worthy: filth, rust, rot, and corrosion will have already made havoc in every beam, plank, and stanchion belonging to them\*. The arsenals and dockyards, too, so judiciously at present stored with every species of naval provision, would be then, it is to be apprehended, found destitute of the supplies and equipments requisite for a great and sudden emergency: large quantities of these stores having been occasionally sold, we may suppose, to the merchant service, in order to meet if possible, by this apparent saving, the ordinary expenditure in the accounts of the Admiralty department.

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\* “ *These stupendous masses now reposing on their shadows.* ”

### WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.

NEVERTHELESS, the ancient courage of the nation, undiminished by one jot, would arouse itself. The trammels of well-meaning arithmeticians who may have too long unconsciously imposed their partial and limited views upon the country, under the garb of science,—the devices of the merchants and manufacturers connected with the Levant, the Baltic, and the Western Archipelago ;—and the deprecations of the short-sighted and nervous fund-holder \* will be disregarded or broken through. The impolicy, in short, of temporizing

\* It is next to impossible to persuade a fundholder that those measures which may reduce the ideal, or at most transferable, value of his property, by ten per cent. for a year or two, may, in the end, be the means of preventing a far greater reduction of it during a far greater period of time, or even of irrecoverably impairing its security. In reality, it is only those who keep floating capitals in the funds who are materially interested in their rise and fall.—Were it not for those absurd fears which are artfully administered to, the price of stock would not vary in so strange a manner, at least to so great an extent, and would generally adjust itself more steadily to the real value of the currency for the time being, in reference to labour.

with a great danger will at length be revealed, and another course unanimously resolved on.

A great effort and generous sacrifices will be made, and, to the surprise of those who may meditate our destruction, a considerable fleet and army will be dispatched to the Mediterranean and India, and for a few months we shall again hold the trident with as lofty an ascendancy as in the days that are gone by.

War, which had been so long covertly waged to the undermining of our stability, will, of course, have been previously declared. The Russian squadrons will then be forced successively to seek shelter in the Marmora, within which we shall blockade them.

At the same time the movement against the frontier of India\* will commence. This, as before has been observed, will probably be made along the valley of the Oxus, and through the beautiful and fertile countries of Balk and Bokhara†. The petty

\* There are many persons who are strongly persuaded that any attempt of this kind were romantic and absurd, and those who know nothing of military affairs are not the least positive on this head. The point will be adverted to more in detail in an after part of the volume. Here it would interrupt our conjectural view of contingent results.

† "In all the regions of the earth, (says Sir William

Khauns who govern these industrious and populous cities, and also Samarcand, will probably lend their assistance. The promise of a share in the plunder of the great emporiums of the Ganges will be the inducement. They are at all events totally incapable of resistance. The Usbeks and Turcomans very likely, who are the only warlike part of the people, will hire themselves out for the occasion. The co-operation of these freebooters is to be had by any one who holds out to them the prospect of military license and enterprise.

In the west, the Muscovite infantry will descend to the Adriatic shore, and thence pass in open boats in spite of all our cruisers, during calms, &c.\* into the Seven Islands—proclaiming them independent, or as united to the presidential republic. Corfu will be invested, and ultimately besieged, so soon as guns and stores can be gradually got over from the main land.

From those islands, and from all parts of the Albanian coasts, attempts will perhaps be made to

Ouseley) there is not a more flourishing or more delightful country than this, especially the district of Bokhara," &c.

\* It is impossible that cruisers could prevent the escape of small flotillas in the night across so narrow a passage.

send detachments, by night, &c. in small vessels to Tarentum, Brundisium, and any of the little adjoining ports which they can make:—nominally to protect the King of Naples, but in great part to proceed into Sicily, and from thence menace a descent upon Malta.

Now a considerable dispersion of our naval force will be deemed necessary.—A number of ships will be dispatched to the coasts of the Morea, to the Grecian islands, to the Bay of Naples, and Alexandria, (whither a strong Russian column will have proceeded by the way of Syria,) in order to detach those feeble governments from the Muscovite alliance.

Encouraged by those circumstances, the fleet of the Marmora, supported, perhaps, by steam-frigates, will debouch from the straits and hazard a general action.

Great as the numerical odds may be against us, they will be driven back under the guns of their castles, but after a heavy loss on our side.—Bad weather comes on; our disabled ships must proceed to refit at Malta;—the hostile fleet, being close to the amplest resources, will of course be ready for sea, and reinforced much quicker than ours can be.

They will again come forth from their strong hold. The small British squadron then remaining in the Archipelago, will make a daring effort, but, from total disparity of numbers, with ill success ;—they will fall back, pursued by the enemy, upon Malta.

The ships repairing at that place boldly come out of the harbour, though but half refitted, and inadequately manned. An engagement ensues, indecisive in its results—but owing to the previous condition of our squadrons, they are necessitated to return into port.

The British reinforcements and supplies for the Mediterranean will have been delayed or reduced in amount by the sinister, and finally hostile, conduct of Spain and the United States ; and the consequent necessity of increasing the force in the Tagus, the St. Lawrence, and the West Indies, and of blockading Cadiz, Corunna, New York, and the Havanna, where a Russian squadron will, perhaps, have been stationed.

For the first time, during a long period of the naval history of this country, a British port (Malta) will be regularly invested by an enemy's fleet, strengthened by the numerous frigates and lighter vessels from the Grecian islands and Morean

Peninsula. The Muscovite troops will now be rapidly brought over from Sicily, and the siege of Valetta commenced.

The Autocrat, promptly availing himself of his superiority in the Mediterranean, dispatches a land force to Spain, with the full concurrence of the Spanish monarch, long ere then a mere puppet in the hands of some prelatory premier, Jesuit confessor, or dignitary of the Holy Office, who will have readily sold himself to the Czar under the influence, perhaps, of a similar prospect, with that which swayed our own Wolsey to the views of Charles.

The investing lines of Gibraltar will be reconstructed—descents threatened from Algesiras,—and a petit-guerre of privateers, steam-boats and small craft, carried on from thence against the bay and mole.

Cadiz and Corunna (possibly even Lisbon) will then be crowded with Russian and Spanish troops, ostensibly for the succour of Ireland, to enable it to throw off, as it will be termed, the English yoke.

Should the American general now a candidate for the highest office in the UNITED STATES, still survive, and be then, for instance, in his

second or third Presidentship, (which is by no means impossible, being a remarkably hale and strong man,) he is one that would co-operate against the British ascendancy in Ireland with a peculiar zeal and determination. His parents are said to have been exiled from that country, and he himself is understood to cherish for it a most fervent remembrance.

The desire of conquest indulged in by our trans-Atlantic descendants is, considering the nature of their institutions, sufficiently absurd ; nevertheless, such is the fact : and there is no public man in all the Federacy, more likely to push that policy to its uttermost, especially against us, than the individual just alluded to.

The Canadas and some islands of the Western Main are primary and unquestionable objects of their ambition. Now if Ireland should be then in a disaffected or insurrectionary state—should some imitative phantom of a presidential government have been created within it, and be in a condition to fulminate, from any beleaguered fastness\*,

\* That there really exists any positive likelihood of this sort, is more than I can pretend to say, having no other data to go by than the accounts which go to this point in most of the public prints. But if these are not great exaggerations,

seditionary decrees resembling those now sent forth from the nascent republic of EGINA—in what better mode could the American general promote the aggressive views on his own borders, than by preparing a number of small fast-sailing vessels or steamers, for the successive conveyance, as they are wanted, of arms, ammunition, and stores to the insurgents? How are we to prevent these supplies being landed in some of the multitude of fine ports which everywhere indent (especially to the westward) the Irish coasts? American cruisers or privateers would, also, under those circumstances, swarm in the Irish Channel and seas.

it might be well to remark that though Ireland, being of limited extent, is the easier held by a regular army—that though, in some parts, it is not very mountainous, it still contains not only an overwhelming population, desperate from want, believing itself aggrieved, and characteristically susceptible of enthusiasm—but also presents a very observable peculiarity of surface, offering, with very little spade labour and no expense, numerous, extensive, and almost inexpugnable positions for entrenched retreats as places of dépôt, drilling, organization, &c. Many of these are unapproachable to cavalry and artillery; or even infantry, except in files and with guides. But there are several military considerations most seriously connected with this topic, that seem to have been as yet uninquired into. A civil war can yield no military glory; soldiers, therefore, cannot touch upon such themes without regret.

A more obvious, an easier, cheaper, or more decisive diversion against the British power could not, it is manifest, be effected. IS IT BY VAINLY ATTEMPTING TO CONCEAL THESE MATTERS THAT THEY ARE TO BE GUARDED AGAINST ?

Whether; however, at the time now referred to, the Sister Island may be in the ascending vigour of a youthful prosperity, the citadel of our strength, and a new source of financial aid, or, on the other hand, the breach through which every enemy will seek to pass to the heart of the national power—is, it may be presumed, totally dependent on intermediate circumstances, which are wholly foreign in their nature to the subject of these pages—and such as the writer is not conversant with. But the actual condition of Ireland, without any reference whatever to its causes or possible remedy, is not by any means an exclusively domestic concern; on the contrary, it is obviously and intimately connected with our external defence and foreign relations: perhaps far too much so. But to pursue this supposed or imaginary war further were superfluous. France would then dread our ruin more than she has ever done our ascendancy. At her earnest intercessions, a temporary peace would be conceded to us. Indemnity for the whole

expenditure of the contest would, in any such case, be most probably imposed on us. If this were equal to the contributions levied by the allies on France, in 1815, it might amount to about forty millions. We should be expelled from the Mediterranean; and in India, driven back behind Oude and the Nerbudda.

*If the FACTS previously brought forward are correct*, the supposition of some such disastrous course of events as that which has been just traced, follows, I conceive, as no more than a necessary and a reasonable corollary. Everything, however, which regards the future, whether deduced from sound or from deceptive data, is open to disbelief and to the flippant imputation of being chimerical. But the note to page 164 will best explain the motive on which those speculations are hazarded,—and which of course have no foundation whatever, excepting in the contemplation of the continued immobility of Europe during the prosecution of what must bring with it a relatively overwhelming accession of strength on the part of Russia.

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### AN ARMED INTERVENTION.

BUT now let us see what might fairly be anticipated from measures similar to those so strenuously advocated by a former British ministry, in regard to the very same power under precisely relative circumstances.

The dangers incurred by an opposite course it has been the endeavour of the foregoing statements to develope. According to the idea about to be entered on, the hazard would be more immediate than certain ; while, by neutrality, it would, in our opinion, be more certain than immediate.

In such case, the objects of proposed attainment might be :—

First,—The inviolable freedom of commercial transit between the Mediterranean and Black Seas, as far, at least, as mutual rights, mutual safety, and the mutable nature of such affairs, admit of.

Second,—A fair indemnity to Russia for the sequestration of ships or cargoes in the Ottoman ports, supposing that she can establish a claim on that score.

Third,—An equitable territorial adjustment between the Turks and Greeks,—such as may lead to permanent security, by means of the eventual establishment of a new Christian state or confederacy of states on this side the Hellespont,—and such as is consistent with the general interests of civilization. Henceforth, also, Turks to live within the Greek territories, and Greeks within those of the Turks, without a right of appeal for protection to foreign states.

These, or at least the greater part of them, are what Russia, above all other powers, could not, with any colour of propriety, object to. If she does, then the mask is discarded, and the whole universe must see what her real purpose is. They are, with very little modification, the ends she proclaims to be her own.

The next question is how these desirable arrangements might be accomplished. On this point it is not presumed to mark out any specific plan; but the following suggestions are thrown out for the consideration of those better qualified to judge of their practicability, or of devising other and more applicable expedients.

The splendid monarchy of the Moors extended during many ages over Spain and Portugal,—a

rocky nook of the Asturias alone excepted. The empire of Morocco, on the other side of the Strait, was possessed by the same people. The Christian Visigoths, by successive struggles, recovered possession of their country. Gradually the Moslem frontier receded, and became limited to the province of Grenada.

It is almost exactly the same course of events which now appears to be in progress in European Turkey. Thus cause and effect follow and are reproduced with unvarying regularity. What the gallant, generous, enlightened and magnificent Arabian of the Iberian peninsula was not exempt from, neither will the brutal Turk of the Thracian promontory. What is, at all events, then about to take effect,—even without any foreign intervention,—namely, the recession of the Ottoman frontier,—but not (if left to its own course) without long strife, suffering, and probable confusion,—might surely be advantageously, justly, and even, perhaps, bloodlessly accelerated, by negotiation, supported by a great and imposing force, on the parts of France, England, and their allies.

Humanity, as well as the general repose, forbids that the Greek and Mussulman should any longer

inhabit the same soil. Let, then, a division of territory proportioned to their respective numbers take place.

In this case an European domain might remain and be guaranteed to the Sultan, bounded on the one side by a line running along the summit of the Balkan, and on the other by some natural demarcation ; or, if that cannot be conveniently found, by a line due north and south, passing westward of Adrianople, or by the Maritza river. This would leave to the two or three millions of European Turks, a square several fold more fertile than Scotland, not above a third less than it in area, and fully capable of supporting double the above population.

Let the Greeks be the people who shall, at some distant period, drive these irreclaimable fanatics out of Europe, as Ferdinand and Isabella did, with such infinitely less reason, the Moslems from Grenada.

As yet the Greeks are not strong enough to be intrusted with the gates of the Bosphorus.

According to the idea of partition above thrown out, there would be ample means for creating a federacy of considerable Christian states, whose principal towns might be Bucharest, Philopolis,

or Salonica, Athens, &c. Only let them be protected by the great powers during a short minority, and they will ere long be enabled to protect themselves.

The unqualified commercial freedom of the canals of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in favour of *all* nations, might, it is presumed, be adequately established by treaty; and the observance of it, sufficiently secured by procuring the cession of one of the islands of the Marmora to such secondary maritime state, as may at once be least dependent on other powers, and least obnoxious to jealousy. Were any such idea adopted, the choice might, perhaps, fall upon Denmark or Naples. As for the recent occupation of the Neapolitan territory by Austrian troops, that was no more than a usurpation on the part of the Northern league, to which every continental state was equally liable.

Another expedient might be adopted—that of giving up to the occupation of a small European force, the two or three castles on the narrow part of the Dardanelles. A moderate toll on the shipping in their passage through the gorge, would go near to defray the charge of such garrisons.

But the former suggestion, if not the most effec-

tual, would perhaps be the least objectionable.—This island should be established as a rendezvous,—a place of supply and refitment for not more than one or two large ships of war, from each power, which might choose to station them in the Marmora—such amount of naval force, and no more, to have at all times the privilege of passing and repassing the Dardanelles. Thus would the vigilant interposition of the Christian ambassadors in preventing hinderances to commerce, and procuring the execution of treaties, have an armed support always at hand, to give weight and efficacy to their instances.

The place chosen with this view, might also be declared a free port ;—its security to be under the protection of all the commercial nations ; and each to have the privilege of placing in it a marine dépôt and commercial establishment.

Those states not possessing territory on the Euxine, to have likewise the right to send into that sea some small vessels of war, for the surety of their trade-shipping.

Whatever expenditure might be incurred by the government in whose favour this insular cession were made, would of course be gladly defrayed—the manifest commercial advantages and

political consideration resulting from the acquisition affording an assurance of the most ample equivalent.

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ON THE FEASIBILITY OF EFFECTING THIS  
SUGGESTION.

If a project of this character were found to be feasible, and calculated to effectuate the object, the next query is how it might be brought about.—And this, I should imagine, could only be attempted with any prospect of success, by means of an Anglo-French expeditionary armament proceeding to the scene of action.

While the Russians are so near at hand as Bulgaria, it would be scarcely safe to trust, within those land-locked seas, less than fifty thousand troops and twenty sail of the line; two thirds, for instance, of the latter might be furnished by us—two-thirds of the army by the French. Thus might prompt consideration be procured for the propositions of our respective envoys; and thus also, by the opportune display of an imposing force and of firmness of councils, at an expense, perhaps, of three or four millions, might an expenditure at

another and no distant time of hundreds of millions, with fearfully multiplied chances of failure, be happily avoided. To do otherwise, will be to sacrifice the future to the present.

This proceeding ought and could be supported (for France and England can indubitably move the whole continent) by a concentration of the Swedish, Prussian, and Austrian armies, with those of their allies, towards their eastern frontiers; and by the assembling of an allied fleet at Stockholm. To go into any detail, here, of the means which present themselves to France and England for compelling the different states to enter into those arrangements, which, in fact, are but conducive to their own safety, would be superfluous. So far from any disposition, however, to refractoriness being to be apprehended, it is more than probable that all the governments bordering on Russia will be but too glad of such an opportunity of effectual coalition for common defence.

Has Russia any right to complain that the marshalling of troops in this manner would have the appearance of hostility, or be such as to afford just cause of umbrage? Certainly not. It is no more than what they are even called upon to do, while a war is carrying on in the vicinity of their

frontiers :—it is no more than what she herself has continued to do, for the last dozen years, without any such pretext.

As to the disposal of the armament before spoken of, ten thousand might take possession of the principal castles on the Dardanelles, and eventually the Bosphorus. Those on the Dardanelles especially, are not of a nature to stand a sea and land attack. On the inner sides they are chiefly defended by loop-holed walls ; and being all of a contracted dimension, they could not resist a plunging fire of shot and shells from the high grounds by which they are domineered. But the Turks will now be extremely ill inclined to resist, in any way, the French and English forces : they will, on the contrary, hail the arrival of our armament, in the conviction of its being for their relief. It is on the anticipation of some such measure that the obstinacy of the Divan has been grounded.

Ten thousand more might be entrenched on the heights above Scutari, from thence to overawe the capital and quicken the resolves of the Porte ; for never was delay more mal-a-propos, or decisive proceedings more imperative.

If the Czar did not immediately arrest his columns, the thirty thousand remaining troops and

the greater part of the fleet might proceed into the Euxine, and menace at once the whole left flank and maritime communications of the invading army ; insisting, as a preliminary, that the ships of both belligerents should retire into port. This is no more than what Russia herself now does, in conjunction with us, in regard to the Morean contest.

This amphibious force alone would probably put an end to the forward movement of the invading columns. The capability of transferring a corps of this strength to different points successively, ought to occupy the attention of at least a hundred thousand men.

Should, however, the Muscovite troops have already penetrated into the plains of Roumelia, and be actually directing their march upon the heights of Ejub, the Mont-Martre of Constantinople, before the expedition arrives (if any such take place) at its destination, then the troops might be disembarked at Silivri, and at once entrench themselves on the most favourable ground to the northward of the capital, in conjunction with their Moslem allies,—a strong naval force, at the same time, passing on into the Euxine.

It is thus that while the troops in position might safely defy the advance of a Russian attack,

and while the remainder of the shipping point their guns upon the city, that the more disinterested negotiators of the western nations would be best enabled to impose reasonable terms on all parties ;—and so restrain at once the overweening Muscovite ambition and arrogance, and subdue the senseless pride of the Asiatic. This would not be war, but, as was so well said—“ taking the last chance of peace.” In the din of arms, when one has to do with stupid barbarians, on the one hand, and with a military court, at the head of a successful army on the other, the talents and appeals of the pacific negotiator run but too much danger of being unappreciated, unattended to, unless an instant power be furnished him of enforcing respect.

But if, in conjunction with this operation, considerable corps, as we have just contemplated, are concentrated in Transylvania, on the Rhine, on the Oder, at Stockholm, the probabilities of an immediate and satisfactory result will, of course, be greatly enhanced.

These are no more than demonstrations, and would cost comparatively little to the respective governments ; and with all the vaunted preparations of Russia, we may venture to conclude that

they are not on a scale, nor can they yet be so, to warrant the further prosecution of an offensive war to the southward, while the other extremity of the empire lies thus exposed to become the theatre of a general and extensive warfare.

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WHERE THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IS MOST  
TANGIBLE OF ATTACK.

STILL, before embarking on this course of action, it were doubtless indispensable to take into maturest consideration the possibility (notwithstanding its extreme improbability) of the most serious collision being the consequence : since it is certainly optional to Russia to brave this combined and formidable demonstration, and press forward, at all hazards, to the fulfilment of her schemes ; although it is, on the contrary, morally certain that she will decide on postponing their execution, until some embroilment, rebellion, war, or convulsion elsewhere shall occur to embarrass the cabinets of St. Cloud and St. James's. A general rising, for instance, in Spain, or even within our own confines, might possibly be looked forward

to, as the more fitting opportunity. The efforts, too, for the resumption of the ministerial power in France, by the faithful allies of Russia, the Jesuits, would not be extraneous to the calculation.

But we will assume the former resolution to be adopted ; and consider where Russia is most liable to injury in the event of a general war.

The political effects of the seizure of an enemy's capital have been often found to be of great consequence. When the war is a government, not a national one, it has not unfrequently proved to be decisive. It was on this principle that Buonaparte almost invariably marched upon the principal city. In proportion as this is populous compared with the numbers of the people generally, so will its fall into the hands of an invader be of importance ; and if it be also a great military and maritime position and station, that importance must be correspondingly increased. Such is Lisbon, so also is Constantinople. Whatever enemy holds possession of Lisbon, has gone far to possess himself of Portugal. And accordingly, if Buonaparte had had the discretion, before contemplating a march to the Kremlin, to send two hundred thousand of the troops assembled in Germany, to drive the British forces out of

Lisbon and Cadiz, he would, perhaps, have died in the palace of the Capets, and not as a prisoner on a remote island. For it may be confidently averred that even the Russian campaign of 1812 had not so great an effect upon the public mind of France, as the descent from the Pyrenees of the Anglo-allied army, and its seizure of the line of the Garonne.

But to return to our subject :—

Moscow is wanting in all the requisites which we have attributed to Lisbon, as rendering it a considerable point of acquisition. Besides which, it is placed at an enormous distance from any base of operations or means of reinforcement which any southern invading army could establish. It is not a *cul de sac*,—it is not even the seat of government,—it is not a naval or military position,—and its population, compared with that of the empire at large, is only in the proportion of one to *two hundred and seventy-five*,—while that of Lisbon, compared with the Portuguese people, is as *one to ten*,—that of London relatively to that of Great Britain as one to about *twelve*,—and that of Paris to France as one to *thirty-seven*. Moscow likewise is surrounded for several months of the year with an interminable desert of snow, which ag-

gravates all its other comparative ineligibilities as a great object of attainment.

Thus it is that a sudden advance against that place can at no time be other than a loose and erroneous application of the general principle, on which the attack of capital cities has been made. It is the circumference of Russia which is most disaffected and most invites an enemy; and of this, the portions most remote from each other would of course require the most distressing efforts for defence. Thus also would she be in a great degree deprived of the benefit of acting on a centre, which belongs to lesser nations when assailed by different lines of approach.

Of the latter, a brilliant and most remarkable exemplification was displayed by the Emperor Napoleon, in the campaign of 1814\*.

Now the armies which Russia might have for her defence in Poland, and those on the borders of the Black Sea and in Persia, could afford each other no sort of assistance, and could not be transferred during the progress of a campaign from one line of operation to another, the intervening distance being about two thousand miles.

\* Excepting, of course, the last movement of it.

Russia was most efficiently supported by us during her worst extremity. We, in effect, completely covered her flanks, by shielding her maritime frontiers ; and by strenuously assisting to obtain for her the alliance of Sweden, as well as peace with Turkey and Persia\*. Thus the attack she had to sustain was reduced to a single front, nay, ultimately she had but to defend *one great road* ; and as the place to which this road led was not actually of paramount importance, by relinquishing it, the incalculable advantage was procured, of giving perfect freedom to the movements of the defensive army, converting it, at least, by the course of events, almost into an offensive one : for there being no longer anything within reach which it was in the least essential to protect, it manœuvred at once, with impunity, upon the enemy's line of communication. Some of these advantages may not belong to her on another occasion.

Austria had consented to receive Illyria as indemnity for Galicia. Then why, it may be asked, did Napoleon forbear to strike the severest blow it was possible to inflict against Russia, by proclaiming the liberation, national existence and re-

\* Of Bucharest and Gulistan—the latter mediated by Sir Gore Ouseley.

union of Poland? At this crisis, his characteristic decision and audacity seem to have forsaken him—he sunk into half measures. Instead of fanning the flame of liberty which had burst forth on his approach, he answered the deputations from Wilna, Warsaw, &c. in an equivocal, tepid, discouraging manner. Never was the vacillation of the politician and the temerity of the warrior more strikingly ill-timed. It seems universally admitted that a more solid and prudential plan had been that of primarily organizing Lithuania, Livonia, &c., and reconstructing in them a general government,—previous to any further considerable advance. In that event,—and all remaining quiet in the rear,—the Czar would probably have been driven to capitulate, on moderate terms, in the second or third campaign,—aided though he was by us \* ;—by Spain,—and secretly,

\* In that instance, the commercial interests of the Russian nobles were completely in unison with the views of their cabinet; and it is this, which is universally understood to have chiefly contributed to the firmness displayed in the national defence. These interests would now, on the contrary, clash, and more so than ever, with the ambition of the court and army: inasmuch as the exports, which produce the revenues of the magnates, are now far greater in proportion to the imports than at any former period. Our merchants would also, on the other hand, suffer comparatively less.

or at least in full anticipation, by Prussia and other states.

Had this been adopted, there seems reason to conclude that scarcely any reinforcements would have been required from France. The Poles might have been expected to bring into line, in the second campaign, at least a hundred and fifty if not two hundred thousand men, whose passions were enlisted in the contest. As it was—seventy or eighty thousand rose in arms, and are said to have been the troops afterwards most contributive in checking the pursuers and saving the remnant of the retiring army.

A European coalition may yet redeem that great political fault. The spark of patriotism is, by every account, far from extinct, and may easily be relumed amongst a people who fought and bled

Further be it observed, that from the campaign alluded to, to the end of the contest, we granted to the allies in aid of their exertions against France, and by which Russia was the chief gainer, in round numbers, FORTY MILLIONS STERLING ! But the greater part of people forget these things, and suppose that Russia single-handed overthrew the legions of Napoleon !—Never again, it may be hoped, will she fight under such favourable auspices. The subsidising of great powers is also, on our parts, it may be anticipated, at an end !

so lately, as! under Koskiousko \*,—and even partially in the same sacred cause under Napoleon. Deplorably bad as was the grinding tyranny of the aristocratical and anarchical system, which for so many ages prevailed in this nominal republic, it has left the germ of aspirations for independence, and constitutional government, much too deeply implanted, and too fervent of purpose, for any foreign rule to destroy within half a century.

The Finlanders are a race far superior to the Russians, and who, entirely partaking of the manly character of the Swedes, disdain the yoke that has been imposed upon them. The Tartars, likewise, being above them in civilization, reluctantly assimilate with their political masters.

Although wisdom has undoubtedly characterised the Russian councils in regard to religion, there has been a total failure in conciliating or securing the allegiance of the Mahometans of the Crimea and the Caucasus. And accordingly in such of those countries as are really subdued, (and scarcely less so, along the whole western frontier,) the serfs,

\* So late as the year 1823, a deputation from Poland, at the head of which was a nephew of this patriot-hero, presented themselves to the constitutional government at Madrid, in the view of concerting some extensive co-operation.

boors, or villagers are virtually prisoners and cannot stir beyond the precincts or immediate district of their huts, without the express indulgence and written permission of a police as searching and inquisitorial in its appointed functions as it is rigid in their execution—unless when bribed. Every stranger and every person that moves from one place to another, must state his business and prove that he is of *good principles*,—a very significant and ample qualification !

Thus do the central Muscovites retain the iron rod of their sway over the subjugated border provinces of the Empire. It is clear, by these and other irksome regulations, that the government fears the light, and is alarmed beyond measure lest political contagion should seize upon the people.

About eighty states or nations compose,—and forty languages are spoken in this wide spreading dominion. Heterogeneous as these materials are, they answer very well for external war,—as long as they are permitted from without to remain intact,—as long as foreigners do not turn against the Autocratic rulers their own Machiavelian arts,—as long as it is omitted to disseminate emissaries with promises of support amongst the various races of

men who long to sever the ties which bind them in this general servitude,—and who, for the most part, burn to reassert their respective independence.

As for the Moscovites who form the fulcrum of the machine, they are profoundly superstitious, and scarcely less disposed to worship their sovereign than their God;—but this does not prevent their hatred in many instances of their owners, or those who are set in authority over them,—and accordingly, bloody and desperate insurrections are by no means unfrequent. On those occasions, strong measures are always adopted.—They are shot in hundreds without form or mercy, and not a word said of it in the government organ, the press; and these occurrences are even often, it is supposed, concealed from the Emperor.

Of late years the Russian government has had the audacity to issue the most rigorous prohibitions\*, in effect, against our trade, for the protection of its infant manufactures. Accordingly our exports thither have diminished altogether in variety; and in value remain almost stationary, while her exports to this and other countries have

\* If the reader will take the trouble to look over the more recent Tarifs, he will find nearly two-thirds of the articles of usual interchange, lately marked—*défendu*.

increased by rapid strides ; thus leaving a great balance in her favour. As a British market, therefore, compared with our present immense foreign commerce, Russia is a very inconsiderable and unimportant one, and what we obtain from thence we can procure with equal facility and convenience from Norway, Sweden, America, &c. But, on the other hand, every particle of their external trade lies completely at our mercy ;—a stroke of the pen in the King's council at Windsor or Downing-street, at once puts an end to it, and deprives them of every kind of sale or market for their surplus produce, which would be the more felt, as it has been of late so greatly and lucratively augmented.

Thus we may be perfectly assured, that there is no war which the Russians can be more reluctant to enter into, during their inferiority as a maritime state, than one with us. Nor can there be, in the nature of things, one which would so thoroughly disgust the boyards, or which must go so directly to shake the influence and popularity of the present executive, if not endanger its stability.

Finally,—Russia, in the event of a general coalition against her, (*which it is perfectly competent, we have conceived, to France and England to create,*) is assailable,—

First,—By cutting off her commerce, and thus placing the present pecuniary interests of the nobles at variance with the projects of the government.

Second,—By attempting the destruction of her great naval depots at Cronstadt, Sevastopol, and other stations.

Third,—By a predatory, and properly supported series of incursions along her maritime frontiers, especially in the Black Sea, within the shores of which, and even in the rear of her line of military posts, she has a host of unsubdued, armed, indomitable mountaineer enemies: by also ruining every establishment with which the government is in any way specially connected.

Fourth,—By aiding the Persians in the recovery of all the possessions which have been wrested from them; and to this end supporting them with a powerful detachment from the native Indian army, with a small reserve or nucleus of British troops. Amongst the British forces there might be successively incorporated a certain proportion of the élite of the Persians, by which means discipline would be rapidly diffused; and accordingly as they were fit to be removed from our ranks they might be formed into independent

corps, under the command, or partly so, of British officers.

The Persians are a warlike people who will receive our instructions with gratitude and avidity ; and profit by them, even with more facility than the Portuguese. Nor is there, by all accounts, a Prince in the world more desirous of tearing asunder the meshes of the net which Russia so astutely endeavoured to cast around him—more anxious to go hand in hand with us, and even place himself under our guidance, or more zealously willing to favour the introduction of improvements both military and civil in pursuance of our councils and tuition, than is the heir apparent, Mirza Abbas, to whom the active part of the administration is in a great degree confided by the Persian King. But, in point of fact, we have, it may be feared, more than once sacrificed the interests of Persia, in regard to which we ought, if possible, to have, perhaps, been more tenacious\*.

\* Exposed as our executive has, more or less, been during the last year, to the tempests of party conflict, no doubt it would have been very inconvenient to interpose between Persia and Russia, or recognize the demand made upon us by the former on the ground of the *casus fœderis*. But I rather believe it may still in reality be a question, whether we are not bound to pay the subsidy stipulated for (one hundred

Persia should now be considered the ally of Europe. The auxiliary\* Sepoy force suggested, would not, in the first instance, be employed in general actions (unless, indeed, where a favourable result seemed almost inevitable), but in compelling

and eighty thousand pounds per annum), in the event of aggression on the part of Russia. The rupture took place, as far as I have been able to learn, in the following manner:—General Pascovitz and the Prince Royal entered into a treaty for the exchange of certain districts of territory, expressly to be of no effect without the confirmation of the Czar and the Shah. It was brought about, as was generally supposed, by corrupting some of the attendants of the Prince. Be this as it may, it was considered, when made known to the Shah, to be so utterly disadvantageous, that he refused to give it validity. The treaty, therefore, to all intents and purposes became a dead letter, and of this the Russians were perfectly aware. In defiance of this fact, however, they send, while the negotiation is still going on, a strong corps into an unoccupied part of the district referred to, where an intrenched camp is immediately established. The Persians remonstrate reiteratedly against the violation of their territory. The Russians positively refuse to move, and declare that they hold the country by right of treaty. The former contend that the treaty, being unratified, does not convey this right according to the law of nations, and at length send a body of troops to dislodge the intruders. If this be a true statement, the Persians may indeed have fired the first shot, but the Russians, nevertheless, are the aggressors.

\* The distinguished Governor of our nearest station to Persia, Bombay, is luckily, perhaps, of all men the most qualified for employment in that country.

the Russians to concentrate, and thus affording the Persian cavalry the means of enveloping them,—of laying waste the country in their vicinity,—of securing the flight of the herds and flocks belonging to the inhabitants,—and of overrunning their communications.

This should be supported by operations on the Caspian. Fifteen hundred or two thousand sailors, with an adequate supply of the excellent native shipwrights of Bombay, might be dispatched at once to Astrabad and Balfrush, there to construct a flotilla, capable of driving the Russians, at least for a couple of seasons (perhaps for much longer), off that sea. There is excellent timber within a mile or two I believe of these two ports, and such of the materials as were sufficiently portable might be carried overland\*. Luckily, vessels of a small class only require to be built, as the navigable depth of those waters is but eight feet. If this were done, the utmost celerity would be requisite, as the enemy would otherwise probably destroy the attempt in embryo, by a debarkation of troops.

The Russians, it is true, can collect enormous resources at Astracan, but the sailors habitually employed in the fishery and armed ships are pro-

\* Six hundred miles from the Gulf.

verbial for their inaptitude, stupidity, want of skill and of enterprise.

Now the army of the Araxes communicates with Russia, and is reinforced and provisioned by the Euxine and Caspian ; and if our flag waves on those seas, it is clear that that army, if it attempts to maintain an advanced line, must eventually perish, or be reduced to surrender in detail. And if it retreat, which it, of course, must at length do, it will still have perils to contend with ; for its march will lie through a country without carriage roads, filled with formidable mountain passes, destitute of supplies, and defended by at least a hundred thousand individually brave and inveterate foes\*.

\* Les troupes Russes, en s'avancant sur le territoire Persan, laisseraient derrière elles au moins cent vingt mille Caucasiens bien armés ; de plus, toute la population Georgienne d'istme, qui n'attend qu'une occasion favorable pour se révolter ; enfin, les tribus Mahometanes du Karabagh, du Chirvan, et du Daghestan, toujours prêtes à secouer le joug des infidèles. —*Klaproth* (1827).

*This able writer is, I believe, considered a most superior authority relative to the Caucasian countries ; and as it is understood that he is not to return to Russia, he is free from any suspicion of bias. The following is from the same source.*

Depuis que la Russie a étendu ses possessions au delà du Caucase, elle est obligée d'entretenir une armée nombreuse dans les provinces nouvellement conquises. Cette armée ne trouvant pas dans les contrées qu'elle occupe les vivres dont

On no account, and particularly when Erzeroum and Trebisonde are within his grasp, will the Czar voluntarily retrograde from this frontier ; and yet there is no theatre of war around the whole circuit of the Russias, wherein a properly sustained contest must entail more exhaustion of the Imperial resources, or be more hopeless in regard to the issue.

Fifth,—By embarking a large corps of troops on board an allied fleet in the Gulf of Finland,—to menace the flanks and reserve of the Russian armies of Poland and Finland. This armament

elle a besoin, on est obligé de les expédier en grande partie par la Mer Noire, et à travers le Caucase, par un chemin où les voitures ne peuvent passer que rarement. Tous les autres objets nécessaires à l'équipement et l'armement des troupes arrivent de la même manière en Georgie ; on peut donc juger que la possession de cette contrée doit être très onéreuse pour la Russie. Quarante mille hommes suffisent à peine pour contenir la population de la Georgie et les tribus guerrières du Caucase, qui épient toutes les occasions de piller le pays et emmener les habitans en esclavage.

Toujours menacés d'un côté par les montagnards non soumis, les Russes ne peuvent disposer librement des forces qu'ils ont au sud du Caucase ; une guerre avec les Persans doit les gêner beaucoup ; car, s'il est facile d'ordonner à cent mille hommes de passer cette chaîne de monts inhospitaliers, il devient impossible de les nourrir quand ils sont arrivés au lieu de leur destination.

would necessarily occupy the attention of three of the enemy's corps,—the two just named, and one to cover the capital.

Sixth,—By efforts to create insurrections and a servile war, which there is every reason to conclude, are by no means unfeasible. For this purpose, a considerable fund would be set apart and numerous emissaries employed. In a country where the judges on the bench may be bought, what may not be done by the agency of money?

Seventh,—By bombarding Petersburg, if that be practicable \* ; of which, however, from want of time for sufficient inquiry, I cannot speak positively. The shoals, on which there are no more than nine feet of water, are known to be its best defence on the sea-side. But I rather think bombs may be prepared of no greater draft of water, or at least may be sufficiently lightened for the purpose. The largest three-deckers are still built in Petersburg, and are brought over those shoals in their way to Cronstadt, on camels.

This city consists, more exclusively perhaps than

\* I believe there is danger to a fleet without a port in this gulf, from heavy westerly winds. But with a land force on board, one or two places of refuge might be seized on and entrenched, in cases of temporary extremity.

any other, of public establishments and mansions of the wealthy, and though unfortified, it would be perfectly justifiable to bombard it, with a view of injuring the credit and resources of the government.

Eighth,—By territorial armaments against Poland and Finland ;—having mainly and avowedly for their object, the final and complete re-establishment of at least the former. Prussia and Austria to be indemnified, let us suppose, for Galicia and the right bank of the Vistula, by the Russian duchy of Oldenburg in the one case, and Servia or Bosnia in the other : an arrangement by which they would both be very essential gainers.

Buonaparte was, it appears, in the habit of estimating (at least in his conversations with those of our countrymen whom he admitted to his presence) the military force of Britain, disposable for external operations, at forty-five thousand men. This is strangely inaccurate : we had above sixty thousand native British troops in 1814 in the south of France,—we had another corps in Belgium,—another actively engaged in the field in America,—a large Sicilian force in our pay, and larger garrisons than necessary at innumerable stations and colonies in various parts of the globe, from

which drafts might have been made. And if to these we add the Hanoverian forces, which we have a right to do, the estimate becomes still more erroneous. It is, on the contrary, probably quite competent to the English government to send into the field, at least one hundred thousand native troops, and support them, when there, at an expense of about ten millions per annum. And I believe it is scarcely necessary to inform the reader, that it would require a very far larger force of any other nation in the world, together with a good deal of perseverance and ingenuity, to stop the march of a British army of this amount, or force it from position.

In the event of any such wide scene of warfare, the improbability of which is, we admit, apparent, because Russia durst not, it may be conjectured, as yet encounter it, we could likewise bring to our allies what—were it possible by any calculation to reduce it to numbers might be put at a very high amount, namely, a chief, for the conduct and direction of the combined armies, before whose renown all petty rivalries must vanish—and whose presiding genius, whether in the council or the camp, must be regarded as amongst the most powerful presages of victory.

It is in vast combinations such as those, that the personal advantage alluded to would tell in so surprising, so inappreciable a degree ; nor could it be easily counter-balanced by numerical odds. —Nothing is more general than a belief, that the difference of talent requisite for posts of the second and first order in matters of government and war, is only an interval of gradation, whereas the qualities, it may be conjectured, are of a different genus, and the separating distance immeasurable !—But it may be asked, how does it happen that Russia should have hitherto so triumphantly repelled the assaults of foreign Potentates ?

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### OF THE INVASION OF RUSSIA BY CHARLES.

Most of the modern continental nations have many times had to withstand the incursion of hostile armies. Russia, dating from the period when she was wont to be alternately overrun by the Poles\* and Tartars, has been only *twice* subject to this sort of visitation. The cause is obvious. The finest districts of Europe, as well as the feeblest in a political sense, were Italy, Spain, the Rhenish banks and the Flemish provinces. These, therefore, became the more constant objects of contention, and theatres of war. An insatiate ambition or compulsory view to remote consequences could alone have directed attention to this new power. "The current of the human race is not to the north." Even the natives themselves of the Sarmatian hemisphere, have ever gladly turned their backs upon their own homes.

Both the invasions above mentioned were, on

\* In the seventeenth century, the then Sovereign of the Muscovites died a prisoner at Warsaw.—Prince Repnin I think it was that demolished his tomb, and carried away the remains into Russia.

their first onset, successful, and both also had a most disastrous and memorable sequel.

Availing themselves of which, the government writers of that country—and every writer in that country must be a government one,—appear solicitous, *as if it were a matter of state policy*, to instil the belief of its invulnerability. But on a brief inquiry, the reader will, I think, be disposed to admit that something further is requisite to maintain the assertion, beyond what is to be found in the course of the remarkable events just alluded to.

On the military quixotism of Charles XII., it were needless to enter into any serious disquisition. He penetrated the Russian frontier with forty-two thousand men ; and had his judgment borne the slightest parity with his valour, it appears probable that, even with this small force, he would have brought his antagonist into the greatest difficulties.

Peter sent to offer terms, but Charles deemed it unworthy of his fame to treat except in the Czar's capital,—whither he directed his march, straight forward, for some hundred miles, successively overthrowing the troops that were opposed to his progress. Presently, however, meeting with unforeseen obstacles, he accedes to the pro-

positions of a traitor feudatory of the Emperor, the Cossack Hetman, and deviating from his course, proceeds for many hundred miles away from the base of operations; without so much as leaving a company, or troop, or fortified house to mark or secure his communication with it.

In performing this march, he had neither guides nor maps; and being without provisions or stores of any kind, or the means of procuring them, he saw, on one occasion alone, two thousand of his men starved to death before his eyes. He left his cannon in quagmires; lost his way and wandered for weeks together, at the head of his columns, amidst unknown and unexplored swamps and forests;—and yet by pure soldiership\*, and the admirable qualities of the troops, was enabled to maintain himself during eighteen months of winter and summer campaigns, almost uninterruptedly victorious, even up to Pultowa. Nor does it seem at all certain, although he had then but eighteen thousand Swedes, with whom to fight a general battle, blockade a fortress, and cover a depôt, that the fate of that day which Europe has to deplore, would have been adverse, such was the usual

\* Latrille, I think it is, who not inaptly characterises him as “*worthy to have been the first soldier of Alexander.*”

effectiveness of the King's personal exertions, were it not for a grievous wound of the previous evening, which placed him on a litter.

The fate of such an expedition proves neither the strength nor the weakness of Russia,—nor, in short, anything else, except the superior and comprehensive abilities of Peter, and the dauntless eccentricities of the rival who so unwisely treated him with contempt, and to whose mania for military adventure, undirected as it was by the slightest degree of general information or political sagacity, this gallant body of troops was so absurdly sacrificed.

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## ON THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN IN 1812.

AN opinion after the event, may be expressed in reference to the conduct of great men without presumption,—since causes and effects being then developed, there remains only to place them in juxtaposition.

Three hundred and twenty-five thousand\* fight-

\* Statement of the French Staff.—Another account, said to have been procured at Paris by espionage for the Russian Staff, puts the corps, as it is averred, at their full original complement, and amounts to four hundred and fourteen thousand; others again carry the numbers to five or six hundred thousand. According to the former (the French estimate) there were one hundred and fifty thousand French soldiers, thirty thousand Austrians, thirty thousand Prussians, and the remainder of other nations. The French army in Spain was then reduced to one hundred and seventy thousand. In 1815, the four great powers stipulated to bring forward contingents, the minimum of which was to be one hundred and fifty thousand each, besides garrisons and the quotas of the lesser nations. And accordingly the combined armaments actually in movement, or in preparation, scarcely fell short of eight or nine hundred thousand. The treaty which wisely provided for these immense contingents, might perfectly well answer for re-enactment in the event of coalition against the north, interchanging merely the words France with Russia, and Nicholas for Napoleon.

ing men, and nearly one thousand pieces of cannon, passed the Niemen under Napoleon's orders. The composition of this army was not good, as inferred from the subsequent defection of the Prussians \*, Austrians, and lastly of the Saxons.

The Russians, in retiring, for the most part swept the population with them, burning at the same time and laying waste everything they were unable to carry away. This was most judiciously done, but it gives no evidence of strength,—and is a Tartar or Parthian mode of defence, rather than that of a powerful, invulnerable nation.

Buonaparte precipitated the pursuit, so as to outmarch his supplies † and droves of cattle. Thus it was, that, from even the first few days, marauding for subsistence, and famine, made their appearance in his ranks. Disorganization and frightful losses were ere long the consequence.

Much controversy has taken place amongst many highly-instructed French military writers re-

\* A wise and honourable defection, in the opinion, it is believed, of most persons.

† At Wilna, it is true, there were provisions, but time or opportunity was wanting to profit by this depôt either in passing or repassing.

lative to the conduct of this "Grand Army" of invasion ; but nothing need be said in its defence. *It vanquished everything that opposed it*, and won the position upon which its march was directed,—in short, it accomplished, within an incredibly short space of time, all that was pointed out to it to do. And if, instead of the Russian Court becoming INTIMIDATED, (the expectation of which was obviously what prompted this UNSUPPORTED FORWARD MOVEMENT,) terrible disasters ensued, then that which is proved by the operation is mainly this,—that a fallacious plan for the campaign was conceived—that the principles on which it was based were probably unsound \* : when a regular army, which has not been beaten in any great action, is subjected, for seven hundred miles, to the destructive insults of a species of cavalry, so insignificant as to have no

\* This inference holds good, although it be fully admitted that the consequences were aggravated beyond anything that foresight could have contemplated, by a conjunction of circumstances, some of which were beyond human control—others for which the French Emperor was not responsible. According to Boutourlin, only eighty thousand of all the invading columns repassed the frontier. By the same authority we find that Kutusoff's central army did not muster, on arriving at the Niemen, above forty-five thousand men. The wings, however, had not suffered so much.

place in an order of battle, can there be any doubt but that *false movements* have been the cause?

Of the Russians, on the other hand, it may be said that they displayed great valour, firmness, and good judgment; and that they inflicted and suffered immense slaughter. But it must also be admitted that they were overthrown, though with honour, on every battle-field,—and that after attempting without effect to cover the approach to one of their capitals, they found it necessary to leave uncovered the road to the other: thus, taking all the previous circumstances into consideration, imitating in reality the mariner, who being in the last extremity, cuts away his masts, or abandons his most valuable cargo.

In truth, they were compelled to trust for safety to retreat,—to the signal improvidence of their foes,—and to the consuming torch, which a noble despair inspired them with the resolution of applying; but above all, to what they well knew were just then most seasonably and opportunely impending for their deliverance,—namely, the storms of heaven.

Nor can it be alleged that this severe climate is a sufficient rampart, if proper provision be previously made. In such case both parties suffer,—

that which retreats, of course, the most. In this very instance the pursuing army lost half its numbers in the march. A hundred years ago, it is on record, that winter operations were carried on, at least on a limited scale, which had nearly proved fatal to the rising greatness of the Russian empire.

And it may be added, that instead of thundering upon the heels of affrighted fugitives, as is commonly supposed in southern Europe, the attenuated remains of the regular Muscovite battalions approached but comparatively on a few occasions\*; and then only feebly contended with their famishing or dying opponents, who were fleeing literally before want, disease, and the elements.

Fully corroborative of these statements was the opinion of the Crown Prince of Sweden, (Bernadotte,) in his letter of March, 1813, to Napoleon, which pointedly attributes this calamitous result, not to the inattackable nature of the Russian power, but to the erroneous character of the operations.—“Du moment,” says he, “que V. M. s’enfonça dans l’interieur de cet empire, l’issue des évènements ne

\* Excepting the conflicts in the vicinity of the Beresina, in effecting the passage of which, the greatness and resources of Buonaparte’s military talents shone forth again so conspicuously.

fut plus douteuse, toutes les combinaisons militaires assuraient que V. M. serait prisonnière."

And, in fact, essentially the same inference may be drawn (though the admission was probably very far from intentional) from the excellent work\* before so often referred to,—written by the Aid-de-Camp, and partly, it is understood, under the dictation of the late Czar.

But any further detail would on this point be tedious to the unmilitary reader, and unnecessary for the professional one : suffice it to say,—that since about a hundred thousand Frenchmen, incumbered with twenty thousand sick and wounded, were enabled, though two thousand miles distant

\* Cette campagne, si mémorable par l'étonnante consommation d'hommes qu'elle occasionna, sera considérée par la postérité comme un terrible exemple du danger de s'écarter à la guerre des règles prescrites par une saine théorie. En effet, jamais le triomphe des vrais principes de l'art ne parut d'une manière aussi éclatante, que dans cette occasion. Napoléon à Moscou présente le spectacle intéressant d'un grand capitaine, qui, à la tête d'une armée innombrable, a rempli le but militaire qu'il s'était proposé en commençant les hostilités, mais qui cependant va perdre toute cette armée, parce qu'il a négligé ou dédaigné le grand principe de la base, qui seul peut assurer les opérations, consolider les conquêtes, et utiliser les succès obtenus sur le champ de bataille. Cette unique faute fait échouer une entreprise conçue par un des plus grands génies militaires qui aient jamais existé.

from their own frontiers, to remain unmolested masters for nearly seven weeks\* of the antique capital of the invaded empire, situated as it is in the very heart of its dominion, eventually also only voluntarily retiring from it, while still decidedly superior in the field,—it must in candour be conceded that THE INVULNERABILITY OF RUSSIA IS YET TO BE PROVED.

\* Les évènements relatés dans les chapitres que nous venons de terminer, nous montrent déjà le commencement des désastres que la faute de Napoléon de prolonger son séjour à Moscou, à attirés sur son armée," Boutourlin.—Even after this ruinous delay, it is the opinion of the Russians themselves that the French army might have taken up "*good winter quarters*" between Kalouga and Smolensk.

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## ON FINANCE.

*“ REMEMBER the instability of England : (said the great Eugene) the voice of mercantile politics is ever to be heard at the doors of her parliament. The English, just, noble, upright, and generous as individuals, are just the contrary with regard to their country.”* Even were the unfavourable part of this opinion well founded, the following will, it is conceived, sufficiently prove, that no financial considerations in reality exist, at the present time, to interdict any line of policy that the national honour or interests shall point out to be expedient.

INDIA and IRELAND are as yet comparatively unexplored mines for the imperial exchequer. One of the ablest of the governor-generals of the FORMER puts, as before quoted, the eventual surplus revenue, likely to be available from thence to the dominant country, at several millions sterling. And it is clear that we have a right to expect that the LATTER may be at length rendered capable of yielding a share to the general expenditure of at least ten or a dozen millions\* annually, beyond what she

\* If soil, population, sea-ports, and locality be any criterion.

at present contributes : thus freeing this branch of the state (England), from the necessity it has so long laboured under, of almost exclusively paying for both.

The public revenue in 1728, a period of profound peace and acknowledged prosperity, was under 7,000,000.—The then aggregate value of our exports and imports was under 14,000,000 ; it is now considerably above 100,000,000.—It will therefore appear that, making the fullest allowance for change in the value of money, the commerce, public revenue, and probable wealth of the nation have intermediately been augmented in a far greater ratio than the number of the consumers.

The four most expensive wars in which we have been engaged were :—

That of the Succession.

The seven years' war.

That of the revolted colonies.

Those arising out of the French Revolution.

I.—In the year 1714, being that immediately

succeeding the first of those periods, our public revenue was about 6,000,000, and the interest or annuity payable out of it, 3,350,000.

II.—The year 1763, being the one immediately subsequent to the seven years' war, the income was 9,000,000, and interest to be deducted from it, nearly 5,000,000.

III.—In 1784, being that succeeding the recognition of the United States, the revenue was about 13,000,000 ; while the annuity payable out of it was above 9,000,000.

IV.—In the year after the last great contest, 1816,—our revenue may be put at considerably above 60,000,000, and the annuity payable from it at rather more than 30,000,000\*.

Thus it will appear that, on the last mentioned of those periods, the receipts bore a much larger proportion to the annuity or interest chargeable on them, than at any of the previous similar epochs. Nay, if we even substitute the revenue of the past year for that of 1816, it will be still found that a manifest superiority in favour of the present time holds good.—Now, as it is quite clear that incumbrances and income are purely relative—the

\* Surplus revenue after payment of interest in 1793, under 7,000,000—in 1828, above 22,000,000.

one to the other,—so it follows from the above memoranda that, however severely we may at present be pressed by debt, our ancestors were even yet more so.

But as my object is only to dispel the unfounded predictions so often indulged in on this head,—a topic specially relevant to the matter in hand,—the following quotation will probably best accomplish it.

*“ Notwithstanding (says Mr. Ricardo) the immense expenditure of the English government, during the last twenty years, there can be little doubt but that the increased production on the part of the people has more than compensated for it. The national capital has not merely been unimpaired, it has been greatly increased, and THE ANNUAL REVENUE OF THE PEOPLE, EVEN AFTER THE PAYMENT OF THEIR TAXES, IS PROBABLY GREATER AT THE PRESENT TIME THAN AT ANY FORMER PERIOD OF OUR HISTORY \*.”*

One word more in relation to finance. Different communities have acquired, by pursuing different methods, accessions to their public property. The Carthaginians flourished by means of commerce and war jointly,—a career not very dissimilar from

\* 1821, cap. 8.

our own. But they were overthrown by a neighbouring people, who, by the use simply of the sword, made the world, barbarian, civilized, commercial or otherwise, pay tribute to them. It was solely by help of the same instrument, that the followers of Mahomet subsequently possessed themselves of the produce of so many of the exchequers, previously the reward of Roman valour. For (in some degree) a like end, some fifteen hundred years ago, another species of plan was adopted for appropriating, not actually kingdoms, but many rich and fertile domains, and splendid endowments, more or less throughout every country of Europe. This was the device of the ecclesiastics resident on the Tiber ;—and a large part of the acquisitions thus, so ingeniously made, still return a noble revenue to the coffers of these pacific conquerors.—All things now lead to the inference, that the chiefs of the numerous people to whose political progress these sheets refer, are about to bend their efforts to a similar goal, though by a different route or process,—that of the bayonet.

It were well, therefore, that the enlightened economists and men of influence would recollect that even the most approved rules of science, and

the laws which govern the financial prosperity of nations, cannot with the least safety be abided by, without an accompanying vigilant precaution against the clashing expedients that may be resorted to by less scrupulous competitors. We have to deal with an empire whose only profession of honour is that of arms—led on by wily politicians, such as are usually to be found in the courts of despotic princes, and whose ambition has but too often no other limit than their abilities.

And in support of the foregoing reasoning, I would observe, that in all the modern history of this country, the two men who, in the administration of its foreign affairs, were most prompt to unsheath the sword in support of the pen, and whose policy was also the most brilliantly successful, were the Earl of Chatham and the Protector Cromwell. The latter was, at once, hated, respected, and courted by all the powers of Europe. Nay, to such an extent did these dispositions prevail, that fortresses were conquered for him and yielded up into his hands, merely to prevent the chance of his displeasure. Nor did any legal king or justly constituted minister ever obtain for the nation so much at so small a sacrifice.—Neither was the transcendent first Pitt much less,

if at all, triumphant in his course. He it was that expelled our then potent rivals from North America,—that founded our present imperial dependency of the East,—and to whose comprehensive genius, clogged though it was by imbecile colleagues, is distinctly assignable the great impetus thenceforward to be discerned in that wide-spreading developement of the British commercial and political grandeur which has subsequently so astonished the world.

But events are now fast approaching their consummation. I, therefore, hasten abruptly to a conclusion, with this reflection,—that, fortunately, at no time in our annals was there less ground, under any conceivable contingency, for apprehending a wasteful or inefficient employment of the national means and powers ; and that although every one must be sensible how becoming any apparent reluctance to resort to a display of force may be on the part of one, who, of all men living, is confessedly best qualified to apply it,—still, that the present is not a question, of what may be seemly to the character of a great man, but of what is most consonant to the interests of a great people. I cannot, therefore, help exulting in the hope, that the glorious and useful task may yet again be

reserved for our Monarch, of guiding the nations to a common safety, and of giving direction to their combined efforts, not merely for repelling, but for dismembering, if need be, the overgrown autocracy of the North, as it before was for subduing the more redeemed and less appalling domination that sprang from the political tempests of the South.

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## SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES, EXTRACTS,

&c. &c.

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### NOTE I.—*The Ottoman Army.*

EXTRACT from the translation of a Turkish Manuscript, written by Tshelebi-Effendi, one of the chief dignitaries of the Ottoman empire, Counsellor, Minister of State, &c., by order of Selim, with a view of proving to the Janissaries and the people the necessity of introducing the European discipline. In following up the purpose of this pamphlet, the Sultan lost his life.

“In truth,” the writer says, “it is well known to those who are acquainted with history, that in the wars which have taken place since the invention of this new (European) system of tactics, the Ottomans have been most frequently worsted, because they found it impossible to make use of their sabres among the infidels as they wished to do, for their regular troops keep in a compact body, pressing their feet together, that their order of battle may not be broken ; and their cannon, being polished like one of Marcovich’s watches, they load twelve times in a minute, and make the bullets rain like musket-balls. Thus they keep up an unintermitted discharge of artillery and small arms. When the Islamites make an attack upon them with infantry or cavalry, the enemies of our faith observe a profound silence, till the soldiers of Islam are come close up to their front, and

then at once giving fire to some hundred carriage-guns, and to seventy or eighty thousand muskets, overturn our men in heaps, without so much as receiving a bloody nose. When they have thus by a few volleys caused thousands of the people of Islam to drink the sherbet of martyrdom, the surviving remnant are wont to fly. Our troops, perceiving how skilful the enemy are in the use of fire-arms, and seeing many thousand men slain in the space of half an hour, while they are unable to avenge themselves on their opponents, have necessarily begun to lose courage. But although the wicked infidels, exerting their whole strength, have, with great prudence and boldness, invented so masterly an art of war, yet the soldiers of Islam, who have not been able to make any stand against them, may justly assert that the fault does not belong to themselves: for since the enemy sends us eighty thousand charges of grape, before a thousand of our men have time to fire their muskets, it is certain that resistance, in such a case, is beyond their power."

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NOTE II.—*On the Establishment of a European Army in Egypt.*

RUMOUR not long ago assigned an intention to the French Government, of sending an expedition to Egypt. Any thing which might cause alienation between the two nations is, at the present moment, relevant to the international affairs of Europe. A very few lines will, I think, shew that, even were such an intention entertained, we might regard its issue with perfect tranquillity.

It may be laid down as a maxim, from which no hostile cabinet can with impunity depart, THAT, were all the maritime powers, both of Europe and America, to combine for the purpose, they would, as yet, be entirely incapable of maintaining a contest with Great Britain, over a sea line of communication, where small craft at least might not come into play.

Egypt is thus situated,—nay, it is almost insular, being approachable on the north and south by seas, and bounded on the west and east by deserts.

Let us suppose France in possession of Egypt. Malta exactly cuts the line by which the invading army could alone be supplied with stores, or reinforced. Even Buonaparte, though so often regardless of the ordinary rules of his art, did not neglect this imperative circumstance. And although it exposed his whole fleet and army to be crushed by Nelson, he still incurred the hazard of delay, in order to possess himself of so essential a connecting link. That is now beyond the power of France to do.

Suez is a miserable place, and scarcely to be called a sea-port; ships cannot approach it within three miles,

nor can fresh water be had within ten. Cosseir is not much better, and is at a very considerable distance from Cairo. There is no timber fit for ship-building nearer than Syria; and that I believe is not suitable for a large class of vessels. Nor are any other maritime stores to be had without a still greater transit. These are essential considerations, because a chief part of the value of Egypt must ever depend on its free intercourse with the eastern seas. This was even the case when it was the granary of Rome, one hundred millions of sesterces being then the annual amount of specie sent to Alexandria for that commerce. To the same source also, far more than to the value of any native products, was its opulence entirely attributable for two or three hundred years antecedently.

It does not seem at all certain that we should interfere with this attempt, were it even executed, beyond, perhaps, the interdiction thenceforward, to every flag but our own, of the navigation of the Red Sea.

But we will suppose the British Government deems it necessary to interpose in a more overt manner. The other small but valuable and cherished colonies of France must at once be at our mercy. We should probably take them forthwith, merely to prevent their becoming receptacles for cruisers, smugglers or privateers. We should then, very possibly, establish at least a depôt in the island of Cyprus, and from thence communicate with, and assist the native chiefs on the adjoining shores with a flotilla, towards the prosecution of their desultory, but annoying, efforts against the eastern flank of the invaders. One or two sloops of war within the Straits of Babelmandel, would then hermetically shut them up on the other side.

And after blockading the ports of the Delta, it would be optional with us to send ten thousand Seapoys from Bombay, to the western shore of the Gulf, to afford a nucleus for the Egyptian operations on the Upper Nile. Mehemet Ali is a man of financial resource, and might not probably object to defray the expense. This force we could with ease keep up to its complement from the Malabar coast.

These arrangements made, we might choose our own time for more energetic steps. That need not be until the enemy were thoroughly wasted and dispirited by endemical diseases, long and harassing marches, and a predatory indecisive warfare. A small British force would then probably be sufficient to wind up the affair.

But let it be granted that, in order to commit France,—the Russian envoy at Paris guarantees that his master will provide England with sufficient occupation elsewhere, and thus prevent her giving any disturbance to the occupation of Egypt,—in that case, Russia must have gained possession of Constantinople, or be close upon it.

But what will be the result to France? Whatever European power is established on the Bosphorus will soon, probably, gain a footing on the coasts of Asia Minor; and that European power which has a footing in Asia Minor, must eventually command the mouths of the Nile, from Rhodes, for instance, even independently of the route by Syria.

Thus, after perhaps eight or ten years of a heavy and onerous expenditure, and after having created establishments, just then about to yield a return, France would be compelled, according to all fair calculation, to relinquish her conquest. A single glance at the map will satisfy the reader on this point.

As long as Russia shall be within reach of Egypt with a superior army—or England is in a capacity to send thither a superior fleet, France cannot hope to maintain herself in that country.

QUERY.—Since it is clear that, after the destruction of their fleet, the French were inevitably entrapped in Egypt,—what might have been the consequence, if we had *postponed* our expedition thither, and sent instead twenty thousand men to assist the Austrians in Piedmont, or disembarked them on the reverse of the French Piedmontese army—or on the shores of Brittany—or Flanders—or Holland? The Directorial government, then suffering humiliations both at home and abroad, was at the last stage of impotency!—Might not this additional weight, opportunely thrown into the opposite scale, have so precipitated their fall, and possibly the erection of a stronger executive in their place, before the escape of Napoleon from Africa, and so precluded his assumption of the Consulate? Our then small acquaintance with the principles of military policy, and the feebly concerted schemes of action consequent on it, not only contributed to defeat the best combinations of the Cabinet, but probably cost the nation, not *tens*—but *hundreds of millions*!

In a military or political point of view, the expedition to Egypt was wild, visionary, baseless, unsound. But personally considered, it was well calculated to spread abroad through the world the fame of the Hero, whose sword was destined ere long to shiver in pieces so many sceptres; and whose genius was then all fervid and creative. Accordingly, it was impossible to execute this

part of the plan more comprehensively, more consummately. He was himself a skilful statesman,—this he had proved in Italy. As a chief, no military man could then remotely compare with him. To the brilliancy of arms was added the still higher lustre of letters. The scene was laid upon classic ground,—untrodden in modern times,—and illustrated by stupendous vestiges of antiquity. Thus was the enterprise surrounded with all the splendour and eclat which it is well possible to conceive. Descending, however, to examine it technically, its consequence sinks very much in estimation.

The sea was the base of this operation, and that was in our possession. He could have no communication with his own country or derive resources from it. Even if he had been able to conquer Syria, conciliate the Ara'bs, and plant his eagles beyond the Tigris, he would still have had the Turks in rear of his left flank, and ourselves in the Persian Gulf, on the reverse of his right.

How different, and how distinctly more scientific was the proceeding of Alexander! The latter declined hazarding himself in the interior of Asia, till all was secure in his rear. Not content with the Hellespont as a base,—nor even yet with the achievement of signal victories in the field, he first extends his line of support to the Nile,—conquers all the intermediate shores and sea ports,—*established his maritime superiority*,—then, and not till then, he commences his forward movement into the centre of the enemy's dominions.

But the Memoirs of Napoleon boldly justify the policy of the measure. "The army," it is therein stated, "which was to change the destiny of India, was to march from the Nile." . . . . . "The conquest of this

province would have produced the ruin of all the English establishments in America, and the peninsula of the Ganges." . . . . . And eventually, " the *Mediterranean would have become a French lake.*"

In a previous part, however, of the same volume, there is an acknowledgment of a very different tendency.

" But the FRENCH FLEET BEING DESTROYED, the Divan took courage and ventured to declare war against France. THE ARMY LOST A GRAND SUPPORT; its position in Egypt was totally changed, and Napoleon was obliged to renounce the hope of establishing the French power permanently in the East, by the results of the expedition to Egypt." *Here, in fact, is a complete avowal of the entire fallacy of the original design. A fleet then that could successfully keep the sea against ours, was essential to the expedition. But this, all the world knew, France did not possess, even before the astounding disaster of Aboukir. The moment we discovered where the French fleet was, its utility to their army was at end. In action or destruction were thenceforward the only alternatives.*

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NOTE III.—*Maritime Prospects—Russian Peasantry—*  
*Count Strogonoff.*

THE following is from a most sufficient authority \* on the subject referred to—namely, the advantages of the Euxine towards creating a navy, amongst which are enumerated,

“ Every description of coast, depth of water, and variety of currents. It has been well observed (says the writer,) that the country which possesses the greatest line of coast must ever prove superior in point of seamen. Now, including the seven hundred and eighty-six miles, the length of the Black Sea and that of Asof, it must be remembered that the extent of coast, without regarding sinuosities, is at least one thousand six hundred miles, nearly all the trade of which would soon fall into the hands of Russia; for the Turks, from indolence and natural aversion to the sea, would soon abandon it to them. No other nation, supposing all restrictions were abolished†, would ever be able to compete with them, on account of the easy rate at which the Russians could build, fit, and sail their vessels, the empire producing within itself every necessary article for both building and equipment at an extraordinary low price, and in the greatest abundance, while the natives are accustomed to live on the hardest

\* An evidently unbiassed and conscientious adherence to fact rendering him one of the safest to quote from, not only on maritime affairs, but concerning Russia generally.

† The author is contemplating merely the freedom of the Bosphorus for the merchant ships of Russia—not the capture of Constantinople.

fare . . . Indeed when I survey the maritime resources of this great Empire, I cannot persuade myself that Russia is not destined to become a great naval and commercial power." And again—"it is impossible to say how soon such an alteration might be effected, particularly when we consider the acknowledged docility of temper, which all the common natives possess."—JONES, (Capt. R.N.) 1827.

"In 1821, there was a revolt of from five to seven thousand peasants in this neighbourhood, (Taganrog) who suffered the greatest hardships and privation, before a military force could subdue them; many died from want, and many afterwards by the knout. It is doubtful, if this ever reached the Emperor's ears; at all events it has been most carefully concealed from the rest of the empire."—*Ibid.*

"But truth is too deeply entrenched and veiled, for even his imperial exertions to explore; and he returns to his capital fatally impressed with an assurance that all is going on well and contentedly, when perhaps it is not too much to say, that more abuse and discontent reign in his dominions, and amongst his fifty-three millions of subjects, than in all the rest of Europe put together, with this dangerous and remarkable difference, that the abuses are nearly open to every body except himself, while the discontent is silent and smothered. The latter, I fear, will be the case only for a short time, and the flame, whenever it does burst, will be most fatal in its effects, perhaps devouring without remorse, that which ought to be most sacred and respected."—*Ibid.*

"Emissaries of every description had long been at work in the Morea, principally from Russia, amongst others a set generally known by the title of philosophers."—*Ibid.*

“ It is a curious but well-known fact, that Strogonoff did all in his power to get the Turks to insult him, and frequently wrote to Odessa of his thorough confidence, that they would give cause of war by their conduct towards him. These letters were openly read or communicated to the public; the last had these remarkable words, ‘ I confidently expect my next will be dated from the Seven Towers.’ But to his surprise and mortification, the Turks told him he might depart if he pleased, for they were determined to hold no more communication with him as ambassador from an emperor, who, they were convinced, had never authorized his conduct, and, as they had no quarrel with Russia, they would not offer her any insult in his person.”—*Ibid.*

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**NOTE IV.—On the Feasibility of an Invasion of India.**

**THERE** is now no time for entering on the question of a movement of a Russian corps upon the northern frontier of India; the result to be anticipated from which, would, at least in the first instance, consist rather in the injury inflicted upon the British power, than in any direct benefit to the assailants.

The tract from Orenburg\* to the Aral Sea, though not formally annexed to the Russian empire, is, for the most part, completely under its sway. Many of the chiefs of the Kirghis acknowledge, even by treaty, the Czar's supremacy. Their feebleness compels them to seek a protector. The population is small and without union or strength.

A very considerable commerce is carried on by caravans between Orenburg and Khiva, Samarcand, &c. The property of the country consists in cattle, camels and horses. The latter are in droves of thousands together.

If one were to judge by the common geographical maps, we should consider this part of Tartary as almost wholly desert. But this term is used in numerous instances, in a generic sense, and by no means invariably infers sterility. Were it so, the immense stock of this country could not exist. In short, the means of trans-

\* Orenburg communicates by the Ural with the Caspian. It is fortified, and particularly well supplied with artillery, as all the posts are, on that remote frontier.

port are here more abundant than in any part of the world. From the Gulf of Koltouk, on the Caspian, is the point, from whence the Russians generally go to Bokhara and Khiva. But between the Gulf of Mertvoy and the western shore of the Aral, is not above one hundred miles.

Attock, on the Indus, may be considered as a sort of central point between the *Mouths* of the *Ganges* and the *Oxus*, although the distances are not equal. I should suppose the embouchure of the latter may be 1000 miles\* from the Indus, that of the former 1400. The Oxus is navigable to within about the same distance from the Indus that the Ganges is. And Herat, Bokhara, and Samarcand are as good, if not more advantageous intermediary stations, than any between Delhi and Attock. The first sentence in the following passage from Sir William Ouseley has been already inserted elsewhere.

“In all the regions of the earth,” says he, “there is not a more flourishing or a more delightful country than this, especially the district of Bokhara. If a person stand on the Kohendis (or ancient castle) of Bokhara, and cast his eyes around, he shall not see any thing but beautiful and luxuriant verdure on every side of the country; so that he would imagine the green of the earth and the azure of the heavens were united; and as there are green fields in every quarter, so there are villas interspersed among the green fields. The Sogd, for eight days journey, is all delightful country, afford-

\* “The operations were on so vast a scale (our last in India, 1818,) that some of the corps, directed to a common centre and object, had been moved from stations distant not less than twelve hundred miles from each other.”—Lord HASTINGS.

ing fine prospects, and full of gardens and orchards, and villages, corn fields and villas, running streams, reservoirs and fountains, both on the right hand and on the left. You pass from corn fields into rich meadows and pasture lands; and the straits of Sogd are the finest in the world."

"It must be obvious," says the Marquis of Hastings, "that should any European potentate aim at the subversion of the British Establishment in India, it would not be with so absurdly extravagant a hope, as the succeeding to a similar domination. To reduce Britain's strength, by depriving her of such sinews as India affords, would be the purpose; and the course which would suggest itself for effecting it, would be the exciting some powerful sentiment in India against us."

"As to attack from abroad, (says the same noble writer,) the intention must be long previously discovered, so that India could not be found unprepared."

This seems by no means certain. Let the Russians construct large boats on the Aral, opposite the Gulf of Mertvoy. Then the troops might sail from the vicinity of Moscow and of Orenburg to the Caspian, &c., and before their destination was known at Calcutta, the columns, with their attendant flotilla, might have nearly arrived at Samarcand, and the other points of rendezvous.

Again, states the late Governor-General,—“Though Oude had not any army, since our subsidiary force supplies the place of one for the defence and interior regulation of the country, that territory required careful attention in a military view. The country contains at least six millions of inhabitants, every adult male of whom is provided with arms, and habituated to the use

of them. The force, however irregular, capable to be thence collected in the rear of the army with which we were meeting the invader on the frontier, was a subject not be revolved without anxiety. *The knowledge of an insurrection behind them to an extent which could not be ascertained*, as our communication with the lower provinces would be precarious and interrupted, if not wholly cut off, would unavoidably agitate the minds, and diminish the confidence of the advanced troops." So writes this able military chief, as well as civil administrator, who was as well versed in the affairs of his government as most men who ever held that office.

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NOTE V.—*On the Commercial Routes to India.*

It is, I believe, a received opinion, that the discontinuance of the overland trade with India, by Egypt and Asia Minor, is exclusively attributable to the ascertained superiority of the transit by sea round the Cape. Now this, both in time and fact, is incorrect. Thirty years previously to this event, the last remnant of general commerce in western and central Asia, was put an end to by the Turks. No competition could exist, and, therefore, no superiority could have been ascertained.

Of the advantage, however, with regard to all heavy goods, no one will be disposed to doubt; at least for the extreme north-western markets. And it is also quite

true, that under the state in which the countries alluded to still continue, the transport of even more portable descriptions of merchandise by sea must yet be the best and most commodious manner of carrying on the trade. But it is not unessential to observe, that as yet it is entirely unproved how this matter might be, in regard to the lighter and more valuable articles of interchange, were good order, the safety of caravans, and security of property in every respect established in the provinces lying contiguous to the Persian seas, the Euxine and the Mediterranean.

The caravan routes from Trebisonde and Aleppo to the Tigris and Euphrates will probably be found, on examination, to be preferable to that through Egypt. Nevertheless the latter was the one solely in use at the time of Vasco de Gama's voyage,—the others having been long impassable, and in effect put a stop to, as before stated. Besides which, the Turks had already closed the Black Sea against every European flag;—making little or no use of it themselves:—and so it has actually continued even up to very recent years,—and even then with only partial, precarious, and capricious intermissions.

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NOTE VI.—*Relating to the Russian Invasion  
of 1812.*

GENERAL LOYD is generally esteemed by professional men, as one of the ablest military writers of modern times. There is in his works, published about fifty years ago, the following passage.

“Smolenskow is fortified, but not so as to be able to make any considerable resistance; this is the most important point on all the Russian frontiers; it is only two hundred miles from Moscow, through which the communication between Petersburg and the southern provinces passes; BY OCCUPYING MOSCOW, THE EMPIRE IS OVERTURNED. It was through this pass the Poles always entered Russia, and for a long series of years contended with success with the Russians, and even set up an impostor on the throne of that empire.”

As this work is in the hands of all military men, it seems not impossible that the above passage may have had some influence on the operations of 1812. But it referred to a period when the power of the Russian government was far less extensive, as well as less consolidated.

“If Charles the Twelfth, (says the same writer) being master of Poland, instead of going to Pultowa, had taken Smolenskow, and from thence advanced to Moscow, a victory would have given him that important place, and for some time the empire.”

The next sentence is prophetic.—“He could not, however, have preserved it while connected with Sweden, for the same reasons that he could not preserve his pro-

vinces on the Baltic; one unfortunate event, which must finally happen at such an *immense distance*, would necessarily have ruined him."

The following does not so well tally with results.

"Moreover," he says, "the mountains of Caucasus, which run from the Sea of Asoph to the Caspian, present so many difficulties, that neither (Russia nor Persia) can make war beyond them."

We have seen the contrary, but under great embarrassment.

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NOTE VII.—*The Principalities.*

"THE natural richness, and the various resources of Wallachia and Moldavia, are such, that if those countries could enjoy the important advantages of a regular government and a wise administration, under which industry and agriculture should receive their due encouragement, the trade of exports laid open, the commercial intercourse with foreign nations set upon a proper footing, and, finally, the mines explored, they would in a short time become the most populous and most flourishing provinces of Europe. The harbour of Galatz would stand in rivalry with all the ports of the Black Sea, not excepting Odessa.

"The fertility of the soil is such as to procure nourishment for ten times the number of the present population, and leave wherewith to supply other countries besides;

the common return of cultivation being sixteen fold, and in more favourable seasons twenty-five."—WILKINSON'S 'Wallachia'—the best and most complete account of those provinces.

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NOTE VIII.—*Extract from the Turkish Military Treatise before quoted, written by the Ottoman Minister of State, Tshlebi-Effendi, about twenty years ago, relative to an Attack on Constantinople, by taking possession of the Reservoirs, in the Forests of Domousdéré, and suspending the course of the Waters to the Capital.*

"IN the city called Petersburg, which is the residence of the Russian sovereign, are to be found men of all nations. Among these was a certain infidel, formerly an Ottoman rayah, but fixed, by his employments, in the Russian states, a man extremely rich, and a complete master of the art of deceit, acute and lively in speech, and devoid of shame and modesty.

"This man, who was at that time become an ambassador, said one day to the sovereign, in a familiar society of Franks, 'Why should you give yourself the trouble of carrying on long and obstinate wars with the Ottomans? If your design be to take Constantinople, why should you, by carrying on operations on the land side, struggle with so many difficulties? Nothing is more easy than the capture of Constantinople.' On the sovereign's desiring to know which was this easy method, the

wicked person answered as follows :— ‘ The *Cralyā* (Empress) having formerly carried on two or three successful wars, and possessed herself of the kingdom of the Crimea, equipped a fleet on the Black Sea, and after annihilating the Tartar nation, and taking many forts and castles, reduced to her obedience the rayahs of the White Sea (Archipelago) and many trading communities : it would be easy, by following up a certain plan, to accomplish in two days the conquest of Constantinople, which need only be attacked by a single streight.’ The *Cralyā*, pleased with this suggestion, said, ‘ If you prove yourself useful in rendering me that service, I will appoint you King of Constantinople for the term of your life, in the same way that I appointed a king over the country of Poland.’ The person then spoke again thus :— ‘ None of all the Ottoman troops are now ready to take the field : those of Anatolia are employed in cultivating the land and smoking their pipes ; such as inhabit Constantinople are either busied in carrying on various trades, or at least are not subject to any good discipline. Were they to assemble troops with the greatest possible expedition, they would require at least a month for that purpose. Behold, the water used for drinking in so great a city, comes from certain reservoirs which are without it. It is not, therefore, expedient for us to carry on a troublesome war with ships and troops by sea and by land. We need only dispatch to the Crimea all the Russian ships that are in the White Sea, and there, filling with troops all our vessels, large and small, we will disembark them suddenly without the channel of the Black Sea, in the district that contains the reservoirs, the walls of which we will beat down with our cannon and destroy. In one

hour this may be effected. On the waters running out, the consequence will be a great tumult at Constantinople, the news being everywhere spread that the Russians have destroyed the reservoirs of water; that they are about to assault Constantinople with all their forces; and that their ulterior projects are not known. In the space of one day, the want of water will produce confusion among them, which will be augmented by our zealous partisans of the Greek nation. The troops which are in Constantinople, instead of marching immediately against us, will pillage the public treasures, and those of their emperor, ministers, and rich men; and putting their booty hastily on board such boats and vessels as they find at hand, will endeavour to fly to Anatolia and elsewhere. The residue of the inhabitants, who remain at Constantinople, being left to themselves in this calamity, and overwhelmed with astonishment, having no water to bake bread, or to drink, will, in the course of two days, be reduced to the last extremity. So that the Russian troops, gradually advancing and entering the city, will make themselves entire masters of it.'

"The Sublime government having received intelligence of this conversation, and of the decision taken in consequence of it, the infernal treachery of the aforesaid wicked person seemed really to have conceived a feasible project. Water sleeps, an enemy is sleepless. It is especially to be considered, that the distance from the peninsula of the Crimea to the channel of the Black Sea, is such, that a ship may cross it without altering a sail; and whatever confidence we may place in our own strength, yet, God forbid that so cunning an enemy should find us in an unguarded posture; particularly since we are instructed

by the example of so many States, that owed their loss of reputation and ruin to the want of care in observing the machinations of their enemies, and in neglecting to provide in proper time efficient troops and military stores. From this source their calamities have arisen, as is written and set forth, as well in other histories, as in that which treats of the misfortune of the Sublime Person, who has received the mercy of God, and of the peace which he concluded. The Russian infidels having withal greatly improved the state of their dominions within the space of seventy or eighty years, and manifested their thirst of glory by their arrogant and insolent interference in the interior affairs of other States, and having annexed several foreign countries to their own dominions; especially the kingdom of Poland, we must not, by any means, consider ourselves secure from so treacherous and deceitful a nation. Besides all this, the upright and provident ministers of the Sublime Government, who are aware of the evil designs of the enemy, having represented to the Emperor, (who is at the summit of power, and inhabits the mansions of wisdom and understanding,) that if such an attempt as that suggested to the Cralyä by the before-mentioned reprobate, should actually take place against the reservoirs, (which God forbid !) as there has been no care taken to provide either money or troops, it would be utterly impossible to dispatch with expedition against the enemy forces that were under no discipline, or to repulse them with such soldiers; and that the people of the Empire of Islam, reposing entirely on the protection of Providence, would not make the least resistance. That therefore, as it was a maxim established that in an urgent case, when some remedy must be sought, resources

must be found in the whole body of those who are attached to government, without consulting the lower orders; there was no other method of dispelling and removing the danger we have spoken of above, but by keeping a body of troops on foot ready for service. It was also taken into consideration, that even if the description of force required for the purpose really existed at Constantinople; yet in case of any danger arising on the side of the reservoirs, in the way we have mentioned, (which Heaven forbid!) as the intelligence must be conveyed from thence to Constantinople, and as the troops must assemble, it would require five days at least before they could reach their destination. May God protect and guard us! 'The serpent kills a man in Egypt whilst the Teryac is coming from Venice,' as the proverb says."

THE END.


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
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
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